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PREFACE.

The present publication deals with problems of modern mass communication. It is the outcome of collaboration between the Institute of Social Research and Columbia University's Office of Radio Research. As a result of frequent exchanges of views between members of the two institutions, many specific questions have arisen concerning the interaction between critical theory and empirical research. It is impossible to do justice to this whole problem within the scope of a single issue. We consider it possible, however, to present examples of an approach especially aware of the necessity to integrate theoretical thinking with empirical analysis. The essays that follow should be read as such examples.

It gives us great satisfaction that for the first time some of our ideas have been applied to specifically American subject matters and introduced into the American methodological debate. We feel particularly indebted to Paul F. Lazarsfeld who has taken categories developed by us in a totally different, highly abstract context, and attempted to present them in terms of the concrete desiderata confronting today's social research.

MAX HORKHEIMER.

New York City
April 1941

Remarks on Administrative and Critical Communications Research.

By Paul Felix Lazarsfeld.

During the last two decades the media of mass communication, notably radio, print and film, have become some of the best-known and best documented spheres of modern society. Careful studies have revealed the size of the audiences of all major radio programs and the composition of this audience in respect to sex, income, and a few other criteria. The circulations of newspapers and magazines are recorded by specially organized research outfits, and others report currently on which magazine stories and which advertisements are read week by week. Books, radio programs, and movies are tested as to the difficulty of the language they use and as to how adequate they are for the different educational levels of the population. The types of entertainment that different groups of people prefer are being investigated all the time, and many promotional campaigns are tested currently as to their success. A number of important new techniques have been developed in the course of all these research efforts. Modern sampling techniques, for instance, have made great progress because it has been realized that the practical value of a study would be lost if it were conducted among a group of people who are not representative of those sections of the population which the sponsoring agency wants to reach. Interviewing techniques have been greatly refined for similar reasons. The competitive character of much of this work has led to ever better methods of recording facts as to the extent of listening and reading. Where a subject matter doesn't lend itself to simple recording devices, great progress has been made in developing indices for complex attitudes and reactions.¹

Behind the idea of such research is the notion that modern media of communication are tools handled by people or agencies for given purposes. The purpose may be to sell goods, or to raise the intellectual standards of the population, or to secure an understanding of governmental policies, but in all cases, to someone who

¹For a general orientation in the field see Douglas Waples, *What Reading Does to People*, University of Chicago Press, 1940 and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Radio and the Printed Page*, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1940. For more current and specific information the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, published by the Princeton University Press, is the best source of articles and bibliography.

uses a medium for something, it is the task of research to make the tool better known, and thus to facilitate its use.

As a result, all communications research centers around a standard set of problems. Who are the people exposed to the different media? What are their specific preferences? What are the effects of different methods of presentation? One who uses media of communication is in competition with other agencies whose purposes are different, and thus research must also keep track of what is communicated by others. Finally, communications research has to be aware that the effect of radio, print, or the movie, does not end with the purposive use which is made of it by administrative agencies. If advertisers, for example, feel that radio is an especially powerful selling device, then printed media will receive less money, and research will have to see whether radio brings about a general deterioration of the reading habits of the population.

Studies of this kind are conducted partly by the major publishing organizations and radio networks and partly by academic agencies supported by universities or foundations.¹ Considerable thought has been given during the past years to clarifying the social and political implications of this new branch of social research. Its relationship to the present crisis is very interestingly discussed in a new study by Harold Lasswell.² One who has not participated in work of this kind can get a good picture of its atmosphere from a "fable" written by participants in the course of a series of discussions which took place during 1939 and 1940. We quote:

"In the interests of concreteness, let us attempt to state the job of research in mass communication in a situation which, though purely hypothetical, serves to illustrate what that job involves.

"Let us suppose that government leaders and those responsible for mass communication are in agreement with respect to policy toward alien groups in this country. The public, they believe, should be made aware of the dangers of subversive activities on the part of aliens, but popular antipathy toward aliens in general should be minimized, and, above all, outbreaks of anti-alien sentiment should be avoided. The policy that the channels of mass communication must serve, then, becomes one of increasing public awareness of specific dangers of subversive action, while, at the same time, building tolerance toward aliens in general.

¹Among the universities, the University of Chicago Library School and the University of Minnesota Journalism School are especially active in the field of communications research. Organizations doing similar work with foundation funds are the Adult Education Association, the American Film Center, the Columbia University Office of Radio Research, the Library of Congress and the Princeton Public Opinion Research Project. In the magazine field, *Life* and *McCall's* are currently publishing valuable information. Material on radio can best be obtained through the research directors of the Columbia Broadcasting System and the National Broadcasting Company.

²Harold Lasswell, *Democracy Through Public Opinion*. George Banta Publishing Co. 1941.

"Suppose that some popular evening radio program, known to attract a considerable portion of the total listening audience, includes an address dealing with the dangers of subversive activities on the part of aliens. The explicit intention of the speaker, of his sponsors, and of the stations which carry the program is simply to further the policy outlined above by drawing attention to dangers to which the country should be alive. News dispatches of the next day or two, however, bring reports from various parts of the country of outbreaks of feeling against alien groups. Reports of local utterances in connection with these outbreaks carry allusions to the broadcast address of the evening. As a result, there is at least a strong suspicion that some connection exists between them and what was said on the evening broadcast.

"Suppose, too, that those responsible for the original address decide that they are likewise responsible for doing something to repair the damage which they quite innocently caused. This decision takes on new importance as the network involved receives from the Federal Communications Commission a request for the text of the address. Conscientious effort to repair the damage, it is clear, involves learning more of what the damage was. The comment it occasioned in the press makes clear that its effects were felt not through the radio alone, but through reports of the unfortunate address which the newspapers carried, in the local utterances which alluded to it, and even in some widely distributed newsreel reports of the local outbreaks that followed. What people then must be reached if the untoward effects of the broadcast are to be remedied?

"What were those effects and precisely what in the broadcast address provoked them? Clearly the broadcast was not alone responsible. Something in what was said evidently combined with the predispositions of the listeners and with the current circumstances—with the force of events, and probably with other widely disseminated communications—to set the stage for what ensued.

"Recognizing these questions as basic in any conscientious effort to repair the damage, those responsible set about to get them answered. Each station which carried the address is asked immediately to dispatch to network headquarters all the evidence that can be gathered on the attention it attracted in the area of the station's coverage—newspaper reports of the address itself, editorials and speeches referring to it, reports of the outbreaks that ensued, newsreel treatments of them, etc. Each station too, is asked to assign the best qualified members of its staff to interviewing listeners to determine as best they can what in the address led to the unanticipated outbreaks. Particularly are they urged to have their interviewers talk with individuals who took an active part in the outbreaks in question. Some of the stations, concerned to do their part, enlist the help of competent specialists from nearby universities to study more intensively the predispositions of individuals who were most aroused by the address, and to attempt to discover what other circumstances combined with the address to make them act as they did. The interviewing organization of one of the national polls is also brought into play to study similarly a cross-section of the country's population sure to comprise both listeners who were affected and not affected by the broadcast, and some as well whom it did not reach at all, directly or indirectly.

"As reports come in from all these inquiries, a new picture of the situation takes shape. To the surprise of the speaker, his sponsors, and the net-

work, what seemed innocent references to the few aliens believed to be engaged in subversive activities were taken by listeners to apply both to aliens generally and to hyphenates from countries thought hostile to American interests and traditions. Some of the individual interviews and the poll reports show an equally surprising attitude of general hostility toward these groups. Some of them specifically allude to what are taken to be racial traits of the group involved, others to specific individuals of the group who are in business competition with the informants. Still others mention seemingly authentic reports of Fifth Column activities in conquered European countries; and a considerable number refer to purported activities of this kind in the United States and in South America. Clearly, the stage was set on the evening of the broadcast for what actually happened both by the general psychological predisposition of listeners, and by the force of recent events.

"All this, of course, clearly contributed to the unusual attention this particular broadcast received—on the part of the radio audience, through the press dispatches which reported it, in the newsreels, and through the local utterances which ensued. Curiously too, the program in which the address was included on this particular evening had a larger audience than usual. Its rating on that evening, as reported by audience research agencies, jumped substantially from its customary level. To be sure, the inclusion of this particular address had been announced in advance, and by coincidence on this particular evening another popular program ordinarily broadcast at the same time, had gone off the air for the summer. This other program, it was generally assumed, appealed more to less educated listeners, with the apparent result that the audience for this address included, perhaps for the first time, more listeners of lower educational status—a supposition confirmed by a breakdown of audience research figures in terms of socio-economic status and by a check of the ratings of other programs broadcast at the same hour, none of which rose above their usual rating and some of which showed a marked decline.

"How to repair the damage done thus becomes more problematical than had at first appeared. Obviously, another address to counteract the one which had caused the damage would not be sufficient. Comparable announcements of it might of course again attract to the program much the same audience as the week before. But, it is pointed out, there is no reason to assume that the predispositions of listeners or the force of circumstances would again lead them to depart from their ordinary listening habits. Furthermore, there is no assurance, for much the same reasons, that a counter-acting address would occasion equal attention in the press or in local utterances. Finally, the original speaker is undoubtedly now firmly identified, in the minds of listeners, with the views on alien and hyphenate groups attributed to him as a result of his earlier address. Would another address by him change that identification? What, then, can be done?

"In the face of this problem comes the suggestion that outside advice should be had. Unless this broadcast is to go down in record as the beginning of a destructive wave of feeling against all aliens and hyphenates and thus utterly defeat the interest which prompted it, any remedial measures have to be most carefully planned. Who is there who can contribute to a better understanding of what happened, and who to suggest what might be done by way of remedy?

"Suppose at this point help is sought from a social psychologist known to have been studying anti-minority feeling. When he is called in, it appears that he has for sometime been recording and analyzing whatever appears in the press, the radio, motion pictures, or in public utterances that seem to have a bearing on the subject. He points out that this is not an isolated episode, but rather, one more in a development which he had for some time been following. Just such anti-minority feeling had been developing in the country over a period of years. The growth of anti-Semitic sentiment in this country had been well recognized, and now the same feelings seemed to be shifting to other scapegoats.

"According to his analysis, the recent flow of mass communication had reflected this general trend. The term 'Fifth Column,' obscurely used in the Spanish Civil War, had had wide currency. In fact, the Allies had missed few opportunities to emphasize the concept, as, for example, in their use of Major Quisling's name. At the same time, reports of Fifth Column activities in the other conquered countries had been coming through, supported in still more recent times by revelations of similar activities in South America. Thus, strong pro-Ally feeling in this country, supported by the growing predisposition to fear and feel hostility toward minority groups, led to the over-generalization of the remarks made in the broadcast address.

"Such feelings, the specialist might go on to point out, would be less restrained among less educated and less self-conscious groups. Furthermore, these groups in his opinion would be less likely to respond to any intellectual appeal that might be devised to counteract the effect of the earlier talk. This, he advises, must be kept in mind as remedial measures are planned. In fact, he is in doubt as to what any single remedial effort can accomplish. Rather, since the talk in question was no isolated example, remedial effort must take into account all the other factors in current mass communication which tend, as he sees it, to arouse just such anti-minority feeling. To repair the damage, he points out, it is necessary to determine who must be reached, not only in terms of geographical coverage, but in psychological terms as well. His final advice at this stage is therefore to turn to another specialist who has studied both the geographical and psychological composition of the audience reached by various types of mass communication.

"This specialist, when called in, readily confirms from his own observations that the program on the night in question reached an audience psychologically different from that it usually attracted. To reach that audience necessitates in his opinion close attention to the listening, reading, movie-going habits of the part of the population affected by the original broadcast. He knows in general the characteristics of each of these audiences and the types of listening, reading, and films which ordinarily attract them. His studies, too, give him some basis for predicting how any given group will respond to a given type of program, though he would need to verify prediction by a careful check on the effects which resulted from the particular address in question. He also knows that the same message conveyed by different media, to reach the audience desired, would have to stress different aspects of the subject which are especially appropriate for the medium in question. If the counteracting measures planned are to be really remedial, he would strongly suggest some pre-testing of the responses which they actually evoke. He would propose, therefore, that any remedial measures should be tried out in advance on a relatively small but typical sample of the popula-

tion, and that a study of their responses be made as a basis for possible modifications before an attempt is made to reach any wider public.

"Thus, with the help of these and other specialists, the job begins. Agreed as it is that the possibility of unintended effects must be avoided, the advice of these specialists is followed. There is no need here to attempt to suggest the nature of what is done, but only to indicate how research in mass communication might contribute to the result. With the help of specialists in such research, the audience originally affected is redetermined. Types of radio programs, press releases, and newsreel treatments are worked out, calculated on the basis of the best evidence available to get a new hearing for the subject, adequate to counter the effects of the original address. Undoubtedly an explanation would be prepared for delivery by the original speaker, but other speakers would be enlisted whose position and identification in the public mind are likely to make their parts most widely influential. All materials prepared are pre-tested as had been suggested and at relatively slight expense—indeed, far less expense, proportionately, than merchandisers ordinarily incur in testing the market for new products. Conscientious effort having taken them so far, those responsible agree in wishing now to have some further test of the actual effects of what they have planned by way of remedy. Accordingly, arrangements are made in advance of their campaign to gauge its progress.

"A happy ending to this fable can probably take the form of a series of charts which subsequently ease the conscience of all concerned by showing, as their campaign proceeds, a consistent decline in all indices of overt hostility toward the groups against which outbreaks of feeling were directed.

"If the fable has a moral, too, that perhaps may come when all concerned, in the relief that follows in their success, philosophize a bit on their experience. The original speaker, the sponsors, and the broadcasters are still convinced of their initial innocence. But they are plagued a bit by certain recollections. One of them remembers, for example, suggesting extra publicity for the broadcast on the ground that the address to be included was particularly timely. Another recalls that the topic of the address was suggested by an acquaintance prominent in an organization which presumably on patriotic grounds had for some time been advocating stricter control of aliens in the country. In the end, their feeling is that however innocent their conscious purposes, they too, as Americans of their time, shared the same predispositions in planning the broadcast, and responded to the force of the same circumstances, as did the listeners to it. It is well, then, that conscious intention should be checked by more objective standards when instrumentalities are used so powerful in their influence as modern mass communication. Somehow the mere fact that they brought objective standards into play seemed to have sharpened their common sense and made them more wary for the future. If similar research had made them warier at the outset, need all this have happened? Need they have run the risk that the inevitable delays in repairing the damage they had caused made its complete repair impossible? Perhaps, they conclude, in media like radio where "instant rejoinder" is often difficult, more trouble should be taken to avoid mistakes like this.

"This fable, it is recognized, may seem to exaggerate the importance of research in mass communication. Ordinarily, to be sure, common sense, the high standards of the communications industries, and the controls of

legal and administrative regulation have appeared sufficient to assure the use of mass communication in the public interest. Ordinarily, wisdom in that use, it might appear, can be allowed to develop by trial and error and the resulting rules of thumb. A critical situation, like that supposed, admittedly throws into high relief considerations which, though always present, ordinarily seem less urgent. But crisis, as the derivation of the word implies, forces judgment; and a desired solution of the crisis necessitates that judgment shall not be mistaken. The critical situation of our fable, then, rather than exaggerating, perhaps only puts into perspective the consequences of mistaken use of mass communication and the help which research can give in avoiding such mistaken use."

Research of the kind described so far could well be called *administrative research*. It is carried through in the service of some kind of administrative agency of public or private character. Administrative research is subject to objections from two sides. On the one hand, there are the sponsors themselves, some of whom feel that they have not really got their money's worth. One good guess, so the argument goes, is of more practical importance than all the details which might be brought to light by an empirical study. There is, however, a fallacy behind this objection. Although speculation is indispensable for guidance in any kind of empirical work, if honestly carried through it will usually lead to a number of alternative conclusions which cannot all be true at the same time. Which one corresponds to the real situation can be decided only by empirical studies.¹ From another side comes an objection directed against the aims which prevail in the majority of current studies. They solve little problems, generally of a business character, when the same methods could be used to improve the life of the community if only they were applied to forward-looking projects related to the pressing economic and social problems of our time. Robert S. Lynd, in his *Knowledge for What*, has vigorously taken this point of view and has shown many ways whereby research could be made more vital.

Neither of these two arguments doubts that research can and should be done at the service of certain well-defined purposes. But at this point a third argument comes up. The objection is raised that

¹There is a rather suggestive way to overcome the argument of the futility of empirical research. One might, for instance, tell such an opponent that according to studies which have been done people who make up their minds during a political campaign as to how to vote are influenced by very different factors than those who have more permanent political affiliations. The opponent will find that immediately understandable and will say that he could have come to this conclusion by using good common sense. It so happens that the opposite is true and that it is possible to predict to a high degree the vote of originally undecided people by means of the same characteristics which describe people with actual party affiliations. There are many other examples by which common sense first can be led to conclusions which then are proved by actual data to be incorrect.

one cannot pursue a single purpose and study the means of its realization isolated from the total historical situation in which such planning and studying goes on. Modern media of communication have become such complex instruments that wherever they are used they do much more to people than those who administer them mean them to do, and they may have a momentum of their own which leaves the administrative agencies much less choice than they believe they have. The idea of *critical research* is posed against the practice of administrative research, requiring that, prior and in addition to whatever special purpose is to be served, the general role of our media of communication in the present social system should be studied. The rest of these remarks are devoted to a formulation of this conception and to a short appraisal of its possible contributions to current communication research.

The idea of critical research has been developed in many studies by Max Horkheimer.¹ It seems to be distinguished from administrative research in two respects: it develops a theory of the prevailing social trends of our times, general trends which yet require consideration in any concrete research problem; and it seems to imply ideas of basic human values according to which all actual or desired effects should be appraised.

As to prevailing trends, everyone will agree that we live in a period of increasing centralization of ownership. Yet, although large economic organizations plan their production to the minutest detail, the distribution of their products is not planned systematically. Their success depends upon the outcome of a competition among a few large units which must rally sizeable proportions of the population as their customers. Thus promotion in every form becomes one of the main forces in contemporary society. The technique of manipulating large masses of people is developed in the business world and from there permeates our whole culture. In the end everything, be it good or bad, is promoted; we are living more and more in an "advertising culture." This whole trend is accentuated still more by the fact that it has to disguise itself. A salesman who has only one line to sell has to explain to each customer why this line suits just his individual purposes. The radio announcer who serves one national advertiser identifies himself to millions of listeners as "your" announcer.

¹Cf. especially "Traditional and Critical Theory" in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, VI (1937), pp. 245-295; "Philosophy and Critical Theory" pp. 625-631. The examples used here in presenting the idea of critical social research were taken from studies done by Dr. T. W. Adorno.

Such an analysis becomes an element of strong concern and solicitude if it is felt that these trends impair basic values in human life. The idea that our times are engulfed by a multitude of promotional patterns is coupled with the feeling that human beings, as a result, behave more and more like pawns upon a chessboard, losing the spontaneity and dignity which is the basic characteristic of the human personality. In order to understand clearly the idea of critical research, one must realize that it is being urged by men who have the idea ever present before them that what we need most is to do and think what we consider true and not to adjust ourselves to the seemingly inescapable.

The theory of a trend toward promotional culture leads to the conclusion that certain tendencies of our time jeopardize basic human values because people are kept from developing their own potentialities to the full. To be fit for the daily competition, we do not spend our leisure time developing a rich range of interests and abilities, but we use it, willingly or unwillingly, to reproduce our working capacity. Thus, not having acquired any criteria of our own, we succumb to and support a system of promotion in all areas of life, which, in turn, puts us in ever-increasing dependence upon such a system; it gives us more and more technical devices and takes away from us any valuable purposes for which they could be used.¹

Thus the stage is set for the procedures of critical research. A critical student who analyzes modern media of communication will look at radio, motion pictures, the press, and will ask the following kinds of questions: How are these media organized and controlled? How, in their institutional set-up, is the trend toward centralization, standardization and promotional pressure expressed? In what form, however disguised, are they threatening human values? He will feel that the main task of research is to uncover the unintentional (for the most part) and often very subtle ways in which these media contribute to living habits and social attitudes that he considers deplorable.

What are the operations into which critical communication research could be broken down? The answer is not easy and a first attempt might be made by visualizing how a student would be trained

¹It might help to clarify these ideas by comparing them briefly with other trends of thought, such as the consumer movement on the one hand and propaganda analysis on the other. The consumer movement is concerned with concrete wrongs in current advertising and might even denounce all advertising as economically wasteful. For the critical approach, business advertisement is only one of the many promotional forms by which present society is maintained and its cultural rather than its economic implications are discussed. A similar difference appears in comparison with propaganda analysis. The problem is not that people are misled in regard to certain isolated facts, but that they have less and less opportunity to develop standards of judgment of their own because wherever they turn they are caught by some kind of promotion.

to make observations in everyday life and to try to interpret them in terms of their social meaning. You sit in a movie and look at an old newsreel showing fashions of ten years ago. Many people laugh. Why do those things which we admired just a little while ago seem so ridiculous now? Could it be that we avenge ourselves for having submitted to them under general pressure, and now that the pressure in favor of these particular styles has been lifted, we compensate by deriding the idols of yesteryear? At the same time, we submit to the style-promotion of today only to laugh at it a few years from now. Could it be that by laughing at past submission, we gather strength to submit to the present pressure upon us? Thus, what looks to an ordinary observer like an incident in a movie theater, becomes, from this point of view, a symptom of great social significance.

Or you find that a large brewery advertises its beer by showing a man disgustedly throwing aside a newspaper full of European war horrors while the caption says that in times like these the only place to find peace, strength, and courage is at your own fireside drinking beer. What will be the result if symbols referring to such basic human wants as that for peace become falsified into expressions of private comfort and are rendered habitual to millions of magazine readers as merchandising slogans? Why should people settle their social problems by action and sacrifice if they can serve the same ends by drinking a new brand of beer? To the casual observer the advertisement is nothing but a more or less clever sales trick. From the aspect of a more critical analysis, it becomes a dangerous sign of what a promotional culture might end up with.

A next step in trying to explain this approach could be taken by applying it not only to an observation of daily life, but to problems we meet in textbooks current in the social sciences. A text on the family, for example, would not be likely to contain a detailed analysis showing how one of the functions of the family in our society might be that of maintaining the authoritarian structure necessary for our present economic system, that the predominant position of the father might prepare the child to accept the privations he will suffer as an adult, and to do so without questioning their necessity. Applying this to a study of the family in the depression we might depart from the traditional question of what changes the depression has brought about in family life. Couldn't it be that the family has influenced the depression? Interesting research problems would come up: what was the effect of different family constellations upon people's ability to find out-of-the-way jobs, to use initiative in organizations of unemployed, and so on?

Another example could arise from a well-known observation which can be found in every text on social psychology, to the effect that the way we look at the world and react to the problems of the day is determined by our previous experience. The notion of experience is taken as a psychological concept which does not need much further elucidation. But could it not be that what we call "experience" undergoes historical changes? Visualize what experience meant for a man who lived in a rather stable, small community, reading in his newspaper elaborate accounts of events he considered news because they happened a few weeks before, spending many an hour walking through the countryside, experiencing nature as something eternally changeless, and as so rich that years were needed to observe all its details. Today we live in an environment where skyscrapers shoot up and elevateds disappear overnight; where news comes like shock every few hours; where continually new news programs keep us from ever finding out the details of previous news; and where nature is something we drive past in our car, perceiving a few quickly changing flashes which turn the majesty of a mountain range into the impression of a motion picture. Might it not be that we do not build up experiences the way it was possible to do decades ago, and if so wouldn't that have bearing upon all our educational efforts? Studies of smaller American communities have shown that since the turn of the century there has been a steady decrease of efforts in adult education of the old style. Now radio with its Professor Quiz program brings up new forms of mass education which, in their differences from the old reading and discussion circles, show a striking parallel to the development sketched here.¹

Omitting a number of details and specifications, the "operation" basic to this approach consists of four steps.

- a) A theory about the prevailing trends toward a "promotional culture" is introduced on the basis of general observations. Although efforts are steadily being made to refine and corroborate this theory it is taken for granted prior to any special study.
- b) A special study of any phenomenon consists in determining how it expresses these prevailing trends (introduced in (a)) and in turn contributes to reinforcing them.
- c) The consequences of (b) in stamping human personalities in a modern, industrial society are brought to the foreground

¹ cf. W. Benjamin's study on Baudelaire in this periodical, Vol. VIII (1939-40), p. 50 ff.

and scrutinized from the viewpoint of more or less explicit ideas of what endangers and what preserves the dignity, freedom and cultural values of human beings.

d) Remedial possibilities, if any, are considered.

Before we turn to the value which such an approach can have for the specific field of communications research, it is first necessary to meet an objection to the idea of critical research which may be raised against it on its own ground, to wit, that so much of its effort is spent on what might be called "showing up" things, rather than on fact-finding or constructive suggestions. It must be admitted that being constructive is a rather relative concept, and that the question of what are relevant facts cannot be decided only according to established procedures. The situation is somewhat similar to the wave of criticism which started with the reports of the Royal Commission in the British Parliament and with the English social literature of the Dickens type in the first half of the last century. Then, the task was to discover and to denounce the material cruelties of the new industrial system: child labor, slum conditions, and so on. Not that all these horrors have now been eliminated, but at least there is enough public consciousness of them so that whenever a student finds similar conditions, for instance among migrant workers or sharecroppers, some steps toward improvement are taken. The trend of public opinion and public administration is toward better social conditions. In cultural matters, a similar development has not yet taken place. The examples given above will be taken by many readers as rather insignificant in a field which is not of great practical importance. It might very well be, however, that we are all so busy finding our place in society according to established standards of success that nothing is more important at this moment than to remind ourselves of basic cultural values which are violated, just as it was of decisive historic importance a hundred years ago to remind the English middle classes that they were overlooking the sacrifices which the new strata of industrial laborers underwent when the modern industrial world was built. As Waller has pointed out,¹ the moral standards of tomorrow are due to the extreme sensitiveness of a small group of intellectual leaders of today. A few decades ago the artist who was destined to be the classic of the succeeding generation was left to starve in his own time. Today we are very eager not to overlook any growing talent, and we have fellowships and many other institutions which try to assist the growth of any seed of artistic

¹*The Family*, Dryden Press, 1931.

development. Why should we not learn also to be more hospitable to criticism and find forms in which more patience can be exercised to wait and, in the end, to see what is constructive and what is not.¹

And now for the specific contributions which the idea of critical research can make to the student who is engaged in the administrative research side of the problem. As long as there is so little experience in the actual cooperation of critical and administrative research, it is very difficult to be concrete. One way to put it is to point to the strong intellectual stimulation which derives from such joint efforts. There will be hardly a student in empirical research who does not sometimes feel a certain regret or impatience about the vast distance between problems of sampling and probable errors on the one hand, and the significant social problems of our times on the other. Some have hit upon the solution of making their social interests their private avocation, and keeping that separate from their research procedures, hoping that one day in the future the two will again merge. If it were possible in the terms of critical research to formulate an actual research operation which could be integrated with empirical work, the people involved, the problems treated and, in the end, the actual utility of the work would greatly profit.

Such a vitalization of research might well occur in a variety of forms which can only be exemplified and not stated in a systematic way. Quite likely, for instance, more attention will be given to problems of control. If we study the effects of communication, however fine methods we use, we will be able to study only the effects of radio programs or printed material that is actually being distributed. Critical research will be especially interested in such material as never gets access to the channels of mass communication: What ideas and what forms are killed before they ever reach the general public, whether because they would not be interesting enough for large groups, or because they would not pay sufficient returns on the necessary investment, or because no traditional forms of presentation are available?

Once a program is on the air or a magazine is printed, critical research is likely to look at the content in an original way. A num-

¹ It is quite possible that the radio industry could lead in releasing some of the pressure which, at this time, keeps much social research in conventional forms and cuts it off from expanding into new fields. Already, in the field of politics, the radio industry has proved itself more neutral and more balanced than any other large business institution. The necessity of keeping in touch with the large masses of the population might also make them more amenable to trying methods of research even if, at first, they seem less innocuous. An honest analysis of program contents and program policies might be the first testing ground.

ber of examples are available in the field of musical programs.¹ Serious music on the radio is not unconditionally accepted as good. The promotion of special conductors, which exaggerates the existing differences and detracts from attention to more important aspects of music, is pointed to as another intrusion of an advertising mentality into an educational sphere. The ceaseless repetition of a comparatively small number of recognized "master works" is derived from the necessity to keep public service programs more in line with commercial fare of the radio. From such an analysis concrete suggestions evolve as to how music programs on the radio should be conducted to make them really serve a more widespread music appreciation. A discussion of the social significance and the probable effect of popular music, to which almost 50 per cent of all radio time is given, is also available and so far represents the most elaborate analysis of a type of mass communication from the point of view of critical social research.² Similar studies of printed matter can be made. For instance, what is the significance of the great vogue of biographies during the last decade? A study of their content shows that they all talk in terms of sweeping laws of society, or mankind or the human soul to which every individual is submitted and at the same time point up the unique greatness and importance of the one hero they are treating.³ The success of this kind of literature among middle class readers is taken as an indication that many of them have lost their bearings in regard to their social problems. These biographies reflect a feeling that we are swept by waves of events over which the ordinary human being has no control and which call for leadership by people with super-human abilities. By such analysis anti-democratic implications are carved out in a literary phenomenon which otherwise would not attract the attention of the social scientist.

On the other end, upon studying the actual effects of communications, larger vistas are opened to someone whose observations are influenced by the critical attitude here discussed. To give only one example: We praise the contribution which radio makes by enlarging so greatly the world of each single individual, and undoubtedly the praise is deserved. But is the matter quite so simple? A farmer might be very well equipped to handle all the problems which his

¹See T. W. Adorno, "On a Social Critique of Radio Music," on file at the Office of Radio Research, Columbia University.

²See T. W. Adorno, "On Popular Music," in this issue.

³Such an analysis has been carried through by L. Lowenthal of the Institute of Social Research and is now being extended to the many biographies which are currently appearing in American magazines with mass circulation.

environment brings up, able to distinguish what makes sense and what doesn't, what he should look out for and what is unimportant. Now the radio brings in a new world with new problems which don't necessarily grow out of the listener's own life. This world has a character of magic, where things happen and are invisible at the same time; many listeners have no experience of their own which would help them to appraise it. We know that that sometimes has very disturbing effects, as witnessed by the attitude of women listeners to daytime serials,¹ by the attitude of millions of letter writers who try to interfere with the world of radio without really believing that their efforts will make any difference. It certainly should be worthwhile not to stop at such incidental observations but to see whether people's attitudes toward reality are not more profoundly changed by radio than we usually find with more superficial observations of their daily habits.

Columbia University's Office of Radio Research has cooperated in this issue of *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* because it was felt that only a very catholic conception of the task of research can lead to valuable results. If there is any general rule of thumb in intellectual work it should be the advice never to pass over criticism without exhausting all the constructive possibilities which might be implied in another person's point of view. The present remarks were written for the purpose of clarifying some of the difficulties which were experienced in actually formulating what critical social research consists in and seeing its best place in a scheme of general integration of all efforts. The writer, whose interests and occupational duties are in the field of administrative research, wanted to express his conviction that there is here a type of approach which, if it were included in the general stream of communications research, could contribute much in terms of challenging problems and new concepts useful in the interpretation of known, and in the search for new, data.

¹See the paper of Herta Herzog in this issue.

On Popular Music.

By T. W. Adorno.

With the assistance of George Simpson.

I. THE MUSICAL MATERIAL.

The two spheres of music.

Popular music, which produces the stimuli we are here investigating, is usually characterized by its difference from serious music. This difference is generally taken for granted and is looked upon as a difference of levels considered so well defined that most people regard the values within them as totally independent of one another. We deem it necessary, however, first of all to translate these so-called levels into more precise terms, musical as well as social, which not only delimit them unequivocally but throw light upon the whole setting of the two musical spheres as well.

One possible method of achieving this clarification would be an historical analysis of the division as it occurred in music production and of the roots of the two main spheres. Since, however, the present study is concerned with the actual function of popular music in its present status, it is more advisable to follow the line of characterization of the phenomenon itself as it is given today than to trace it back to its origins. This is the more justified as the division into the two spheres of music took place in Europe long before American popular music arose. American music from its inception accepted the division as something pre-given, and therefore the historical background of the division applies to it only indirectly. Hence we seek, first of all, an insight into the fundamental characteristics of popular music in the broadest sense.

A clear judgment concerning the relation of serious music to popular music can be arrived at only by strict attention to the fundamental characteristic of popular music: standardization.¹ The

¹The basic importance of standardization has not altogether escaped the attention of current literature on popular music. "The chief difference between a popular song and a standard, or serious, song like *Mandalay*, *Sylvia*, or *Trees*, is that the melody and the lyric of a popular number are constructed within a definite pattern or structural form, whereas the poem, or lyric, of a standard number has no structural confinements, and the music is free to interpret the meaning and feeling of the words without following a set pattern or form. Putting it another way, the popular song is 'custom built,' while

(footnote continued on next page)

whole structure of popular music is standardized, even where the attempt is made to circumvent standardization. Standardization extends from the most general features to the most specific ones. Best known is the rule that the chorus consists of thirty-two bars and that the range is limited to one octave and one note. The general types of hits are also standardized: not only the dance types, the rigidity of whose pattern is understood, but also the "characters" such as mother songs, home songs, nonsense or "novelty" songs, pseudo-nursery rhymes, laments for a lost girl. Most important of all, the harmonic cornerstones of each hit—the beginning and the end of each part—must beat out the standard scheme. This scheme emphasizes the most primitive harmonic facts no matter what has harmonically intervened. Complications have no consequences. This inexorable device guarantees that regardless of what aberrations occur, the hit will lead back to the same familiar experience, and nothing fundamentally novel will be introduced.

The details themselves are standardized no less than the form, and a whole terminology exists for them such as break, blue chords, dirty notes. Their standardization, however, is somewhat different from that of the framework. It is not overt like the latter but hidden behind a veneer of individual "effects" whose prescriptions are handled as the experts' secret, however open this secret may be to musicians generally. This contrasting character of the standardization of the whole and part provides a rough, preliminary setting for the effect upon the listener.

The primary effect of this relation between the framework and the detail is that the listener becomes prone to evince stronger reactions to the part than to the whole. His grasp of the whole does not lie in the living experience of this one concrete piece of music he has followed. The whole is pre-given and pre-accepted, even before the actual experience of the music starts; therefore, it is not likely to influence, to any great extent, the reaction to the details,

the standard song allows the composer freer play of imagination and interpretation." (Abner Silver and Robert Bruce, *How to Write and Sell a Song Hit*, New York, 1939, p. 2.) The authors fail, however, to realize the externally super-imposed, commercial character of those patterns which aims at canalized reactions or, in the language of the regular announcement of one particular radio program, at "easy listening." They confuse the mechanical patterns with highly organized, strict art forms: "Certainly there are few more stringent verse forms in poetry than the sonnet, and yet the greatest poets of all time have woven undying beauty within its small and limited frame. A composer has just as much opportunity for exhibiting his talent and genius in popular songs as in more serious music" (pp. 2-3). Thus the standard pattern of popular music appears to them virtually on the same level as the law of a fugue. It is this contamination which makes the insight into the basic standardization of popular music sterile. It ought to be added that what Silver and Bruce call a "standard song" is just the opposite of what we mean by a standardized popular song.

except to give them varying degrees of emphasis. Details which occupy musically strategic positions in the framework—the beginning of the chorus or its reentrance after the bridge—have a better chance for recognition and favorable reception than details not so situated, for instance, middle bars of the bridge. But this situational nexus never interferes with the scheme itself. To this limited situational extent the detail depends upon the whole. But no stress is ever placed upon the whole as a musical event, nor does the structure of the whole ever depend upon the details.

Serious music, for comparative purposes, may be thus characterized:

Every detail derives its musical sense from the concrete totality of the piece which, in turn, consists of the life relationship of the details and never of a mere enforcement of a musical scheme. For example, in the introduction of the first movement of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony the second theme (in C-major) gets its true meaning only from the context. Only through the whole does it acquire its particular lyrical and expressive quality,—that is, a whole built up of its very contrast with the *cantus firmus*-like character of the first theme. Taken in isolation the second theme would be disrobed to insignificance. Another example may be found in the beginning of the recapitulation over the pedal point of the first movement of Beethoven's "Appassionata." By following the preceding outburst it achieves the utmost dramatic momentum. By omitting the exposition and development and starting with this repetition, all is lost.

Nothing corresponding to this can happen in popular music. It would not affect the musical sense if any detail were taken out of the context; the listener can supply the "framework" automatically, since it is a mere musical automatism itself. The beginning of the chorus is replaceable by the beginning of innumerable other choruses. The interrelationship among the elements or the relationship of the elements to the whole would be unaffected. In Beethoven, position is important only in a living relation between a concrete totality and its concrete parts. In popular music, position is absolute. Every detail is substitutable; it serves its function only as a cog in a machine.

The mere establishment of this difference is not yet sufficient. It is possible to object that the far reaching standard schemes and types of popular music are bound up with dance, and therefore are also applicable to dance-derivatives in serious music, for example, the minuetto and scherzo of the classical Viennese School. It may be maintained either that this part of serious music is also to be

comprehended in terms of detail rather than of whole, or that if the whole still is perceivable in the dance types in serious music despite recurrence of the types, there is no reason why it should not be perceivable in modern popular music.

The following consideration provides an answer to both objections by showing the radical differences even where serious music employs dance-types. According to current formalistic views the scherzo of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony can be regarded as a highly stylized minuetto. What Beethoven takes from the traditional minuetto scheme in this scherzo is the idea of outspoken contrast between a minor minuetto, a major trio, and repetition of the minor minuetto; and also certain other characteristics such as the emphatic three-fourths rhythm often accentuated on the first fourth and, by and large, dance-like symmetry in the sequence of bars and periods. But the specific form-idea of this movement as a concrete totality transvaluates the devices borrowed from the minuetto scheme. The whole movement is conceived as an introduction to the finale in order to create tremendous tension, not only by its threatening, foreboding expression but even more by the very way in which its formal development is handled.

The classical minuetto scheme required first the appearance of the main theme, then the introduction of a second part which may lead to more distant tonal regions—formalistically similar, to be sure, to the "bridge" of today's popular music—and finally the recurrence of the original part. All this occurs in Beethoven. He takes up the idea of thematic dualism within the scherzo part. But he forces what was, in the conventional minuetto, a mute and meaningless game-rule to speak with meaning. He achieves complete consistency between the formal structure and its specific content, that is to say, the elaboration of its themes. The whole scherzo part of this scherzo (that is to say, what occurs before the entrance of the deep strings in C-major that marks the beginning of the trio), consists of the dualism of two themes, the creeping figure in the strings and the "objective," stone-like answer of the wind instruments. This dualism is not developed in a schematic way so that first the phrase of the strings is elaborated, then the answer of the winds, and then the string theme is mechanically repeated. After the first occurrence of the second theme in the horns, the two essential elements are alternately interconnected in the manner of a dialogue, and the end of the scherzo part is actually marked, not by the first, but by the second theme which has overwhelmed the first musical phrase.

Furthermore, the repetition of the scherzo after the trio is scored

so differently that it sounds like a mere shadow of the scherzo and assumes that haunting character which vanishes only with the affirmative entry of the Finale theme. The whole device has been made dynamic. Not only the themes, but the musical form itself have been subjected to tension: the same tension which is already manifest within the two-fold structure of the first theme that consists, as it were, of question and reply, and then even more manifest within the context between the two main themes. The whole scheme has become subject to the inherent demands of this particular movement.

To sum up the difference: in Beethoven and in good serious music in general—we are not concerned here with bad serious music which may be as rigid and mechanical as popular music—the detail virtually contains the whole and leads to the exposition of the whole, while, at the same time, it is produced out of the conception of the whole. In popular music the relationship is fortuitous. The detail has no bearing on a whole, which appears as an extraneous framework. Thus, the whole is never altered by the individual event and therefore remains, as it were, aloof, imperturbable, and unnoticed throughout the piece. At the same time, the detail is mutilated by a device which it can never influence and alter, so that the detail remains inconsequential. A musical detail which is not permitted to develop becomes a caricature of its own potentialities.

Standardization.

The previous discussion shows that the difference between popular and serious music can be grasped in more precise terms than those referring to musical levels such as “lowbrow and highbrow,” “simple and complex,” “naive and sophisticated.” For example, the difference between the spheres cannot be adequately expressed in terms of complexity and simplicity. All works of the earlier Viennese classicism are, without exception, rhythmically simpler than stock arrangements of jazz. Melodically, the wide intervals of a good many hits such as “Deep Purple” or “Sunrise Serenade” are more difficult to follow *per se* than most melodies of, for example, Haydn, which consist mainly of circumscriptions of tonic triads, and second steps. Harmonically, the supply of chords of the so-called classics is invariably more limited than that of any current Tin Pan Alley composer who draws from Debussy, Ravel, and even later sources. Standardization and non-standardization are the key contrasting terms for the difference.

Structural standardization aims at standard reactions. Listening to popular music is manipulated not only by its promoters, but as it

were, by the inherent nature of this music itself, into a system of response-mechanisms wholly antagonistic to the ideal of individuality in a free, liberal society. This has nothing to do with simplicity and complexity. In serious music, each musical element, even the simplest one, is "itself," and the more highly organized the work is, the less possibility there is of substitution among the details. In hit music, however, the structure underlying the piece is abstract, existing independent of the specific course of the music. This is basic to the illusion that certain complex harmonies are more easily understandable in popular music than the same harmonies in serious music. For the complicated in popular music never functions as "itself" but only as a disguise or embellishment behind which the scheme can always be perceived. In jazz the amateur listener is capable of replacing complicated rhythmical or harmonic formulas by the schematic ones which they represent and which they still suggest, however adventurous they appear. The ear deals with the difficulties of hit music by achieving slight substitutions derived from the knowledge of the patterns. The listener, when faced with the complicated, actually hears only the simple which it represents and perceives the complicated only as a parodistic distortion of the simple.

No such mechanical substitution by stereotyped patterns is possible in serious music. Here even the simplest event necessitates an effort to grasp it immediately instead of summarizing it vaguely according to institutionalized prescriptions capable of producing only institutionalized effects. Otherwise the music is not "understood." Popular music, however, is composed in such a way that the process of translation of the unique into the norm is already planned and, to a certain extent, achieved within the composition itself.

The composition hears for the listener. This is how popular music divests the listener of his spontaneity and promotes conditioned reflexes. Not only does it not require his effort to follow its concrete stream; it actually gives him models under which anything concrete still remaining may be subsumed. The schematic build-up dictates the way in which he must listen while, at the same time, it makes any effort in listening unnecessary. Popular music is "pre-digested" in a way strongly resembling the fad of "digests" of printed material. It is this structure of contemporary popular music, which in the last analysis, accounts for those changes of listening habits which we shall later discuss.

So far standardization of popular music has been considered in structural terms—that is, as an inherent quality without explicit

reference to the process of production or to the underlying causes for standardization. Though all industrial mass production necessarily eventuates in standardization, the production of popular music can be called "industrial" only in its promotion and distribution, whereas the act of producing a song-hit still remains in a handicraft stage. The production of popular music is highly centralized in its economic organization, but still "individualistic" in its social mode of production. The division of labor among the composer, harmonizer, and arranger is not industrial but rather pretends industrialization, in order to look more up-to-date, whereas it has actually adapted industrial methods for the technique of its promotion. It would not increase the costs of production if the various composers of hit tunes did not follow certain standard patterns. Therefore, we must look for other reasons for structural standardization—very different reasons from those which account for the standardization of motor cars and breakfast foods.

Imitation offers a lead for coming to grips with the basic reasons for it. The musical standards of popular music were originally developed by a competitive process. As one particular song scored a great success, hundreds of others sprang up imitating the successful one. The most successful hits, types, and "ratios" between elements were imitated, and the process culminated in the crystallization of standards. Under centralized conditions such as exist today these standards have become "frozen."¹ That is, they have been taken over by cartelized agencies, the final results of a competitive process, and rigidly enforced upon material to be promoted. Non-compliance with the rules of the game became the basis for exclusion. The original patterns that are now standardized evolved in a more or less competitive way. Large-scale economic concentration institutionalized the standardization, and made it imperative. As a result, innovations by rugged individualists have been outlawed. The standard patterns have become invested with the immunity of bigness—"the King can do no wrong." This also accounts for revivals in popular music. They do not have the outworn character of standardized products manufactured after a given pattern. The breath of free competition is still alive within them. On the other hand, the famous old hits which are revived set the patterns which have become standardized. They are the golden age of the game-rules.

This "freezing" of standards is socially enforced upon the agen-

¹See Max Horkheimer, *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, vol. VIII, 1939, p. 115.

cies themselves. Popular music must simultaneously meet two demands. One is for stimuli that provoke the listener's attention. The other is for the material to fall within the category of what the musically untrained listener would call "natural" music: that is, the sum total of all the conventions and material formulas in music to which he is accustomed and which he regards as the inherent, simple language of music itself, no matter how late the development might be which produced this natural language. This natural language for the American listener stems from his earliest musical experiences, the nursery rhymes, the hymns he sings in Sunday school, the little tunes he whistles on his way home from school.—All these are vastly more important in the formation of musical language than his ability to distinguish the beginning of Brahms' Third Symphony from that of his Second. Official musical culture is, to a large extent, a mere superstructure of this underlying musical language, namely the major and minor tonality and all the tonal relationships it implies. But these tonal relationships of the primitive musical language set barriers to whatever does not conform to them. Extravagances are tolerated only insofar as they can be recast into this so-called natural language.

In terms of consumer-demand, the standardization of popular music is only the expression of this dual desideratum imposed upon it by the musical frame of mind of the public,—that it be "stimulatory" by deviating in some way from the established "natural," and that it maintain the supremacy of the natural against such deviations. The attitude of the audience toward the natural language is reinforced by standardized production, which institutionalizes desiderata which originally might have come from the public.

Pseudo-individualization.

The paradox in the desiderata—stimulatory and natural—accounts for the dual character of standardization itself. Stylization of the ever identical framework is only one aspect of standardization. Concentration and control in our culture hide themselves in their very manifestation. Unhidden they would provoke resistance. Therefore the illusion and, to a certain extent, even the reality of individual achievement must be maintained. The maintenance of it is grounded in material reality itself, for while administrative control over life processes is concentrated, ownership is still diffuse.

In the sphere of luxury production, to which popular music belongs and in which no necessities of life are immediately involved, while, at the same time, the residues of individualism are most alive there in the form of ideological categories such as taste and free

choice, it is imperative to hide standardization. The "backwardness" of musical mass production, the fact that it is still on a handicraft level and not literally an industrial one, conforms perfectly to that necessity which is essential from the viewpoint of cultural big business. If the individual handicraft elements of popular music were abolished altogether, a synthetic means of hiding standardization would have to be evolved. Its elements are even now in existence.

The necessary correlate of musical standardization is *pseudo-individualization*. By pseudo-individualization we mean endowing cultural mass production with the halo of free choice or open market on the basis of standardization itself. Standardization of song hits keeps the customers in line by doing their listening for them, as it were. Pseudo-individualization, for its part, keeps them in line by making them forget that what they listen to is already listened to for them, or "pre-digested."

The most drastic example of standardization of presumably individualized features is to be found in so-called improvisations. Even though jazz musicians still improvise in practice, their improvisations have become so "normalized" as to enable a whole terminology to be developed to express the standard devices of individualization: a terminology which in turn is ballyhooed by jazz publicity agents to foster the myth of pioneer artisanship and at the same time flatter the fans by apparently allowing them to peep behind the curtain and get the inside story. This pseudo-individualization is prescribed by the standardization of the framework. The latter is so rigid that the freedom it allows for any sort of improvisation is severely delimited. Improvisations—passages where spontaneous action of individuals is permitted ("Swing it boys")—are confined within the walls of the harmonic and metric scheme. In a great many cases, such as the "break" of pre-swing jazz, the musical function of the improvised detail is determined completely by the scheme: the break can be nothing other than a disguised cadence. Hence, very few possibilities for actual improvisation remain, due to the necessity of merely melodically circumscribing the same underlying harmonic functions. Since these possibilities were very quickly exhausted, stereotyping of improvisatory details speedily occurred. Thus, standardization of the norm enhances in a purely technical way standardization of its own deviation—pseudo-individualization.

This subservience of improvisation to standardization explains two main socio-psychological qualities of popular music. One is the fact that the detail remains openly connected with the underlying scheme so that the listener always feels on safe ground. The choice

in individual alterations is so small that the perpetual recurrence of the same variations is a reassuring signpost of the identical behind them. The other is the function of "substitution"—the improvisatory features forbid their being grasped as musical events in themselves. They can be received only as embellishments. It is a well-known fact that in daring jazz arrangements worried notes, dirty tones, in other words, false notes, play a conspicuous role. They are apperceived as exciting stimuli only because they are corrected by the ear to the right note. This, however, is only an extreme instance of what happens less conspicuously in all individualization in popular music. Any harmonic boldness, any chord which does not fall strictly within the simplest harmonic scheme demands being apperceived as "false," that is, as a stimulus which carries with it the unambiguous prescription to substitute for it the right detail, or rather the naked scheme. Understanding popular music means obeying such commands for listening. Popular music commands its own listening-habits.

There is another type of individualization claimed in terms of kinds of popular music and differences in name-bands. The types of popular music are carefully differentiated in production. The listener is presumed to be able to choose between them. The most widely recognized differentiations are those between swing and sweet and such name-bands as Benny Goodman and Guy Lombardo. The listener is quickly able to distinguish the types of music and even the performing band, this in spite of the fundamental identity of the material and the great similarity of the presentations apart from their emphasized distinguishing trade-marks. This labelling technique, as regards type of music and band, is pseudo-individualization, but of a sociological kind outside the realm of strict musical technology. It provides trade-marks of identification for differentiating between the actually undifferentiated.

Popular music becomes a multiple-choice questionnaire. There are two main types and their derivatives from which to choose. The listener is encouraged by the inexorable presence of these types psychologically to cross-out what he dislikes and check what he likes. The limitation inherent in this choice and the clear-cut alternative it entails provoke like-dislike patterns of behavior. This mechanical dichotomy breaks down indifference; it is imperative to favor sweet or swing if one wishes to continue to listen to popular music.

II. PRESENTATION OF THE MATERIAL.

Minimum requirements.

The structure of the musical material requires a technique of its own by which it is enforced. This process may be roughly defined as "plugging." The term "plugging" originally had the narrow meaning of ceaseless repetition of one particular hit in order to make it "successful." We here use it in the broad sense, to signify a continuation of the inherent processes of composition and arrangement of the musical material. Plugging aims to break down the resistance to the musically ever-equal or identical by, as it were, closing the avenues of escape from the ever-equal. It leads the listener to become enraptured with the inescapable. And thus it leads to the institutionalization and standardization of listening habits themselves. Listeners become so accustomed to the recurrence of the same things that they react automatically. The standardization of the material requires a plugging mechanism from outside, since everything equals everything else to such an extent that the emphasis on presentation which is provided by plugging must substitute for the lack of genuine individuality in the material. The listener of normal musical intelligence who hears the Kundry motif of "Parsifal" for the first time is likely to recognize it when it is played again because it is unmistakable and not exchangeable for anything else. If the same listener were confronted with an average song-hit, he would not be able to distinguish it from any other unless it were repeated so often that he would be forced to remember it. Repetition gives a psychological importance which it could otherwise never have. Thus plugging is the inevitable complement of standardization.¹

Provided the material fulfills certain minimum requirements, any given song can be plugged and made a success, if there is adequate tie-up between publishing houses, name bands, radio and moving pictures. Most important is the following requirement: To be plugged, a song-hit must have at least one feature by which it can be distinguished from any other, and yet possess the complete conventionality and triviality of all others. The actual criterion by which a song is judged worthy of plugging is paradoxical. The publisher wants a piece of music that is fundamentally the same as all the other current hits and simultaneously fundamentally different from them. Only if it is the same does it have a chance of being

¹As the actual working of the plugging mechanism on the American scene of popular music is described in full detail in a study by Duncan MacDougald, the present study confines itself to a theoretical discussion of some of the more general aspects of the enforcement of the material.

sold automatically, without requiring any effort on the part of the customer, and of presenting itself as a musical institution. And only if it is different can it be distinguished from other songs,—a requirement for being remembered and hence for being successful.

Of course, this double desideratum cannot be fulfilled. In the case of actual published and plugged songs, one will generally find some sort of compromise, something which is by and large the same and bears just one isolated trade-mark which makes it appear to be original. The distinguishing feature must not necessarily be melodic,¹ but may consist of metrical irregularities, particular chords or particular sound colors.

Glamor.

A further requirement of plugging is a certain richness and roundness of sound. This requirement evolves that feature in the whole plugging mechanism which is most overtly bound up with advertising as a business as well as with the commercialization of entertainment. It is also particularly representative of the inter-relationship of standardization and pseudo-individualization.

It is musical glamor: those innumerable passages in song arrangements which appear to communicate the "now we present" attitude. The musical flourishes which accompany MGM's roaring lion whenever he opens his majestic mouth are analogous to the non-leonine sounds of musical glamor heard over the air.

Glamor-mindedness may optimistically be regarded as a mental construct of the success story in which the hardworking American settler triumphs over impassive nature, which is finally forced to yield up its riches. However, in a world that is no longer a frontier world, the problem of glamor cannot be regarded as so easily soluble. Glamor is made into the eternal conqueror's song of the common man; he who is never permitted to conquer in life conquers in glamor. The triumph is actually the self-styled triumph of the

¹Technical analysis must add certain reservations to any acceptance of listener reactions at their face value in the case of the concept of melody. Listeners to popular music speak mainly about melody and rhythm, sometimes about instrumentation, rarely or never about harmony and form. Within the standard scheme of popular music, however, melody itself is by no means autonomous in the sense of an independent line developing in the horizontal dimension of music. Melody is, rather, a function of harmony. The so-called melodies in popular music are generally arabesques, dependent upon the sequence of harmonies. What appears to the listener to be primarily melodic is actually fundamentally harmonic, its melodic structure a mere derivative.

It would be valuable to study exactly what laymen call a melody. It would probably turn out to be a succession of tones related to one another by simple and easily understandable harmonic functions, within the framework of the eight bar period. There is a large gap between the layman's idea of a melody and its strictly musical connotation.

business man who announces that he will offer the same product at a lower price.

The conditions for this function of glamor are entirely different from those of frontier life. They apply to the mechanization of labor and to the workaday life of the masses. Boredom has become so great that only the brightest colors have any chance of being lifted out of the general drabness. Yet, it is just those violent colors which bear witness to the omnipotence of mechanical, industrial production itself. Nothing could be more stereotyped than the pinkish red neon lights which abound in front of shops, moving picture theatres and restaurants. By glamorizing, they attract attention. But the means by which they are used to overcome humdrum reality are more humdrum than the reality itself. That which aims to achieve glamor becomes a more uniform activity than what it seeks to glamorize. If it were really attractive in itself, it would have no more means of support than a really original popular composition. It would violate the law of the sameness of the putatively unsame. The term glamorous is applied to those faces, colors, sounds which, by the light they irradiate, differ from the rest. But all glamor girls look alike and the glamor effects of popular music are equivalent to each other.

As far as the pioneer character of glamor is concerned, there is an overlapping and a change of function rather than an innocent survival of the past. To be sure, the world of glamor is a show, akin to shooting galleries, the glaring lights of the circus and deafening brass bands. As such, the function of glamor may have originally been associated with a sort of advertising which strove artificially to produce demands in a social setting not yet entirely permeated by the market. The post-competitive capitalism of the present day uses for its own purposes devices of a still immature economy. Thus, glamor has a haunting quality of historic revival in radio, comparable to the revival of the midway circus barker in today's radio barker who implores his unseen audience not to fail to sample wares and does so in tones which arouse hopes beyond the capacity of the commodity to fulfill. All glamor is bound up with some sort of trickery. Listeners are nowhere more tricked by popular music than in its glamorous passages. Flourishes and jubilations express triumphant thanksgiving for the music itself—a self-eulogy of its own achievement in exhorting the listener to exultation and of its identification with the aim of the agency in promoting a great event. However, as this event does not take place apart from its own celebration, the triumphant thanksgiving offered up by the music is a self-betrayal. It is likely to make itself felt as

such unconsciously in the listeners, just as the child resents the adult's praising the gifts he made to the child in the same words which the child feels it is his own privilege to use.

Baby talk.

It is not accidental that glamor leads to child-behavior. Glamor, which plays on the listener's desire for strength, is concomitant with a musical language which betokens dependence. The children's jokes, the purposely wrong orthography, the use of children's expressions in advertising, take the form of a musical children's language in popular music. There are many examples of lyrics characterized by an ambiguous irony in that, while affecting a children's language, they at the same time display contempt of the adult for the child or even give a derogatory or sadistic meaning to children's expressions ("Goody, Goody," "A Tisket a Tasket," "London Bridge is Falling Down," "Cry, Baby, Cry"). Genuine and pseudo-nursery rhymes are combined with purposeful alterations of the lyrics of original nursery rhymes in order to make them commercial hits.

The music, as well as the lyrics, tends to affect such a children's language. Some of its principal characteristics are: unabating repetition of some particular musical formula comparable to the attitude of a child incessantly uttering the same demand ("I Want to Be Happy");¹ the limitation of many melodies to very few tones, comparable to the way in which a small child speaks before he has the full alphabet at his disposal; purposely wrong harmonization resembling the way in which small children express themselves in incorrect grammar; also certain over-sweet sound colors, functioning like musical cookies and candies. Treating adults as children is involved in that representation of fun which is aimed at relieving the strain of their adult responsibilities. Moreover, the children's language serves to make the musical product "popular" with the subjects by attempting to bridge, in the subjects' consciousness, the distance between themselves and the plugging agencies, by approaching them with the trusting attitude of the child asking an adult for the correct time even though he knows neither the strange man nor the meaning of time.

Plugging the whole field.

The plugging of songs is only a part of a mechanism and obtains its proper meaning within the system as a whole. Basic to the system

¹The most famous literary example of this attitude is "Want to seee the wheels go wound" (John Habberton, *Helen's Babies*, New York, p. 9 ff). One could easily imagine a "novelty" song being based upon that phrase.

is the plugging of styles and personalities. The plugging of certain styles is exemplified in the word swing. This term has neither a definite and unambiguous meaning nor does it mark a sharp difference from the period of pre-swing hot jazz up to the middle thirties. The lack of justification in the material for the use of the term arouses the suspicion that its usage is entirely due to plugging—in order to rejuvenate an old commodity by giving it a new title. Similarly plugged is the whole swing terminology indulged in by jazz journalism and used by jitterbugs, a terminology which, according to Hobson, makes jazz musicians wince.¹ The less inherent in the material are the characteristics plugged by a pseudo-expert terminology, the more are such auxiliary forces as announcers and commentaries needed.

There is good reason to believe that this journalism partly belongs immediately to the plugging mechanism, insofar as it depends upon publishers, agencies, and name bands. At this point, however, a sociological qualification is pertinent. Under contemporary economic conditions, it is often futile to look for "corruption," because people are compelled to behave voluntarily in ways one expected them to behave in only when they were paid for it. The journalists who take part in the promotion of a Hollywood "oomph-girl" need not be bribed at all by the motion picture industry. The publicity given to the girl by the industry itself is in complete accord with the ideology pervading the journalism which takes it up. And this ideology has become the audience's. The match appears to have been made in heaven. The journalists speak with unbought voices. Once a certain level of economic backing for plugging has been reached, the plugging process transcends its own causes and becomes an autonomous social force.

Above all other elements of the plugging mechanism stands the plugging of personalities, particularly of band leaders. Most of the features actually attributable to jazz arrangers are officially credited to the conductor; arrangers, who are probably the most competent musicians in the United States, often remain in obscurity, like scenario writers in the movies. The conductor is the man who immediately faces the audience; he is close kin to the actor who impresses the public either by his joviality and genial manner or by dictatorial gestures. It is the face-to-face relation with the conductor which makes it possible to transfer to him any achievement.

Further, the leader and his band are still largely regarded by the audience as bearers of improvisatory spontaneity. The more

¹Wilder Hobson, *American Jazz Music*, p. 153, New York, 1939.

actual improvisation disappears in the process of standardization and the more it is superseded by elaborate schemes, the more must the idea of improvisation be maintained before the audience. The arranger remains obscure partly because of the necessity for avoiding the slightest hint that popular music may not be improvised, but must, in most cases, be fixed and systematized.

III. THEORY ABOUT THE LISTENER.

Recognition and acceptance.

Mass listening habits today gravitate about recognition. Popular music and its plugging are focused on this habituation. The basic principle behind it is that one need only repeat something until it is recognized in order to make it accepted. This applies to the standardization of the material as well as to its plugging. What is necessary in order to understand the reasons for the popularity of the current type of hit music is a theoretical analysis of the processes involved in the transformation of repetition into recognition and of recognition into acceptance.

The concept of recognition, however, may appear to be too unspecific to explain modern mass listening. It can be argued that wherever musical understanding is concerned, the factor of recognition, being one of the basic functions of human knowing, must play an important role. Certainly one understands a Beethoven sonata only by recognizing some of its features as being abstractly identical with others which one knows from former experience, and by linking them up with the present experience. The idea that a Beethoven sonata could be understood in a void without relating it to elements of musical language which one knows and recognizes—would be absurd. What matters, however, is what is recognized. What does a real listener recognize in a Beethoven sonata? He certainly recognizes the “system” upon which it is based: the major-minor tonality, the inter-relationship of keys which determines modulation, the different chords and their relative expressive value, certain melodic formulas, and certain structural patterns. (It would be absurd to deny that such patterns exist in serious music. But their function is of a different order. Granted all this recognition, it is still not sufficient for a comprehension of the musical sense.) All the recognizable elements are organized in good serious music by a concrete and unique musical totality from which they derive their particular meaning, in the same sense as a word in a poem derives its meaning from the totality of the poem and not from the everyday use of the word, although the recognition of this everydayness of the word

may be the necessary presupposition of any understanding of the poem.

The musical sense of any piece of music may indeed be defined as that dimension of the piece which cannot be grasped by recognition alone, by its identification with something one knows. It can be built up only by spontaneously linking the known elements—a reaction as spontaneous by the listener as it was spontaneous by the composer—in order to experience the inherent novelty of the composition. The musical sense is the New—something which cannot be traced back to and subsumed under the configuration of the known, but which springs out of it, if the listener comes to its aid.

It is precisely this relationship between the recognized and the new which is destroyed in popular music. Recognition becomes an end instead of a means. The recognition of the mechanically familiar in a hit tune leaves nothing which can be grasped as new by a linking of the various elements. As a matter of fact, the link between the elements is pre-given in popular music as much as, or even to a greater extent than, the elements are themselves. Hence, recognition and understanding must here coincide, whereas in serious music understanding is the act by which universal recognition leads to the emergence of something fundamentally new.

An appropriate beginning for investigating recognition in respect of any particular song hit may be made by drafting a scheme which divides the experience of recognition into its different components. Psychologically, all the factors we enumerate are interwoven to such a degree that it would be impossible to separate them from one another in reality, and any temporal order given them would be highly problematical. Our scheme is directed more toward the different objective elements involved in the experience of recognition, than toward the way in which the actual experience feels to a particular individual or individuals.

The components we consider to be involved are the following:

- a) Vague remembrance.
- b) Actual identification.
- c) Subsumption by label.
- d) Self-reflection on the act of recognition.
- e) Psychological transfer of recognition-authority to the object.

a) The more or less vague experience of being reminded of something (“I must have heard this somewhere”). The standardization of the material sets the stage for vague remembrance in practically every song, since each tune is reminiscent of the general pattern and of

every other. An aboriginal prerequisite for this feeling is the existence of a vast supply of tunes, an incessant stream of popular music which makes it impossible to remember each and every particular song.

b) The moment of actual identification—the actual “that’s it” experience. This is attained when vague remembrance is searchlighted by sudden awareness. It is comparable to the experience one has sitting in a room that has been darkened when suddenly the electric light flares up again. By the suddenness of its being lit, the familiar furniture obtains, for a split second, the appearance of being novel. The spontaneous realization that this very piece is “the same as” what one heard at some other time, tends to sublate, for a moment, the ever-impending peril that something is as it always was.

It is characteristic of this factor of the recognition experience that it is marked by a sudden break. There is no gradation between the vague recollection and full awareness but, rather, a sort of psychological “jump.” This component may be regarded as appearing somewhat later in time than vague remembrance. This is supported by consideration of the material. It is probably very difficult to recognize most song hits by the first two or three notes of their choruses; at least the first motif must have been played, and the actual act of recognition should be correlated in time with the apperception—or realization—of the first complete motifical “Gestalt” of the chorus.

c) The element of subsumption: the interpretation of the “that’s it” experience by an experience such as “that’s the hit ‘Night and Day.’” It is this element in recognition (probably bound up with the remembrance of the title trade-mark of the song or the first words of its lyrics¹) which relates recognition most intimately to the factor of social backing.

The most immediate implication of this component may be the following: the moment the listener recognizes the hit as *the* so and so

¹The interplay of lyrics and music in popular music is similar to the interplay of picture and word in advertising. The picture provides the sensual stimulus, the words add slogans or jokes that tend to fix the commodity in the minds of the public and to “subsume” it under definite, settled categories. The replacement of the purely instrumental ragtime by jazz which had strong vocal tendencies from the beginning, and the general decline of purely instrumental hits, are closely related to the increased importance of the advertising structure of popular music. The example of “Deep Purple” may prove helpful. This was originally a little-known piano piece. Its sudden success was at least partly due to the addition of trade-marking lyrics.

A model for this functional change exists in the field of raised entertainment in the nineteenth century. The first prelude of Bach’s “Well Tempered Clavichord” became a “sacral” hit when Gounod conceived the fiendish idea of extracting a melody from the sequel of harmonies and combining it with the words of the “Ave Maria.” This procedure, meretricious from its very inception, has since been generally accepted in the field of musical commercialism.

—that is, as something established and known not merely to him alone—he feels safety in numbers and follows the crowd of all those who have heard the song before and who are supposed to have made its reputation. This is concomitant with or follows hard upon the heels of element b). The connecting reaction consists partly in the revelation to the listener that his apparently isolated, individual experience of a particular song is a collective experience. The moment of identification of some socially established highlight often has a dual meaning: one not only identifies *it* innocently as being this or that, subsuming it under this or that category, but by the very act of identifying it, one also tends unwittingly to identify *oneself* with the objective social agencies or with the power of those individuals who made this particular event fit into this pre-existing category and thus “established” it. The very fact that an individual is capable of identifying an object as this or that allows him to take vicarious part in the institution which made the event what it is and to identify himself with this very institution.

d) The element of self-reflection on the act of identification. (“Oh, I know it; this belongs to me.”) This trend can be properly understood by considering the disproportion between the huge number of lesser-known songs and the few established ones. The individual who feels drowned by the stream of music feels a sort of triumph in the split second during which he is capable of identifying something. Masses of people are proud of their ability to recognize any music, as illustrated by the widespread habit of humming or whistling the tune of a familiar piece of music which has just been mentioned, in order to indicate one’s knowledge of it, and the evident complacency which accompanies such an exhibition.

By the identification and subsumption of the present listening experience under the category “this is the hit so and so,” this hit becomes an object to the listener, something fixed and permanent. This transformation of experience into object—the fact that by recognizing a piece of music one has command over it and can reproduce it from one’s own memory—makes it more propiety than ever. It has two conspicuous characteristics of property: permanence and being subject to the owner’s arbitrary will. The permanence consists in the fact that if one remembers a song and can recall it all the time, it cannot be expropriated. The other element, that of control over music, consists in the ability to evoke it presumably at will at any given moment, to cut it short, and to treat it whimsically. The musical properties are, as it were, at the mercy of their owner. In order to clarify this element, it may be appropriate to point to one of its extreme though by no means rare manifestations. Many people,

when they whistle or hum tunes they know, add tiny up-beat notes which sound as though they whipped or teased the melody. Their pleasure in possessing the melody takes the form of being free to misuse it. Their behavior toward the melody is like that of children who pull a dog's tail. They even enjoy, to a certain extent, making the melody wince or moan.

e) The element of "psychological transfer": "Damn it, 'Night and Day' is a good one!" This is the tendency to transfer the gratification of ownership to the object itself and to attribute to it, in terms of like, preference, or objective quality, the enjoyment of ownership which one has attained. The process of transfer is enhanced by plugging. While actually evoking the psychic processes of recognition, identification, and ownership, plugging simultaneously promotes the object itself and invests it, in the listener's consciousness, with all those qualities which in reality are due largely to the mechanism of identification. The listeners are executing the order to transfer to the music itself their self-congratulation on their ownership.

It may be added that the recognized social value inherent in the song hit is involved in the transfer of the gratification of ownership to the object which thus becomes "liked." The labelling process here comes to collectivize the ownership process. The listener feels flattered because he too owns what everyone owns. By owning an appreciated and marketed hit, one gets the illusion of value. This illusion of value in the listener is the basis for the evaluation of the musical material. At the moment of recognition of an established hit, a pseudo-public utility comes under the hegemony of the private listener. The musical owner who feels "I like this particular hit (because I know it)" achieves a delusion of grandeur comparable to a child's daydream about owning the railroad. Like the riddles in an advertising contest, song hits pose only questions of recognition which anyone can answer. Yet listeners enjoy giving the answers because they thus become identified with the powers that be.

It is obvious that these components do not appear in consciousness as they do in analysis. As the divergence between the illusion of private ownership and the reality of public ownership is a very wide one, and as everyone knows that what is written "Especially for You" is subject to the clause "any copying of the words or music of this song or any portion thereof makes the infringer liable to prosecution under the United States copyright law," one may not regard these processes as being too *unconscious* either. It is probably correct to assume that most listeners, in order to comply with what they regard as social desiderata and to prove their "citizenship," half-humorously

"join" the conspiracy¹ as caricatures of their own potentialities and suppress bringing to awareness the operative mechanisms by insisting to themselves and to others that the whole thing is only good clean fun anyhow.

The final component in the recognition process—psychological transfer—leads analysis back to plugging. Recognition is socially effective only when backed by the authority of a powerful agency. That is, the recognition-constructs do not apply to any tune but only to "successful" tunes,—success being judged by the backing of central agencies. In short, recognition, as a social determinant of listening habits, works only on plugged material. A listener will not abide the playing of a song repeatedly on the piano. Played over the air it is tolerated with joy all through its heyday.

The psychological mechanism here involved may be thought of as functioning in this way: If some song-hit is played again and again on the air, the listener begins to think that it is already a success. This is furthered by the way in which plugged songs are announced in broadcasts, often in the characteristic form of "You will now hear the latest smash hit." Repetition itself is accepted as a sign of its popularity.²

Popular music and "leisure time."

So far the analysis has dealt with reasons for the acceptance of any particular song hit. In order to understand why this whole *type* of music maintains its hold on the masses, some considerations of a more general kind may be appropriate.

The frame of mind to which popular music originally appealed, on which it feeds, and which it perpetually reinforces, is simultaneously one of distraction and inattention. Listeners are distracted from the demands of reality by entertainment which does not demand attention either.

The notion of distraction can be properly understood only within its social setting and not in self-subsistent terms of individual psychology. Distraction is bound to the present mode of production, to the rationalized and mechanized process of labor to which, directly or indirectly, masses are subject. This mode of production, which engenders fears and anxiety about unemployment, loss of income, war, has its "non-productive" correlate in entertainment; that is,

¹Cf. Hadley Cantril and Gordon Allport, *The Psychology of Radio*, New York, 1935 p. 69.

²The same propaganda trick can be found more explicitly in the field of radio advertising of commodities. Beautyskin Soap is called "famous" since the listener has heard the name of the soap over the air innumerable times before and therefore would agree to its "fame." Its fame is only the sum-total of these very announcements which refer to it.

relaxation which does not involve the effort of concentration at all. People want to have fun. A fully concentrated and conscious experience of art is possible only to those whose lives do not put such a strain on them that in their spare time they want relief from both boredom and effort simultaneously. The whole sphere of cheap commercial entertainment reflects this dual desire. It induces relaxation because it is patterned and pre-digested. Its being patterned and pre-digested serves within the psychological household of the masses to spare them the effort of that participation (even in listening or observation) without which there can be no receptivity to art. On the other hand, the stimuli they provide permit an escape from the boredom of mechanized labor.

The promoters of commercialized entertainment exonerate themselves by referring to the fact that they are giving the masses what they want. This is an ideology appropriate to commercial purposes: the less the mass discriminates, the greater the possibility of selling cultural commodities indiscriminately. Yet this ideology of vested interest cannot be dismissed so easily. It is not possible completely to deny that mass-consciousness can be molded by the operative agencies only because the masses "want this stuff."

But why do they want this stuff? In our present society the masses themselves are kneaded by the same mode of production as the artifact material foisted upon them. The customers of musical entertainment are themselves objects or, indeed, products of the same mechanisms which determine the production of popular music. Their spare time serves only to reproduce their working capacity. It is a means instead of an end. The power of the process of production extends over the time intervals which on the surface appear to be "free." They want standardized goods and pseudo-individualization, because their leisure is an escape from work and at the same time is molded after those psychological attitudes to which their workaday world exclusively habituates them. Popular music is for the masses a perpetual busman's holiday. Thus, there is justification for speaking of a pre-established harmony today between production and consumption of popular music. The people clamor for what they are going to get anyhow.

To escape boredom and avoid effort are incompatible—hence the reproduction of the very attitude from which escape is sought. To be sure, the way in which they must work on the assembly line, in the factory, or at office machines denies people any novelty. They seek novelty, but the strain and boredom associated with actual work leads to avoidance of effort in that leisure-time which offers the only chance for really new experience. As a substitute, they crave a

stimulant. Popular music comes to offer it. Its stimulations are met with the inability to vest effort in the ever-identical. This means boredom again. It is a circle which makes escape impossible. The impossibility of escape causes the wide-spread attitude of inattention toward popular music. The moment of recognition is that of effortless sensation. The sudden attention attached to this moment burns itself out *instantly* and relegates the listener to a realm of inattention and distraction. On the one hand, the domain of production and plugging presupposes distraction and, on the other, produces it.

In this situation the industry faces an insoluble problem. It must arouse attention by means of ever-new products, but this attention spells their doom. If no attention is given to the song, it cannot be sold; if attention is paid to it, there is always the possibility that people will no longer accept it, because they know it too well. This partly accounts for the constantly renewed effort to sweep the market with new products, to hound them to their graves; then to repeat the infanticidal maneuver again and again.

On the other hand, distraction is not only a presupposition but also a product of popular music. The tunes themselves lull the listener to inattention. They tell him not to worry for he will not miss anything.¹

The social cement.

It is safe to assume that music listened to with a general inattention which is only interrupted by sudden flashes of recognition is not followed as a sequence of experiences that have a clear-cut meaning of their own, grasped in each instant and related to all the precedent and subsequent moments. One may go so far as to suggest that most listeners of popular music do not understand music as a language in itself. If they did it would be vastly difficult to explain how they could tolerate the incessant supply of largely undifferentiated material. What, then, does music mean to them? The answer is that the language that is music is transformed by objective processes into a language which they think is their own,—into a language which serves as a receptacle for their institutionalized wants. The less music is a language *sui generis* to them, the more does it become established as such a receptacle. The autonomy of music is replaced by a mere socio-psychological function. Music today is largely a social cement. And the meaning listeners attribute to a material, the

¹The attitude of distraction is not a completely universal one. Particularly youngsters who invest popular music with their own feelings are not yet completely blunted to all its effects. The whole problem of age levels with regard to popular music, however, is beyond the scope of the present study. Demographic problems, too, must remain out of consideration.

inherent logic of which is inaccessible to them, is above all a means by which they achieve some psychical adjustment to the mechanisms of present-day life. This "adjustment" materializes in two different ways, corresponding to two major socio-psychological types of mass behavior toward music in general and popular music in particular, the "rhythmically obedient" type and the "emotional" type.

Individuals of the rhythmically obedient type are mainly found among the youth—the so-called radio generation. They are most susceptible to a process of masochistic adjustment to authoritarian collectivism. The type is not restricted to any one political attitude. The adjustment to anthropophagous collectivism is found as often among left-wing political groups as among right-wing groups. Indeed, both overlap: repression and crowd-mindedness overtake the followers of both trends. The psychologies tend to meet despite the surface distinctions in political attitudes.

This comes to the fore in popular music which appears to be aloof from political partisanship. It may be noted that a moderate leftist theatre production such as "Pins and Needles" uses ordinary jazz as its musical medium, and that a communist youth organization adapted the melody of "Alexander's Ragtime Band" to its own lyrics. Those who ask for a song of social significance ask for it through a medium which deprives it of social significance. The use of inexorable popular musical media is repressive *per se*. Such inconsistencies indicate that political conviction and socio-psychological structure by no means coincide.

This obedient type is the rhythmical type, the word rhythmical being used in its everyday sense. Any musical experience of this type is based upon the underlying, unabating time unit of the music,—its "beat." To play rhythmically means, to these people, to play in such a way that even if pseudo-individualizations—counter-accent and other "differentiations"—occur, the relation to the ground metre is preserved. To be musical means to them to be capable of following given rhythmical patterns without being disturbed by "individualizing" aberrations, and to fit even the syncopations into the basic time units. This is the way in which their response to music immediately expresses their desire to obey. However, as the standardized metre of dance music and of marching suggests the coordinated battalions of a mechanical collectivity, obedience to this rhythm by overcoming the responding individuals leads them to conceive of themselves as agglutinated with the untold millions of the meek who must be similarly overcome. Thus do the obedient inherit the earth.

Yet, if one looks at the serious compositions which correspond to this category of mass listening, one finds one very characteristic fea-

ture: that of disillusion. All these composers, among them Stravinsky and Hindemith, have expressed an "anti-romantic" feeling. They aimed at musical adaptation to reality,—a reality understood by them in terms of the "machine age." The renunciation of dreaming by these composers is an index that listeners are ready to replace dreaming by adjustment to raw reality, that they reap new pleasure from their acceptance of the unpleasant. They are disillusioned about any possibility of realizing their own dreams in the world in which they live, and consequently adapt themselves to this world. They take what is called a realistic attitude and attempt to harvest consolation by identifying themselves with the external social forces which they think constitute the "machine-age." Yet the very disillusion upon which their coordination is based is there to mar their pleasure. The cult of the machine which is represented by unabating jazz beats involves a self-renunciation that cannot but take root in the form of a fluctuating uneasiness somewhere in the personality of the obedient. For the machine is an end in itself only under given social conditions,—where men are appendages of the machines on which they work. The adaptation to machine music necessarily implies a renunciation of one's own human feelings and at the same time a fetishism of the machine such that its instrumental character becomes obscured thereby.

As to the other, the "emotional" type, there is some justification for linking it with a type of movie spectator. The kinship is with the poor shop girl who derives gratification by identification with Ginger Rogers, who, with her beautiful legs and unsullied character, marries the boss. Wish-fulfillment is considered the guiding principle in the social psychology of moving pictures and similarly in the pleasure obtained from emotional, erotic music. This explanation, however, is only superficially appropriate.

Hollywood and Tin Pan Alley may be dream factories. But they do not merely supply categorical wish-fulfillment for the girl behind the counter. She does not immediately identify herself with Ginger Rogers marrying. What does occur may be expressed as follows: when the audience at a sentimental film or sentimental music become aware of the overwhelming possibility of happiness, they dare to confess to themselves what the whole order of contemporary life ordinarily forbids them to admit, namely, that they actually have no part in happiness. What is supposed to be wish-fulfillment is only the scant liberation that occurs with the realization that at last one need not deny oneself the happiness of knowing that one is unhappy and that one could be happy. The experience of the shop girl is related to that of the old woman who weeps at the wedding services

of others, blissfully becoming aware of the wretchedness of her own life. Not even the most gullible individuals believe that eventually everyone will win the sweepstakes. The actual function of sentimental music lies rather in the temporary release given to the awareness that one has missed fulfillment.

The emotional listener listens to everything in terms of late romanticism and of the musical commodities derived from it which are already fashioned to fit the needs of emotional listening. They consume music in order to be allowed to weep. They are taken in by the musical expression of frustration rather than by that of happiness. The influence of the standard Slavic melancholy typified by Tchaikowsky and Dvorak is by far greater than that of the most "fulfilled" moments of Mozart or of the young Beethoven. The so-called releasing element of music is simply the opportunity to feel something. But the actual content of this emotion can only be frustration. Emotional music has become the image of the mother who says, "Come and weep, my child." It is katharsis for the masses, but katharsis which keeps them all the more firmly in line. One who weeps does not resist any more than one who marches. Music that permits its listeners the confession of their unhappiness reconciles them, by means of this "release," to their social dependence.

Ambivalence, spite, fury.

The fact that the psychological "adjustment" effected by today's mass listening is illusionary and that the "escape" provided by popular music actually subjects the individuals to the very same social powers from which they want to escape makes itself felt in the very attitude of those masses. What appears to be ready acceptance and unproblematic gratification is actually of a very complex nature, covered by a veil of flimsy rationalizations. Mass listening habits today are *ambivalent*. This ambivalence, which reflects upon the whole question of popularity of popular music, has to be scrutinized in order to throw some light upon the potentialities of the situation. It may be made clear through an analogy from the visual field. Every moviegoer and every reader of magazine fiction is familiar with the effect of what may be called the obsolete modern: photographs of famous dancers who were considered alluring twenty years ago, revivals of Valentino films which, though the most glamorous of their day, appear hopelessly old-fashioned. This effect, originally discovered by French surrealists, has since become hackneyed. There are numerous magazines today that mock fashions as outmoded, although their popularity dates back only a few years and although the

very women who appear ridiculous in the past styles are at the same time regarded as the peak of smartness in present-day fashions. The rapidity with which the modern becomes obsolete has a very significant implication. It leads to the question whether the change of effect can possibly be due entirely to the objects in themselves, or whether the change must be at least partly accounted for by the disposition of the masses. Many of these who today laugh at the Babs Hutton of 1929 not only admire the Babs Hutton of 1940 but were thrilled by her in 1929 also. They could not now scoff at the Barbara Hutton of 1929 unless their admiration for her (or her peers) at that time contained in itself elements ready to tilt over into its opposite when historically provoked. The "craze" or frenzy for a particular fashion contains within itself the latent possibility of fury.

The same thing occurs in popular music. In jazz journalism it is known as "corniness." Any rhythmical formula which is out-dated, no matter how "hot" it is in itself, is regarded as ridiculous and therefore either flatly rejected or enjoyed with the smug feeling that the fashions now familiar to the listener are superior.

One could not possibly offer any musical criterion for certain musical formulas today considered tabu because they are corny—such as a sixteenth on the down beat with a subsequent dotted eighth. They need not be less sophisticated than any of the so-called swing formulas. It is even likely that in the pioneer days of jazz the rhythmical improvisations were less schematic and more complex than they are today. Nevertheless, the effect of corniness exists and makes itself felt very definitely.

An adequate explanation that can be offered even without going into questions that require psychoanalytical interpretation is the following: Likes that have been enforced upon listeners provoke revenge the moment the pressure is relaxed. They compensate for their "guilt" in having condoned the worthless by making fun of it. But the pressure is relaxed only as often as attempts are made to foist something "new" upon the public. Thus, the psychology of the corny effect is reproduced again and again and is likely to continue indefinitely.

The ambivalence illustrated by the effect of corniness is due to the tremendous increase of the disproportion between the individual and the social power. An individual person is faced with an individual song which he is apparently free either to accept or reject. By the plugging and support given the song by powerful agencies, he is deprived of the freedom of rejection which he might still be capable of maintaining toward the individual song. To dislike the song is no longer an expression of subjective taste but rather a rebellion against

the wisdom of a public utility and a disagreement with the millions of people who are assumed to support what the agencies are giving them. Resistance is regarded as the mark of bad citizenship, as inability to have fun, as highbrow insincerity, for what normal person can set himself against such normal music?

Such a quantitative increase of influence beyond certain limits, however, fundamentally alters the composition of individuality itself. A strong-willed political prisoner may resist all sorts of pressure until methods such as not allowing him to sleep for several weeks are introduced. At that point he will readily confess even to crimes he has not committed. Something similar takes place with the listener's resistance as a result of the tremendous quantity of force operating upon him. Thus, the disproportion between the strength of any individual and the concentrated social structure brought to bear upon him destroys his resistance and at the same time adds a bad conscience for his will to resist at all. When popular music is repeated to such a degree that it does not any longer appear to be a device but rather an inherent element of the natural world, resistance assumes a different aspect because the unity of individuality begins to crack. This of course does not imply absolute elimination of resistance. But it is driven into deeper and deeper strata of the psychological structure. Psychological energy must be directly invested in order to overcome resistance. For this resistance does not wholly disappear in yielding to external forces, but remains alive within the individual and still survives even at the very moment of acceptance. Here spite becomes drastically active.

It is the most conspicuous feature of the listeners' ambivalence toward popular music. They shield their preferences from any imputation that they are manipulated. Nothing is more unpleasant than the confession of dependence. The shame aroused by adjustment to injustice forbids confession by the ashamed. Hence, they turn their hatred rather on those who point to their dependence than on those who tie their bonds.

The transfer of resistance skyrockets in those spheres which seem to offer an escape from the material forces of repression in our society and which are regarded as the refuge of individuality. In the field of entertainment the freedom of taste is hailed as supreme. To confess that individuality is ineffective here as well as in practical life would lead to the suspicion that individuality may have disappeared altogether; that is, that it has been reduced by standardized behavior patterns to a totally abstract idea which no longer has any definite content. The mass of listeners have been put in complete readiness

to join the vaguely realized conspiracy directed without inevitable malice against them, to identify themselves with the inescapable, and to retain ideologically that freedom which has ceased to exist as a reality. The hatred of the deception is transferred to the threat of realizing the deception and they passionately defend their own attitude since it allows them to be voluntarily cheated.

The material, to be accepted, necessitates this spite, too. Its commodity-character, its domineering standardization, is not so hidden as to be imperceptible altogether. It calls for psychological action on the part of the listener. Passivity alone is not enough. The listener must force himself to accept.

Spite is most apparent in the case of extreme adherents of popular music—jitterbugs.

Superficially, the thesis about the acceptance of the inescapable seems to indicate nothing more than the relinquishing of spontaneity: the subjects are deprived of any residues of free will with relation to popular music and tend to produce passive reactions to what is given them and to become mere centers of socially conditioned reflexes. The entomological term jitterbug underscores this. It refers to an insect who has the jitters, who is attracted passively by some given stimulus, such as light. The comparison of men with insects betokens the recognition that they have been deprived of autonomous will.

But this idea requires qualifications. They are already present in the official jitterbug terminology. Terms like the latest craze, swing frenzy, alligator, rug-cutter, indicate a trend that goes beyond socially conditioned reflexes: fury. No one who has ever attended a jitterbug jamboree or discussed with jitterbugs current issues of popular music can overlook the affinity of their enthusiasm to fury, which may first be directed against the critics of their idols but which may tilt over against the idols themselves. This fury cannot be accounted for simply by the passive acceptance of the given. It is essential to ambivalence that the subject not simply react passively. Complete passivity demands unambiguous acceptance. However, neither the material itself nor observation of the listeners supports the assumption of such unilateral acceptance. Simply relinquishing resistance is not sufficient for acceptance of the inescapable.

Enthusiasm for popular music requires wilful resolution by listeners, who must transform the external order to which they are subservient into an internal order. The endowment of musical commodities with libido energy is manipulated by the ego. This manipulation is not entirely unconscious therefore. It may be assumed that among those jitterbugs who are not experts and yet are enthusiastic

about Artie Shaw or Benny Goodman, the attitude of "switched on" enthusiasm prevails. They "join the ranks," but this joining does not only imply their conformity to given standards; it also implies a decision to conform. The appeal of the music publishers to the public to "join the ranks" manifests that the decision is an act of will, close to the surface of consciousness.¹

The whole realm of jitterbug fanaticism and mass hysteria about popular music is under the spell of spiteful will decision. Frenzied enthusiasm implies not only ambivalence insofar as it is ready to tilt over into real fury or scornful humor toward its idols but also the effectuation of such spiteful will decision. The ego in forcing enthusiasm, must over-force it, since "natural" enthusiasm would not suffice to do the job and overcome resistance. It is this element of deliberate overdoing which characterizes frenzy and self-conscious² hysteria. The popular music fan must be thought of as going his way firmly shutting his eyes and gritting his teeth in order to avoid deviation from what he has decided to acknowledge. A clear and calm view would jeopardize the attitude that has been inflicted upon him and that he in turn tries to inflict upon himself. The original will decision upon which his enthusiasm is based is so superficial that the slightest critical consideration would destroy it unless it is strengthened by the craze which here serves a quasi-rational purpose.

Finally a trend ought to be mentioned which manifests itself in the gestures of the jitterbug: the tendency toward self-caricature which appears to be aimed at by the gaucheries of the jitterbugs so often advertised by magazines and illustrated newspapers. The jitterbug looks as if he would grimace at himself, at his own enthusiasm and at his own enjoyment which he denounces even while pretending to enjoy himself. He mocks himself as if he were secretly hoping for the day of judgment. By his mockery he seeks to gain exoneration for the fraud he has committed against himself. His sense of humor makes everything so shifty that he cannot be put—or, rather, put himself—on the spot for any of his reactions. His bad taste, his fury, his hidden resistance, his insincerity, his latent contempt for himself, everything is cloaked by "humor" and therewith neutralized. This interpretation is the more justified as it is quite unlikely that the ceaseless repetition of the same effects would allow for genuine merriment. No one enjoys a joke he has heard a hundred times.³

¹On the back of the sheet version of a certain hit, there appears the appeal: "Follow Your Leader, Artie Shaw."

²One hit goes: "I'm Just a Jitterbug."

³It would be worth while to approach this problem experimentally by taking motion pictures of jitterbugs in action and later examining them in terms of gestural psychology. Such an experiment could also yield valuable results with regard to the question

(footnote continued on next page)

There is an element of fictitiousness in all enthusiasm about popular music. Scarcely any jitterbug is thoroughly hysterical about swing or thoroughly fascinated by a performance. In addition to some genuine response to rhythmical stimuli, mass hysteria, fanaticism and fascination themselves are partly advertising slogans after which the victims pattern their behavior. This self-delusion is based upon imitation and even histrionics. The jitterbug is the actor of his own enthusiasm or the actor of the enthusiastic front page model presented to him. He shares with the actor the arbitrariness of his own interpretation. He can switch off his enthusiasm as easily and suddenly as he turns it on. He is only under a spell of his own making.

But the closer the will decision, the histrionics, and the imminence of self-denunciation in the jitterbug are to the surface of consciousness, the greater is the possibility that these tendencies will break through in the mass, and, once and for all, dispense with controlled pleasure. They cannot be altogether the spineless lot of fascinated insects they are called and like to style themselves. They need their will, if only in order to down the all too conscious premonition that something is "phony" with their pleasure. This transformation of their will indicates that will is still alive and that under certain circumstances it may be strong enough to get rid of the superimposed influences which dog its every step.

In the present situation it may be appropriate for these reasons—which are only examples of much broader issues of mass psychology—to ask to what extent the whole psychoanalytical distinction between the conscious and the unconscious is still justified. Present-day mass reactions are very thinly veiled from consciousness. It is the paradox of the situation that it is almost insuperably difficult to break through this thin veil. Yet truth is subjectively no longer so unconscious as it is expected to be. This is borne out by the fact that in the political praxis of authoritarian regimes the frank lie in which no one actually believes is more and more replacing the "ideologies" of yesterday which had the power to convince those who believed in them. Hence, we cannot content ourselves with merely stating that spontaneity has been replaced by blind acceptance of the enforced material. Even the belief that people today react like insects and are degenerating into mere centers of socially conditioned reflexes, still belongs to the façade. Too well does it serve the purpose of those

of how musical standards and "deviations" in popular music are apperceived. If one would take sound tracks simultaneously with the motion pictures one could find out i.e. how far the jitterbugs react gesturally to the syncopations they pretend to be crazy about and how far they respond simply to the ground beats. If the latter is the case it would furnish another index for the fictitiousness of this whole type of frenzy.

who prate about the New Mythos and the irrational powers of community. Rather, spontaneity is consumed by the tremendous effort which each individual has to make in order to accept what is enforced upon him—an effort which has developed for the very reason that the veneer veiling the controlling mechanisms has become so thin. In order to become a jitterbug or simply to “like” popular music, it does not by any means suffice to give oneself up and to fall in line passively. To become transformed into an insect, man needs that energy which might possibly achieve his transformation into a man.

Radio as an Instrument of Reducing Personal Insecurity.

By Harold D. Lasswell.

As long as radio reflects the interests of an individualistic society, there will be "psychological" programs, programs devoted to the explanation and handling of human nature. The child who is born into an individualistic society develops acute consciousness of his own ego, since he is trained to compare himself incessantly with all potential rivals. He is taught to discipline his own impulses in the interest of success, and by success is meant the improvement of his control over such values as power, respect and income. In return for work well done, success is said to be sure. (It is no accident that one of the most popular mottoes of the last generation was "Strive and Succeed"; this formula is one of the most characteristic expressions of modern individualism.)

The taste for psychology may be found among all men everywhere, but only among individualistic societies does the taste become a craving that approaches the magnitude of an addiction. Within the general framework of such a culture, there are zones of special emphasis upon individualistic achievement. The child who is reared in a middle class family usually grows to share the middle class aspiration to rise in the world. The middle class child is the quintessential climber in a society of climbers ("climbing" is spoken of technically as "mobility upward", as improvement of status in the distribution of available values in a community).

Whatever conflicts are found in the culture as a whole are brought to burning focus in the lives of middle class children. The ideological structure of our own society is no homogenous unity, since it contains ideals that are difficult to hold in balanced relation to one another. There is great stress upon individual achievement; but this is mitigated by the virtues of service and loyalty. Within the occupational network of our culture are found two sharply contrasting types, one devoted to the pursuit of money, the other to the service of non-pecuniary aims. (Recall, in this connection, the difference between what is expected of a businessman and of a clergyman.)

The double standard of success and service creates enormous difficulties in the lives of middle class boys and girls. If the middle

class is the germinating bed of ambitious climbers, it is also the custodian of morality, of ideals of sacrifice on behalf of values that transcend the limits of the individual ego. The typical conflict within the personality of the middle class youth is between "ambition" and "ideals"; the individual suffers from contradictory emphases that are found throughout the total structure of an individualistic society.

Given the individualistic traditions of American life, we know that the taste for psychology will be particularly active during periods of social difficulty. When they meet rebuff severe crises are generated within the personalities of all who share individualistic traditions. From the earliest days they have been trained to appraise the value of the ego in terms of success and failure. If they proudly accept responsibility for what they achieve, they seem bound to accept the onus of blame for what they do not attain. But they are restive under the onus of responsibility for lack of success. When they are thrown back upon themselves, they seek escape from the keen anxieties that arise from the feelings of futility and guilt. At such times the need of insight, the need of clarification of the position of the person in relation to the whole of experience, is most acute; and "psychology" is one of the symbols of reference to those who claim expert knowledge of human nature. Hence the prominence of "psychology" in the interest scale of insecure people; hence the truth in the prediction that as long as the media of mass communication in an individualistic society reflect popular sentiment, they will concern themselves with psychology—to some extent at all times; to a greater extent in times of general insecurity.

Explanations of human nature, popular or scientific, fall in three convenient categories. Stress may be put upon the impulses and ideas of the person, upon the environment to which he is exposed, or upon a balance of internal and external factors. Strictly speaking, there is a continuous gradation from one extreme to the other, hence there are varying degrees of balance and imbalance in between. For the sake of clarity we may speak of Type A, concerned with the internal environment, Type B, descriptive of the external environment, and Type C, presenting a balance of the two sets of factors. The scientific point of view is Type C. It is, of course, taken for granted that there are large degrees of difference in the amount of stress put upon internal or external factors among various groups of specialists.

Type A may be illustrated by the following excerpt from a broadcast by the present writer:¹

¹Number 12, *Human Nature in Action*, Sustaining Program of the National Broadcasting Company, April 5, 1940. The script collaborator was Albert N. Williams of NBC.

(In accordance with the plan of the series, the "Dictator" type of personality is shown from four successive standpoints: conventional, intimate, unconscious, formative. An example of characterization from the conventional standpoint):

MAN: (FADE ON) Well—let me tell you one thing. You may be Mayor of this town—but you don't any more run this town than you run my business—my business is this town. . . .

ANALYST: We will call this man the hyperaggressive type, which means simply that here is a man who imposes his personality upon other people to an intense degree. This man could have been a dictator. In fact, he is definitely of the stuff from which Napoleons are made. . . .

(From an intimate point of view):

MAN: (FADE ON) Huh! Look down their noses at me because I never went to college. . . . I don't know modern art. . . . I don't know literature. . . . I think I better have my secretary get me some books on modern art and the next time I have a dinner party I'll teach those people a thing or two about their own subjects. . . .

ANALYST: You see what the psychology of this man is? Every time he feels inferior because of a blind spot in his intellectual makeup he immediately takes drastic measures to correct that fact. He is a very imaginative, well-trained man; he is a highly disciplined person who knows his weaknesses, and takes immediate steps to correct them. . . .

(From an unconscious point of view, as reflected in his dreams):

(DREAM TECHNIQUE)

MAN: This art gallery of mine . . . this great art gallery . . . those pictures cost a million dollars . . . each one cost a million dollars . . . they are the greatest pictures in the world and nobody can see them except me . . . ohhh . . . it's pulling off my arms . . . it's pulling off my right arm . . . and ohhh that picture . . . is pulling off my right leg . . . I'm being killed . . . those pictures are pulling off my arms and legs . . . ohhhhhhhh (FADE).

ANALYST: Yes . . . the pattern of his dreams is quite similar . . . great possessions and then final destruction. . . .

The foregoing extracts concentrate attention upon the inner life of the subject, and relate behavior and conduct in the immediate present chiefly to other parts of the internal environment. The dream life is brought prominently into the focus of attention as an index of the incompatible tendencies that are found within the "Dictator's" personality. Taken out of its context, we have here a rather good example of Type A.

The following excerpts deal with the formative years of the same man:

BOY: (FADE ON) Have to work at a paper stand all day long . . . I can play baseball . . . I can have a good time like the other kids . . . but mother says that I've got to work at a paper stand all day long . . . never have any fun, never have any time to play baseball . . . never any money to go to the movies. . . .

ANALYST: Yes . . . he was a victim of poverty . . . he couldn't enjoy a free life of boyhood, but had to work. . . .

These sentences relate the boy to his external environment, emphasizing both his poverty and the exactions of his mother. Taken by themselves, we would not hesitate to classify them in Type B of the explanations mentioned above. Taken in conjunction, as part of the same script as Type A, they justify the inclusion of the broadcast in Type C, the balanced type.

For the proper study of psychological broadcasts, as of any broadcast, content analysis is essential. If we are to discover the effect of psychological programs upon the listening audience, we must make use of the methods adequate to the task of describing them. In the foregoing example, we have illustrated a very crude variety of content analysis. Excerpts have been selected that answer two opposite specifications: Presentation of the subject as dependent upon his internal environment; presentation of the subject as dependent upon his external environment. More refined methods would make it possible to describe relative degrees of such presentations within the limits of these selected excerpts. The soliloquy about the rebuff at the dinner party obviously refers to an interpersonal situation in the recent past of the subject. The connection of the dream sequence with an external situation involving people is not evident on the face of the record. Hence the dream sequence falls entirely within the category of the subjective event without explicit reference to an immediate feature of the personal environment. (The allusions to the gallery are not explicitly made to people.)²

Why is it important to distinguish carefully among the forms of psychological explanation that are current in our society? Chiefly because there are very searching hypotheses about the alleged effect of these various forms upon political and social movements. We have no adequate data at present that enable us to confirm or to disaffirm any seriously held hypothesis about the effects of psychological

²It is not within the scope of this article to pursue the problem of content analysis any further. Reference may be made in this connection to H. D. Lasswell, "A Provisional Classification of Symbol Data," *Psychiatry* (1938): 1:197-204.

programs upon those who listen. However, the possibility that research may yield data on significant questions is presumably increased when we guide our investigations by important hypotheses; and with this in mind, we have put in the very forefront of this discussion the classification of programs according to the stress given to internal or external factors in the causation of conduct and behavior.

And what are the socially significant hypotheses that lay so much emphasis upon the type of psychological explanation? With the greatest succinctness, the hypothesis (a compound hypothesis) is that in an individualistic society in our historical period Type A has reactionary, Type B has revolutionary, and Type C has adjustive effects. Let us consider what is meant by the suggestion that Type A has reactionary results upon the auditing group. It is said that such explanations of human activity lead the individual to concentrate his attention upon the subtleties of private experience, and to divert his gaze from the broad situations in the culture that need change, if more healthy private lives are to be made possible. Explanations of Type B, on the other hand, fix attention upon the broader outlines of the institutions of society, and attaches to them major responsibility for the distortion of human personality. It is predicted that those who accept explanations of the B type are more disposed to participate actively in social and political movements for the fundamental reconstruction of the social order.

In passing, it may be suggested that the first hypothesis is plausible, as stated, only if immediate effects are taken into consideration. It is doubtful if passivity is the enduring response to incessant stress upon subjective factors. On the contrary; if the level of general insecurity continues high, more and more members of the community may be expected to be "fed up" on "little Willie stories," upon childhood memories to account for difficulties that seem plausibly accounted for by the threat of unemployment and of invasion from abroad. If the revulsion against "Hamletism" rises to significant dimensions, the choice of activist symbols depends upon the alternatives available at the moment (revolutionary, counter-revolutionary).³

In any case Types A and B are probably connected with rigid and dogmatic ways of responding to the difficulties of adapting a richly complicated social structure to internal and external stress. Type C is the pattern of psychological explanation that may be expected to

³The hypothesis that explanations of Type B necessarily lead to "progressive" political movements is among the unconfirmed, though dogmatically reiterated, assertions of Communists.

nourish and sustain the progressive adjustment of an individualistic society to the needs of the time. In Type C the emphasis is balanced, correcting over-emphasis upon an individualistic ideology without flying to the opposite extreme of dogmatic anti-individualism.

It is not easy to give currency to balanced explanations of the C type. We know only too well that specialists as well as laymen have their difficulties when they try to clarify the complex interrelationships of internal and external environments. Among scientists the inept days of opposing such ambiguities as "heredity" versus "environment" are practically at an end. Yet among laymen echoes of the past continue to resound in the overtones of popular speech. We have not made proper use of our modern instruments of communication to clarify the community as a whole about the nature of human nature, about the complex interrelations between one person and another. We can demonstrate in many instances the connection between timidity and the kind of maternal care received by the individual; yet these distinctions, often corroborated by common experience, are obscure when the layman begins to think about "human nature." He is unprovided with a vocabulary appropriate to the context. Subtle interconnections are dramatized in his mind around crude expressions like "heredity" or "environment"; there is little perception of the variable degrees of effectiveness to be assigned to the internal or the external environment at a given moment. No doubt the use of such expressions as "interpersonal relations" will polarize many realistic associations in the minds of laymen. Eventually it may be possible to talk quietly about different kinds of interpersonal situations, and to estimate the relative influence of internal and external factors upon the adjustment of each participant.

It is necessary to experiment with different ways of bringing language about the internal and the external environment into the same universe of discourse. The present writer has experimented in this direction by inviting attention to focus upon "impulses" and "practices," with special reference to "destructive impulses" and "destructive practices." Human destructiveness is thus expressed in two forms, directly through destructive impulses that are unchecked, and less directly through institutional practices that provoke crises by creating situations in which destructive impulses are sharply stimulated. The task of reducing human destructiveness is to discover and to spread proper methods of controlling destructive impulses, once aroused, and of reducing the occasions that prod them into concentrated life.

In addition to a common language that balances internal and external factors in the explanation of human nature in action, there

is need of common language about important specific factors. The writer has experimented in this direction by calling attention to "hurt ego" (alternatively: "damaged self-esteem," "endangered self-respect," "damaged deference," "compromised human dignity" . . .) as a major cause of human destructiveness. This emphasis is in line with the findings of modern psychiatry, and of other branches of specialized research on the dynamics of personality formation.⁴ This method of analysis was presented on the radio in two forms, one a series of lectures, and the other a series of dramatizations with analysis.⁵

Quite apart from the question of whether these specific formulations are fortunate or not, the urgency of directing radio research toward the study of the effects of different kinds of psychological broadcasts is great. If any of the basic hypotheses about Types A, B and C are true, they are of the gravest importance for understanding the human consequences of radio as an instrument of communication in American society. It should not be forgotten that psychological explanations are not only given currency over the radio in broadcasts that happen to be called "psychological." In fact, the most important effect of radio upon the popular understanding of psychological causation may take place in "commercial" broadcasts that have never been conceived as disseminating psychological information or misinformation. If, in this discussion, we refer to explicitly labelled "psychological" (or near psychological) programs, we do not lose sight of the total problem of assessing, through any period of time, the total psychological content of the broadcasts to which the listening audience is subjected.

For the guidance of research and policy in reference to psychological broadcasts, let us specify in more detail the objectives to be sought. We assume, at the outset, that the socially significant purpose of these broadcasts is *insecurity reduction*. The reduction of the national level of insecurity can be sought by means of broadcasts that contribute to *insight, recognition, and selection*.

⁴A recent clarifying statement is by Harry Stack Sullivan, President, The William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, Washington, D. C., "Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry," *Psychiatry* (1940) 3:1-117.

⁵The first series of Human Nature in Action began May 17, 1939, and concluded August 9, 1939. The second (dramatized) series began January 12, 1940, and ended December 17, 1940 (with number 46). The writer proposed the idea of combining dramatization with analytic comment some time before the series. He was fortunate in having assigned to him a talented writer and director, Albert N. Williams, who had been experimenting along many new program lines, including the combination of drama with comment. The experiments were undertaken at the instance of James Rowland Angell and Walter Preston, Jr., of NBC. The contrast between the lecture-question method and the drama-analysis pattern may be seen with special clarity by contrasting the last episode of the first series with "The Dictator."

(1) *Insight*. To some extent the anxiety level of individuals can be reduced by insight, rendering them less tense, less worried and irritable, less compulsive in their attitude toward themselves and the world.

(2) *Recognition*. Persons can be trained to recognize personality conditions that require expert assistance. Many tragedies have been averted because someone has had the discrimination to steer individuals into competent hands before destructive breakdown took place.

(3) *Selection*. Assuming that dangerous conditions can be recognized, there is the added step of selecting competent experts.

Patient research is needed to translate these standards into the specifics of practical application. It would be unwise to underestimate the complexity of the problems involved at each step in the inquiry. With reference to insight, for example, we know that there is no one-to-one correspondence between degrees of insight and levels of anxiety, although there is a broad inverse relationship between the two (the greater the insight, the less the anxiety). More refined study shows that the initial phases of an insight process intensify anxiety before they release it. There are subjectively complacent individuals who must endure sharp increases in the level of their anxiety before they can achieve enough insight to bring about a general reduction in anxiety and tension.⁶

Taking it for granted that conscientious and skillful investigation will reduce the ambiguity of these standards, we may take the further step of formulating the characteristics of programs compatible with them.

1. *Cautious Optimism*. Optimism is needed if listeners are to feel reassured about the possibility of freeing themselves (and others) of anxiety. Yet there is need of restraint in reference to the removal of noxious subjective states, since optimism can be carried so far that it arouses incredulity and leads to frustration. False optimism can prepare the way for crushing disillusionment. Hence the need of cautious optimism—for calm, matter-of-factness, for balanced and unexaggerated statement, for emphasis upon slow and steady effort to surmount difficulties, for expert attention to cope with many difficult situations.

2. *Restrained Endorsement of Specific Means*. In a sense this is a sub-category of "cautious optimism," but it is singled out for coordinate emphasis because of the frequency with which it is dis-

⁶"Uncertainty" is a realistic appraisal of a situation whose outcome is indeterminate. "Anxiety" is a dysphoric subjective state that is disproportionate to the external situation.

regarded in current practice. Our dependable knowledge of human nature is regrettably meagre, and restraint is needed in the endorsement of any diagnosis or of any therapeutic expedient. There can be confidence without over-confidence in the efficacy of any specific item.

3. *Balance of Internal and External Factors.* We have dealt extensively above with the need of maintaining a balance between internal and external factors in the explanation of human activity.

4. *Balance of Prestigious and Non-prestigious Instances.* There is danger in crippling the usefulness of psychology if it is popularly understood as a system of innuendo. This impression can be gained when psychological explanations are invoked only to account for the Hitlers and never for the Churchills. It is true that we seek psychological insight chiefly to get rid of disturbing personal relations; yet there is a theory of "successes" as well as "distortions."

5. *Guidance to Competent Specialists.* If the listening audience is to act wisely with reference to dangerous human situations, there is need of definite instruction about how to identify such situations, and how to get in touch with competent specialists. But who, it may be asked, are the competent specialists? Our knowledge of human nature has been growing with startling rapidity in recent years, and the onrush of new data has not been critically evaluated and finally assimilated into our social inheritance. No one body of specialized observers can justifiably claim to monopolize useful knowledge of man and his works. Yet there are certain extreme conditions in which it is imperative to establish contact with a qualified physician, and preferably a psychiatrist. Over the years, no doubt, guidance will present less delicate problems than it does today; it is unlikely that we will suffer from another inundation of interpretations and methods quite as extensive as occurred during the past generation. (Contrast Sigmund Freud, for example, with Ivan P. Pavlov.)

Let no one assume that the present writer is under the impression that the series of programs to which reference has been made in this article constitutes a model of conformity to these standards. Without passing judgment upon degree to which the Human Nature in Action broadcasts as a whole measure up to these requirements, certain deficiencies may be specified at once. It is probable that the "optimism score" of some of the broadcasts would be low. "The Dictator," for example, contained little if any explicit suggestion that tendencies toward the formation of dictatorial personalities could be brought under control. To some extent, of course, any balanced explanation of human personality contributes to optimism, since it suggests that what can be understood can be partially directed. Some

of the broadcasts were explicit in suggesting that certain noxious situations had been cleared up by means of proper methods of thought and of adjusting the external environment. But in the main the series was diagnostic, and offered a bare minimum of specific therapeutic suggestions. For this reason the series would obtain a high score on a "restrained endorsement" scale. In fact one irate (and highly exceptional) listener expressed the sentiment of an unknown number of his colleagues when he wrote:

I would like to be delivered from the recital of case after case of neurotic aberration, from Psychiatry, "our latest experiment in ignorance," into some hope of sanity through mental hygiene,—the only *constructive hope* for relief and upbuilding. From long and close study of the methods of so-called psychiatrists, I am convinced that they tend to *deepen every morbid tendency*—instead of leading out and up and on into sanity and balance. We aren't all morons who wish to swallow such stuff as is dealt out. From dealing with subnormal and diseased, you seem to accept them as typical. Surely there is no hope or uplift on that line.

Probably, too, the broadcasts would rank high on "balance of internal and external factors." There would be a lower score, and possibly a much lower score, on the "balance of prestigious and non-prestigious instances," although the second third of the second series had to do with historical personages of some eminence.

We need much careful investigation to determine the effect of psychological programs in general, and of specific patterns in particular, upon various listening audiences. The effect will depend, in part, upon the varied predispositions latent and active in the personalities of those who listen. Indeed, one of the most interesting questions to be raised in connection with psychological broadcasts is who listens to them at all. This is what Paul F. Lazarsfeld calls the preselective effect, the self-selecting not only of radio as a channel of communication, but of specific types of program.

Very few facts are known about those who listen to psychological broadcasts. From the general theory of response, however, we may propose certain hypotheses as a guide to future study. Any response is a function of two sets of factors, environmental and predispositional (R is a function of E and P . P is equivalent to the expression "internal environment" used above). The probability of a positive rather than a negative response to any given environment is increased if past response to the dominant features of the environment have been followed by gains rather than losses (if the environment has changed indulgently rather than deprivationally to the responder). Now who are the people who may be said to be predisposed toward

listening to a psychological program? (Whether they keep it up or not can be predicted on the same principle; if the listening is followed by gains, the probability of further listening is increased.)

Certainly we may expect that one listening group will be composed of (1) *those who talk or want to talk about psychology*. By watching the technique of the broadcast, they hope to improve their own skill in talking about the subject. In the past they have often gained vocabulary by exposing themselves to the language of others about psychology; hence we may expect them to continue until their gains drop down. (It should be noted that the responses that affect predisposition may be the focussing of attention upon the successful responses of others.)

The following references to those who listened to the Human Nature in action programs are intended to add concreteness to general hypotheses here outlined about the preselective effects of psychological broadcasts. It was not possible to study the listening audience with enough care to create an inclusive picture.

One listening group was composed of colleagues in various universities who were interested in the problem of talking about psychology to laymen, and who wanted to form a first-hand impression of the drama-analysis technique of presentation. (I may also add, in all candor, that some of them, acquainted with some of my technical publications, listened out of sheer incredulity that the writer could deliver a simple and popular lecture.) The writer received a steady trickle of criticisms from these colleagues, many of whom were not personally known to him. Often the suggestions were very penetrating. One distinguished psychiatrist and social psychologist wrote as follows:

Unfortunately I heard only three so far but I think that is enough to get some impression of the whole. What I want to say is that I found the ones I heard very good indeed. It seems to me that the idea of blending theoretical explanation with slight dramatization is an excellent one. It makes the whole thing very much alive and at the same time in no way cheapens it. Your theoretical comment and the examples chosen seem to me excellent and I should think that they attain the purpose of giving knowledge and of suggesting thought to a wide range of people. . . . I think it might be a good idea to emphasize somewhat more that given such and such childhood background, this background is not the simple "cause" for a specific outcome but that certain other factors which complicate the picture and which cannot be dealt with in the broadcast make for the one or other outcome. In other words, I feel that although one should show the listener the general lines of development, one should also make him feel how complex the causal relationship between early experiences and later personality development is.

Another social psychologist with psychoanalytical training found much to praise in the method of presentation, but he, too, wanted more explicit references to the part of the social structure in which the child was reared. He was inclined to the view that the use of "psychological" language obscured the correlation of the conduct discussed with facts of social structure. Thus some of the situations depicted in the broadcasts were typical of lower middle class families in which an ambitious mother believes that she has married "beneath her position," and strives to realize through the children the career that she "threw away." And in the text of the analytical comments there were no explicit references made to these important facts about the position of the family in the structure of society.

These remarks, it will be noted, bear on the all-important question of the proper balance between internal and external factors, and they reflect judgments made during the first series and the first half of the second series, when the facts of the internal environment were conspicuous.^{6a}

Incidentally such appraisals show how broadcasts on psychology can be critically used for educational purposes. It would be a mistake to imagine that radio broadcasts can substitute for textbook or lecture in the classroom (as some over-enthusiasts have occasionally suggested). The chief role of the psychological broadcast in relation to classroom work is supplementary in two directions. To some extent the broadcast can enliven the interest of some classes in the subject, and confer a sense of vivid reality upon some of the words in the text, or in the lecture delivered by a familiar teacher. Of more importance is the critical study of the material included (and excluded) in the broadcast. To what extent is a balance held between internal and external factors? To what extent is the terminology chosen consistent with particular schools of systematic thought? To what degree is the vocabulary clarifying to the layman, and consistent with a scientifically defensible framework?

Some teachers wrote in to report on discussions with colleagues who listened to the broadcasts, or to tell about the result of classroom discussion after a broadcast.

Among the many specialists who communicated with the writer were sociologists, social psychologists, psychologists, political scientists, anthropologists, economists, philosophers, psychiatrists, physicians, social workers, adult educators, army morale officers, educational directors in CCC camps; college, junior college, and high school administrators; high school teachers of the social studies;

^{6a}See footnote 5.

clergymen; librarians; graphologists; nurses; students (many in search of "term paper" material).

From the foregoing listeners who use or want to use language about psychology, we pass over to a group (2) that is *aware of the problem of manipulating other people* (without necessarily wanting to talk about the theory of it). This group is separated by a gentle slope, rather than a sharp cliff, from the first group here described (and detailed study might show that the persons referred to here belong in the first class). The manipulators (who may actually avoid shop talk about psychology, for fear of arousing the "guinea pig response") include public relations counsels, advertising men, display consultants, salesmen, playwrights, lawyers, receptionists, dentists, teachers of music and art.

The last group (3) in the present list includes the enormous total of those who suffer from *anxiety or uncertainty about the self or others*. In this group are some of the patients in mental and other hospitals, mothers left behind by their children, jilted suitors and partners in marital splits, elderly persons concerned about senescence, young parents (prospective, actual), disturbed adolescents, anxious bachelor women (more often than men), and the like.

Systematic study would enable us to locate the zones in the social structure that, at a given time, give rise to the most disturbed personalities. We have already called attention to the conflictful middle classes; but an inclusive survey would explore all the classes distinguished according to power, respect, income, safety.⁷

What are the forms of response available to the groups that pre-select psychological programs? Since we have selected insecurity reduction as the social purpose of psychological broadcasting, it is convenient to consider responses as follows:

- (1) Immediate or eventual reduction of anxiety in the self, (a) with the reduction of anxiety in others, (b) with the increase of anxiety in others;
- (2) Immediate or eventual increase of anxiety in the self, (a) with increased anxiety in others, (b) with decreased anxiety in others.

From case studies we know that the reduction of anxiety in one person is not invariably followed by reductions in the anxiety of those whom he affects. If a timid husband becomes more assertive as he

⁷A suggestive inventory by a contemporary psychiatrist is by James S. Plant, *Personality and the Cultural Pattern*, New York, 1937. For a more comprehensive and systematic picture, consult Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*; *Studies in Modern Social Structure*, New York, 1940.

overcomes certain internal limitations, he may precipitate severe difficulties in the personality of his wife, if she is unstably integrated. We know, too, that increasing anxiety may reduce anxiety in others, if the effect of augmented anxiety is to reduce the provocative intimidation of another person.

Reliable data about the effects of psychological broadcasts must come from observers who obtain a total, intensive view of persons who preselect such radio programs.⁸ It is futile to attempt to infer effects from the classification of the mail received from the listening audience. We do not know who writes, as distinguished from who listens and does not write; and we do not know what connection there is between what is written, and the effect of the broadcast upon the level of anxiety.

However, the mail received from the radio audience need not be ignored entirely, since we may classify it into groups and undertake to do the field work needed to discover the correlation between the manner of man who writes in a given vein, and the total effect of the broadcast.

It is convenient to separate the mail received from the listening audience into those containing *no special requests* and *special requests*. Another interesting classification is according to *plus* or *minus* references to the speaker and the program.

(Since an example of extremely adverse criticism was given above, this may be balanced by instances of extremely favorable criticism. The following is by Bob Landry, able radio editor of *VARIETY* (February 7, 1940), who had this to say in the exuberant language of the showman's journal:

A professor of social psychology, Harold Lasswell, has de-jinxed the well-known but little-loved "educational program" and is proving on Friday nights at 10:45 over the NBC red that a touch of showmanship will transform the potentially dull into the vividly engrossing. . . . He has evolved the lecture-with-dramatic-flashbacks. And it's highly stimulating as an authentic advance in the art of radio. The formula is as flexible as an Arabian acrobat.

The Lasswell series is called "Human Nature in Action" and deals with problems of neurosis (queer birds to you, muggs!), which is a subject that can get lost in the fog of big words in no time if the professor lets himself go. Lasswell not only keeps his theme in sharp focus all the way, but by the use of professional actors to illustrate his points is able to make the jump from the academic to the specific and, better than that, the dramatic fade-in and fade-out puts human sympathy and compassion into a subject that is often discussed as if sensitive human souls were so many pieces of rhinoceros skin.

⁸Concerning intensive and extensive standpoints of observation, see Harold D. Lasswell, "Person, Personality, Group, Culture," *Psychiatry* (1939) 2:533-561.

Mrs. Drudge, a gal with a tangled personality, was examined by the professor from the standpoint of what she is outwardly, privately, subconsciously, and, in retrospect, what influences moulded her. The actress who played Mrs. Drudge was excellent, and the whole effort stacked up as basic drama, viz., putting the human ego under a microscope and then magnifying it for the whole radio world. In its way it was as significant as the headlines from Finland.

To disarm his listeners, Lasswell has, with Confucius-like wisdom, omitted both "professor" and "doctor" from his billing.

Among those who make *no special requests*, several responses may be distinguished. Some go no further than to note examples of the types described by the speaker. Often the writer says no more than that he, himself, or someone known to him, is a "perfect example."

Sometimes the correspondent raises a general question that bears no avowed or obvious relationship to a worry. The problem is posed in the general spirit of intellectual inquiry; and there may be original disquisitions upon problems touched upon, or suggested by, the speaker.

Often the dominant trend of the letter seems to be self-justification. One example is a pencilled note from a New England farmer's wife:

You be careful what you say of the woman who can't make up her mind, the silly talking woman. She isn't as silly as you think. Just her way of doing business is with her heart and intuition which sounds pretty foolish to a hard headed business man. I graduated at 21 and tried every way to be a business woman. After six years I decided I was getting nowhere fast. At the time I had three or four men friends, and so I selected the one I thought would make a good husband and father. We were married. He is a smart young man and I have done everything to push him ahead. We own our own home and have three beautiful children. Perhaps you will call me a drudge. If so, I still like it. I don't like the little social clubs. They push me around too much and I haven't the time or it isn't worth the energy to push them around. Then I stay at home a lot. I have plenty of work. . . . Your radio program is fine. Keep up the good work. (Name and address.)

The *special request* communications ask for discussions or replies over the air, by special correspondence, or by personal consultation. (Sometimes there are requests to get the writer a job, or there are lecture and other invitations.)

One group poses a problem for discussion that is apparently not a problem that disturbs the writer, but is intellectually stimulating. One woman from a high income group, active in civic affairs, writes to suggest the analysis of two fellow townsmen, whom she describes

in friendly, and somewhat puzzled, fashion. A receptionist describes a fellow worker in detail, exhibiting no animus, and betraying no concern about the other worker as a serious problem.

Some write of problems in the handling of others (sometimes disguising the fact that the type described constitutes a specific problem to the writer). Representative is this terse, straightforward letter of a cultured woman from a farm community in the West:

Because of a problem which is confronting me—the problem of a young woman who, though she seems normal in other respects, has a tendency to literally fall in love with other women (and at present with my young daughter, a perfectly normal girl) I am writing for any available books, pamphlets, or printed information on the subject of perversion of this kind. I want, if possible, to help this strange young woman to understand herself, and in order to do so, I need information myself. If you can help me in any way by sending such information if you have it, or by directing me to any source where it can be obtained, I shall be glad to pay for your service, and for the material I may receive.

Much of the special request correspondence asks help in relation to the self as the dominant problem. Sometimes there is a slight disguise—as in the case of an alcoholic who called up over the long-distance telephone during a broadcast to ask for a discussion of the psychology of alcoholism, which he assured us would be of great benefit to the whole world (thus including himself).

Using these various categories of correspondence, it will be possible to select subjects from among those who respond to future psychological broadcasts, and to learn more about the impact of these programs upon determinate portions of the population. Such full knowledge of representative persons will enable us to test the revolutionary, reactionary, or adjustive effect of psychological programs of Types A, B, and C. Only when further investigation has been done can we translate general program standards into the specifics of effective policy, and embark with certainty upon the fundamental task of reducing the level of personal insecurity by the proper articulation of radio with every agency of mass communication.

On Borrowed Experience.

An Analysis of Listening to Daytime Sketches.

By Herta Herzog.

If, on an average weekday, one could see at a glance what all the women throughout the country are doing at a specific time, he would find at least two million of them listening to a so-called "day-time serial." Some of these women would just be sitting in front of the radio; most of them would be doing some housework at the same time; but all of these two millions would attentively follow the day's installment of a dramatization which mirrors scenes from the everyday life of middle class people. A number of these stories have gone on for eight years. Each day's episode is introduced by a short summary of the previous day's events, and winds up with questions preparing for the coming sequel. "What will Mrs. X do tomorrow?" "Will Fate catch up with Mr. Y?"

A program of this kind lasts fifteen minutes, and when it is finished another serial comes on the air. Often eight or ten such programs follow one another without interruption other than the voice of the announcer who tells about the product and the company sponsoring the particular dramatization. There are between two and three hundred stories broadcast over American stations during the day, and in one of the larger cities a woman can listen to a score or two of them between morning and evening without more effort than an occasional switch of the dial from one station to another.

Since the life of very many middle class and lower middle class people is uneventful, the variety of incidents in these programs is many times greater than anything which these women could live through or observe themselves. Thus the question comes up of whether, through daytime serials, radio is likely to have a great influence upon the attitude of these listeners toward their own lives and the problems they have to meet.

To determine the effect of these programs seems an urgent, but by no means easy task of contemporary social research. One would

have to study their content very carefully. One would have to know which women listen and which women do not listen. Most of all, one would have to check periodically, with a great variety of listeners, to see whether there are any changes in their way of thinking and living which could be traced to the programs.

The present study has tried to prepare the way for such a larger enterprise by reporting on interviews with a number of women who listen regularly and were asked about what these programs mean to them, why they listen, and what they do with what they hear. It is intended to give a picture of these women's reactions and to develop a conceptual framework which would be helpful for future, more elaborate analysis.

The Material.

The report is based on personal interviews obtained within the last two years with 100 women living in Greater New York. An effort was made to cover women in various age and income groups. Most of the persons interviewed were housewives, some had worked previous to their marriage, others had not. Among them were also a few high school students and a number of maids. All the women interviewed listened to at least two daytime serials regularly,¹ the number actually listened to varying from two to 22 programs daily. Thus, the study must be considered an analysis of fan listeners.

The first twenty interviews were made as "open" interviews to cover the ground thoroughly. From these discussions a questionnaire was developed which, in its final form, was used for the second half of the sample. The questionnaire covered the listening habits of the respondents, a detailed discussion of the favorite programs of each, a number of questions trying to get at the general appeal of the programs, and finally, some information about the listeners themselves, such as their reading habits, social activities, hobbies or special interests, favorite movies, and the things they wanted most in life. The questionnaire is attached in the Appendix.

"Getting into trouble and out again."

The listeners' reports on the content of their favorite stories boils down almost invariably to one stereotyped formula. Contents of various programs are described as "getting into trouble and out again." Following are a few answers given by the people studied when they were asked to describe their favorite story.

¹Sixty-five different programs were mentioned as listened to. The programs most frequently referred to were: Road of Life, Woman in White, Life Can Be Beautiful, and The Goldbergs.

I like DAVID HARUM. It is about a town philosopher who solves everyone's problems, even his enemies'. He is also in the races. Right now his horse has been poisoned and someone stole the body. They are trying to figure out why. *He always is in trouble and out again.*

My favorite is SOCIETY GIRL. The story is about a young man who marries the boss's daughter. The boss buys them a beautiful estate on Long Island. They are *going to have some kind of trouble* about the old graveyard and a tombstone which has been tampered with. They *will find a way out*, though.

I like the O'NEILLS. It is about a widowed mother and her children and grandchildren. The twins offer many problems. The son gets into riots, and the daughter may go to Chicago. But Ma O'Neill *will settle everything*, and *something else will come up*.

The average number of daytime serials listened to regularly by the women in this study is 6.6 programs. Very few of the listeners said "yes" to the question whether they were only listening "because there was nothing else on at this particular time of the day." When asked whether they selected the programs to fit their daily work-schedule or whether they adjusted their schedule to fit the programs, 31 per cent said the latter. Three-fourths of the listeners claimed they had never been "bored" with their favorite story, while 57 per cent could not mention any incident in the stories listened to which they had disliked in any way.

These data indicate an intensive and obviously quite satisfactory consumption of radio stories. How does this tie in with the fact that the "getting into trouble and out again" formula is applied to all the sketches? Why is it that people do not get tired of stories with the same theme?

Programs Picked to Match the Listener's Problems.

The listeners studied do not experience the sketches as fictitious or imaginary. They take them as reality and listen to them in terms of their own personal problems. Listeners to the same sketch agree about its "trouble" content, but find it realized in quite different ways. The following comments were made by women who listened to the same program, namely, ROAD OF LIFE.

It is concerning a doctor, his life and how he always tries to do the right thing. Sometimes he gets left out in the cold too.

Dr. Brent is a wonderful man, taking such good care of a poor little orphan boy. He is doing God's work.

It is a drama, Jim Brent and Dr. Parsons—jealousy, you know. There are several characters, but Jim Brent is the important one. He will win out in the end.

It is about a young doctor in Chicago. I like to hear how he cures sick people. It makes me wonder whether he could cure me too.

All of these listeners look for the "troubles" in the story and how they are solved, but each interprets the "trouble" situation according to her own problems. Thus, for example, a sick listener stresses the sick people cured by the doctor in the story. The young high school girl, who wishes she knew interesting people like Dr. Brent, picks the jealousy aspect of the story and the way Dr. Brent stands up to it. The woman over forty, with the memory of a sad childhood, insists that Dr. Brent "is doing God's work." And the mother sacrificing herself for an unappreciative family feels a common bond in the fact that "sometimes he (Dr. Brent) is left out in the cold too."

Each of these women also listens to a number of other programs. In picking the programs she likes, she selects those presenting problems which are to her mind most intimately related to her own. Sometimes all the stories listened to have the same central theme to the listener. Thus the woman quoted above, who likes Dr. Brent because of his kindness to the orphan boy, listens to four other programs which have a "kind adult" for one of their leading characters. Her comment on *RIGHT TO HAPPINESS* is: "The mother is a fine woman. She gave her life up for her child." Of *HILLTOP HOUSE* she says: "The woman there is not getting married because she has to take care of the orphanage." She also listens to *MYRT AND MARGE* and *THE O'NEILLS*, which she describes in similar terms as having a "kind mother" as the leading character.

Similarly, the young high school girl who would like to know a person like Dr. Brent listens, in addition to *ROAD OF LIFE*, to two more programs, which she describes as "love stories." They are *OUR GAL SUNDAY* and *HELEN TRENT*.

Sometimes the listeners go through quite a complicated process of shifting and exchanging incidents and characters in their favorite stories to suit their own particular needs. This behavior was brought out clearly in the case of a middle aged quite balanced woman whose chief interest in life is her family. She listens to only two radio programs because she claims she has "no time for more." Listening for her has the function of keeping alive the contact with the various members of her family when the real members are at work or in school. Her favorite story is *PEPPER YOUNG'S FAMILY*. She is interested in it because "the son there acts against his father just the way our son does." But she doesn't care for the mother in this sketch because "she is too submissive"; so she turns to a second program, *THE WOMAN IN WHITE*, for there "the woman is boss."

By scrambling the mother in the one sketch with the father and son in the other she establishes a family situation which she considers most "similar" to her own. To use her own words, the programs "help keep her company" when she is at home alone.

The more complex the listener's troubles are or the less able she is to cope with them, the more programs she seems to listen to. Thus we find on the one hand the woman quoted above who listens to only two programs because she has "no time" for more—that is, probably "no need" for more. On the other hand is the extreme case of a colored maid in a home with no fewer than five radios in it, who listens to twenty-two stories daily. To this person of very little education, with no friends or relatives and few opportunities for a normal life, the radio stories are practically everything. "Sunday," she said, "is a very bad day for me. I don't know what to do with myself. During the week I have the stories." When asked how long, in her opinion, a story should last, misunderstanding the reason for the question she said anxiously, "They're not going to stop them, are they? I'd be lost without them!"

Having no life apart from the stories, this listener wants to listen to as many of them and as long as she possibly can. Since all the stories have the common theme of getting into trouble and out again, it is possible for the listener to combine aspects of various stories into a sort of patchwork of "reality" which best fits her particular needs.

Three Main Types of Gratification.

Basically the various stories mean the same thing to all the listeners. They appeal to their insecurity and provide them in one way or another with remedies of a substitute character. This occurs in, roughly, three types of reactions, which are differentiated as modes of experience but not in terms of their function.

1. Listening to the stories offers an emotional release.
2. Listening to the stories allows for a wishful remodelling of the listener's "drudgery."
3. Listening provides an ideology and recipes for adjustment.

Some of the listeners enjoy the stories primarily as a means of letting themselves go emotionally. Others enjoy them because they provide the opportunity to fill their lives with happenings which they would like to experience for themselves. Still others enjoy them in a more realistic way because they furnish them with formulas to bear the kind of life they are living.

Following is a detailed description of how these various types of gratification come about.²

I. LISTENING AS AN EMOTIONAL RELEASE.

Many of the listeners become emotionally excited when listening to the stories. When asked whether they had ever been "very excited" about a story, 50 per cent of them said yes. A number also claimed they could not work while listening. Said one of them: "I can't even do my crocheting when I am listening. I just have to sit still, they get me so excited." The claims of excitement aroused by listening were corroborated by actual observations of some of the respondents while they listened to a story. Such observations were made in a casual and thus quite reliable manner. If for instance a woman complained that the interview interfered with her favorite story, the interviewer politely offered to listen with her and postponed the interview until afterward. In this way it was actually observed how excited some of the listeners became, how they were talking back to the radio, warning the heroes, and so on.

Listening to the stories provides for emotional release in various forms. It provides an outlet for the pent-up anxieties in giving the listener a "chance to cry." It provides, secondly, emotional stimuli and excitement to a listener who is temperamentally unable to have such emotional experiences otherwise or who lives a kind of life which just does not provide such stimuli. Third, it gives the listener a chance to compensate for her own hardships through aggressiveness against other people. Sometimes such tendencies of aggressiveness are satisfied within the stories themselves by giving the listener the opportunity to enjoy "other people's troubles." Sometimes the stories serve as a means to feel vastly superior to people in the actual environment of the listener. Building a "union of sufferers" with the characters of the story, the listener becomes contemptuous and aggressive against members of the world actually surrounding her.

A Chance to Cry.

Several of the respondents like the sketches because they give them a chance to let themselves go and to release the anxiety stored up in them. This is what the crippled listener already quoted said:

In a case like mine you can go crazy just sitting and thinking, thinking. Sometimes the stories get me and I cry. I think I am a fool, but it makes me feel better.

²The material was not sufficiently large to study the important problem of the correlation of listener characteristics and type of gratification obtained from listening.

Another case is that of a newly married young woman. She used to work before she was married; now she has to live with her in-laws and is quite upset over the narrowness of her new life. She turned to the radio stories originally in order to have something to talk about with her mother-in-law. She said:

There is no one program I like particularly well. They all tug at the heart-strings, they are so sad. I am very nervous sometimes, but my troubles are such stupid ones. I love to listen to the programs; I can cry with them.

The sketches, in their *specific* sad content, serve as an outlet for the *unspecific* anxiety of this listener. They give her a chance to cry, which is gratifying for two reasons. First, many adults would deny themselves the "right" to cry over themselves. Having outgrown the status of the child who could come and cry on its mother's lap, they have lost the comfort of an emotional release in spite of the increase in problems demanding such release. In the second place, the stories allow for crying without the listener's having to reveal the real reasons for her wanting to cry.

In other instances the programs are enjoyed not as an outlet but as a stimulus for an emotional excitement which the listener misses in actual life.

"Surprise, happy or sad."

The above is the comment of a woman who says she has always enjoyed life. She mentions nothing that she would like to have. She feels that the troubles in radio stories are about the same as her own. "But," as she says, "they can make more of it. They can put them on a big scale." She herself is middle aged, excessively fat, placid, and barely able to read or write. Anything that moves her is "fine." She wants the stories to "go on forever." She likes HELEN TRENT because:

She has hundreds of experiences with her designing, and all. There is always a surprise coming up. Happy or sad, I love it.

When asked whether she would prefer to have her favorite story happen to her in actual life she answered with a decided no. "I am too old," she said. "When you get older you give all that (romance) up."

Similarly, the young woman quoted before, who finds relief in crying over the stories, says she would rather lead a "peaceful life" than have the actual experiences as told in the stories. The listeners

prefer the release of being moved to the moving experience itself. They accept the stories as a substitute for reality, just as they identify themselves with the content of the stories and take, as will be seen, the success of the heroine as a substitute for their own success.

The stories make for a short-lived pseudo-catharsis. The laughing or crying produced by them makes the listeners feel better only as long as the story lasts. They keep asking for new "surprises" and new "chances to cry," in the realization that their actual lives will not give them the emotional experiences they crave. "I am too old for romance," says one woman. "My life would make a stupid story," says another. Thus the question might be raised of whether the temporary emotional release obtained from listening to other people's troubles will not, in the long run, have to be paid for by an intensified sense of frustration and by the listener's having been rendered still more incapable of realizing emotional experiences outside the stories.

"If I'm blue it makes me feel better . . ."

A number of the listeners said they felt a sense of relief in knowing that "other people had their troubles too." In a few cases this relief is tied up with the fact that in finding out about other people's troubles the listener loses the sense of having been singled out for trouble herself. In a few others it seems related to the stories' helpfulness in focussing a general sense of frustration upon events or things which "happen." If one knows what is wrong, and if this happens to be a particular "event," rather than the structure of the society one lives in, it makes for a release of anxiety. Most frequently, however, the listeners enjoy the troubles of other people as a means to compensate for their own misery through aggressiveness against others. The stories provide the listeners with subjects to be aggressive against.

Some of the respondents find a particular relief in listening to the troubles of other people who are supposedly "smarter" than they are. In the words of one of them:

If I am gloomy it makes me feel better to know that other people have hardships too. They are so smart and still they have to suffer.

The listeners also enjoy the stories as an outlet for feelings of aggressiveness which they would not allow themselves otherwise. An example is the reaction of a listener describing herself as a "religious" woman. She reads no other book but the Bible and dislikes the movies because they are not "clean." She approves, how-

ever, of the radio stories because the people in them "are so brave about their own troubles and in helping other people. They teach you to be good." Although she claims she listens to "learn to be still more helpful," the episode she liked best was one which dealt with a catastrophe suffered by the heroine:

I liked it best when they were so happy before the husband got murdered and so sad afterwards.

The interest in other people's misfortunes was also brought out in the answers to the question whether and about which incidents the respondents had ever been very much excited. Forty-one per cent of those who answered in the affirmative referred to murders, violent accidents, gangsters, and fires; 15 per cent more mentioned illness and dying; 26 per cent spoke of psychological conflicts, while only 18 per cent named incidents of a non-violent or non-catastrophic kind. The aggressive meaning of these answers was exemplified rather strikingly in the following comment of a listener who explained why she never had been really excited. Referring to WOMAN IN WHITE she said:

I thought the murder *would* be exciting. But it was not. It happened abroad somewhere.

How closely the aggressiveness against the radio characters is tied up with the listener's desire to find compensation for her own troubles is demonstrated in the following remark of a listener. She has had a hard time bringing up her children after her husband's death. She chooses programs which have as their heroine a self-sacrificing woman. Her comment about one of them is:

I like HILLTOP HOUSE. The woman there is always doing things for children. . . . I wonder whether she will ever get married. Perhaps it isn't right for her to do it and give up the orphanage. She is doing such a wonderful thing. I really don't think she should get married.

This listener compensates for her resented fate by wishing a slightly worse one upon her favorite radio character. In return for the death of her own husband she wants the heroine to have no husband at all. She expects her to sacrifice herself for orphan children, whereas she herself is sacrificing herself for her own.

In the examples given so far the listeners found scapegoats for aggressiveness within the stories themselves. In the cases which will be reported below the stories serve as a means to bolster up tendencies of aggressiveness which are directed against people in the listeners' actual environment.

The Union of Sufferers.

Some of the listeners use the stories to magnify their own "suffering." In identifying their sacrifices with those in the stories they find a means to label and to enhance their own. When one of the respondents was asked the routine question about whether she was married and whether she had any children, she gave the following information. She was a widow and she had been living with her only son. Recently, however, she had moved away from her son's apartment so as "not to be in his way." She was induced to make this sacrifice by her favorite story, *STELLA DALLAS*. Her comment on the heroine which was made at some other point of the interview, was:

She is like me. She also does not want to be in her daughter's way . . . How does she look? Well, she is a regular person, one in a thousand, always doing the right thing. She is getting tired and haggard. She has just spent herself.

It is possible that this listener did move away from her son's apartment to be like "Stella Dallas." We do not know how voluntary this act of hers was or how much it was appreciated. In any case, her identification with the radio heroine who has "spent herself" gives the listener a chance to make the most of her own act of tolerance and self-sacrifice.

Such identified tolerance sometimes gives the listener a feeling of superiority. She feels different from other people. Admiring the radio characters excessively, she imagines she is like them. While rising to new heights of "tolerance" in this identification, she becomes at the same time contemptuous and critical of the world around her. An example of this may be found in the following two remarks by a woman who listens to the programs because the people in them are so "wonderful":

They teach you how to be good. I have gone through a lot of suffering, but I still can learn from them.

Yet this same woman, when asked whether she disliked any program, answered:

I don't listen to *THE GOLDBERGS*. Why waste electricity on the Jews?

Obviously her "tolerance" wasn't wide enough to include the Jews. It seems rather a means to feel superior to them.

An example of the manner in which the stories are used as an excuse for being critical of people in the listener's actual environ-

ment is the case of a woman living in the neighborhood known as Greenwich Village. She "loathes it." When asked what she wanted most in life she said: "A home in the country, just for me and my family, with a *white fence* around it."

She admires the programs because they portray the "clean American life," as contrasted to the hated "Village." Admiration for the radio people is for her a means to exaggerate her contempt against the world surrounding her while at the same time providing for a fence against it.

II. LISTENING AS A MEANS OF REMODELLING ONE'S DRUDGERY.

In the various forms of gratification characterized as "emotional release," listening makes for the stimulation or the release of emotions which the listener would not be able to feel or allow herself to enjoy otherwise. The story content is only indirectly important insofar as it provides a sufficiently strong emotional appeal.

In the cases to be described now the connection between the radio stories and the listener's situation is of a much more comprehensive character. Emphasis is on the specific content of the story rather than on its emotional appeal. The listener pretends that what is happening in the stories is happening to her. She not only feels *with* the radio characters, like the person who gets emotional release from listening; she *is* the characters. Accepting the story content as a substitute for reality, she uses it to remodel her life. In this type of experience the distinction between "story" reality and actual reality is destroyed by wishful thinking.

Drowning One's Troubles.

In the most radical form of identification the listener escapes into the story quite consciously. She makes use of the stories to superimpose upon her life another, more desirable life. Listening works as a potent drug making her forget her own troubles while listening to those described in the stories. One of these listeners said:

I can hardly wait from Friday till Monday, when the stories come on again. They make me forget my own troubles. I have only money problems. They don't. Their troubles are more complicated, but also more exciting. Also, they can solve them. For instance, they just hop into a plane when they want to go to Washington. Money doesn't seem to matter to them. In the stories there is real romance. I love to hear about romance. I keep waiting for David to propose.

The stories are as real to the listener as an actual experience. She experiences the romance of MARY MARLIN as if it were her own.

A romance experienced by means of the story is a satisfactory substitute for a real life experience, because of two conditions which do not exist in reality. For one, happenings in the stories are to a large extent determined by the listener's desires. If she wants a romance she selects a program which gives it to her. Within the story, the listener still has a choice in terms of "how it ought to be." If MARY MARLIN in the story does not get enough romance the listener may still feel:

I would have made David propose months ago. They don't have to make him the perfect bachelor. I would have made him slip.

If the listener feels the story is not going to develop at all the way she wants it to, she may even discontinue listening and look for another story. Such discontinuation of listening to a program which had been listened to regularly before was reported by 63 per cent. In two-thirds of the cases the reasons were external, such as the program having gone off the air. In one-third the program was no longer listened to because of the listeners' disapproval. The most frequent reasons were that it was "too improbable," or "too monotonous." Both these objections in most cases meant merely that the program was not developing fast enough or not in the direction the listener hoped it would. This is brought out quite clearly in the comment of a listener who stopped listening to HELEN TRENT:

I stopped listening when Helen Trent went to Hollywood. It was so improbable. I have been in Hollywood myself. It is an awful place. Wives lose their husbands there. Why did she not go to some nice, safe place? There are a lot of them in this country.

The program was considered "improbable" because its expected course threatened to interfere with the listener's desire to hear about "nice," that is, "safe" places and relationships.

Secondly, listening provides the chance to live "exciting lives" while one "relaxes" and "smokes a cigarette." As mentioned already, hardly any of the listeners would prefer to have the incidents of the stories actually happen to them instead of hearing them over the radio. They enjoy a condition in which they may lose themselves in an excitement related to borrowed rather than to their own experiences.

Examples of complete escape into the stories, such as the one quoted above, were not frequent among the women studied. This is probably due to the character of the stories. They supposedly portray everyday life and contain at least so many allusions to it that they do not allow very easily for a complete forgetting of the

listeners' own drudgery. For the most part the listeners studied select certain aspects of the stories to fit into their lives in such a way as to make them more interesting or more agreeable. Such glorification of the listeners' own life goes all the way from finding fulfillment of desires which are not fully satisfied in life to finding compensation for personal failure in borrowing the story-character's success.

Cultivating the "Happy" Aspects.

Some of the respondents use the radio programs to get more of the kind of experiences which they claim to enjoy in real life. An example is the case of a young married woman who likes to listen to "some other happy marriages." She says:

I just love to listen to those programs. Dr. Brent is like a second husband. After all, I can get married only once. I would love to have some more husbands.

We cannot tell from our data whether the listener is as happily married as she claims to be. The Dr. Brent in the story is not an admitted substitute for her real husband. Very likely, however, the desires for her marriage are greater than their fulfillment and listening to Dr. Brent as a "second husband" is used to make up for it.

Similarly, another "happily married" woman says: "I like to snatch romance wherever I can get more of it."

In both instances there is the desire to use the stories as a means of duplicating what one already has. The added quantity provides a substitute for an intensity of experience which is probably lacking in real life.

Filling in the Gaps.

Still others use the programs to inject into their lives elements which they admittedly miss in actual life. Here belongs the woman married to a sick husband whom she loves very much. Her favorite program is VIC AND SADE and she especially likes the "funny episodes" in it. She says:

Since my husband got sick we haven't had much fun. I love to listen to VIC AND SADE. They are like us. Vic looks like my husband. Many funny things happen to them. I always tell my husband about them.

The episode she liked best was the one in which Sade mixed up her shoes at a friend's party and came home with one shoe that was

hers and one that was not. This listener probably feels tied down in a marriage which, at the moment, seems to be based primarily on loyalty. Telling her husband about the funny episodes happening to the couple in the story serves as a substitute for their actual occurrence.

One of the gratifications of this type most interesting from a sociological point of view is tied up with stories of doctors as the leading characters. Listening to such stories is a source of extreme gratification not only for the old spinster or the widow:

Dr. Brent is such a lovely man. He takes care of physical and spiritual problems of all the people who come to him. He reminds me a little bit of my own doctor, but I think Dr. Brent is a younger and more lovable man.

My husband died and my brother had a stroke. I really don't have anybody to talk to, and I would have needed advice in the tragedy which happened to my daughter. Dr. Brent is such a fine man. It helps me to listen to him. I really have him right in my room.

The kind and efficient Dr. Brent is enjoyed also by the woman who said, at one point in the interview: "At home *I* am the boss," indicating that she does not consider her husband qualified to be. Dr. Brent is loved, too, by the girl who wishes she knew "another person like him." Women in all phases of life seem to have a frequently unfulfilled need for the kind and able male who is protector rather than economic provider or competitor. The doctor of the story fits into this gap. He acquires a kind of father-role for the listener.³

Reviving Things Past.

Some listeners use the stories to revive things that are past and gone. The associations provided by the stories serve to carry them back to other, more pleasant times. Thus a woman, who was brought up in a small town and feels homesick for it, finds in DAVID HARUM a chance to get back to the small-town life she once knew. Says this listener:

I like to listen to DAVID HARUM and his homely philosophy. It is about a small town. I was brought up in one too, and I loved it.

³Whether the importance of the doctor as a father substitute is fostered by the story contents or due to a particular attitude among the listeners cannot be decided without a careful content analysis. Such an analysis is at present under way at the Office of Radio Research at Columbia University. Be it either way, the stress on doctors as psychological consultants might indicate a declining importance of the minister as the helper in spiritual matters. It seems as if, for many people, health has become a substitute for salvation.

Another woman likes OUR GAL SUNDAY because she herself grew up in a mining town. Listening to the story reminds her of "home." She says:

OUR GAL SUNDAY is about a poor girl found on a doorstep. She is raised by two men in a mining town, and when she grows up she marries a lord. The part about the mining town reminds me of my own life, for I was brought up in one too. I am so far away and there's nobody here to remind me of it otherwise.

Sometimes it is persons, and not situations, that are remembered, as in the case of a listener who said, referring to THE GOLDBERGS:

Ma Goldberg reminds me of a woman I used to know as a kid. She lived right next door. She was always finding excuses when we didn't behave well. She was always saying good things.

Thirty-nine per cent of the listeners stated they had known "similar" people, while 27 per cent said they had come across "similar" situations to those described in some of the stories. The difference between the two figures must first be proven in a larger sample before an interpretation ought to be ventured. Even in the small sample tested, both figures were significantly higher than the number of cases whose primary source of gratification was related to the familiarity with the persons or situations depicted in the program. Associations with the past account for the primary enjoyment of a program only if the memories evoked are a highly suitable substitute for a less desirable present. This is illustrated in the following comment of a respondent:

I like to listen to HELEN TRENT. Her romance sounds like mine. My husband was always so lovable and affectionate. He never squabbled. We were very happy, and still are. This story brings back my romance after nineteen years.

This woman was probably not aware that in telling her story she invariably used the past tense. Her "we are still happy" exemplifies exactly the kind of gratification she gets from listening. There is probably more "squabbling" now between herself and her husband. She enjoys HELEN TRENT as the chance to relive her own early love experiences by pretending that what was true nineteen years ago is still true today.

For the listener it seems more important that the story evokes a memory which allows for wishful thinking than that the similarity between story situation and remembered situation is a complete one. If the listener would like very much that what happens in the story would actually happen to her, she is likely to construct "similarities"

in an artificial manner. This is exemplified in the comment of a 55 year old woman who also listens to the romance of HELEN TRENT because it reminds her of experiences of her youth. When she was asked whether she had ever used any product of a sponsoring company, she said:

I use the face cream advertised by HELEN TRENT because she is using it and she is over 35 years herself and still has all those romances.

This listener does not seem quite convinced about the applicability of the story. By using the beautifying cream that her heroine uses she adds supporting evidence to the rather weak and wishful analogy between herself and Helen Trent. The product, particularly if tied up with the story in such an intricate manner, is the link between the world of story happenings and reality. Through the real face cream the fictitious happenings of the stories are brought within the realm of possible occurrences.⁴

Compensating for Failure through Identification with Success.

A great number of the women use the stories to compensate for specific personal failures. They enjoy listening to the success the radio heroine is having in the field where they themselves have failed. When one of the women was asked what she wanted most in life she said, "A happy marriage." She also said that she didn't like to have company because her husband might be "rude" to them. This woman picks as her favorites stories in which "a woman puts things over." Her comment is interesting:

I like EASY ACES. There is a dumb woman and she puts things over. I also like HILLTOP HOUSE. The woman in it is always doing things. She has no time to marry.

This listener's comment on HILLTOP HOUSE is very different from the comments of other listeners to the same program. Instead of stressing the self-sacrificing and "doing good" elements she interprets the story in terms of her own difficulties and failures. According to her, the heroine "has no time to marry," and she sees in her the "independent" rather than the "good" woman.

Still another of the listeners seems to have been a failure in her family relations. Her daughter has run away from home to marry,

⁴The kind of advertising in which the product is built into the events of the story in such a manner that it seemingly accounts for some of the "nice" things in the stories is probably more efficient than a promotion of the product which is independent of the story. The respondents occasionally stressed that they disliked such advertising because it "takes time away from the story."

and of her husband she says, "He is away from home five nights of the week." She picks programs like *THE GOLDBERGS* or *THE O'NEILLS*, each portraying a successful mother or wife. She says:

I like the O'NEILLS. It stresses harmony and yet it portrays the individuality of family members.

At the same time she is quite critical of Ma O'Neill and says:

No woman can be that divine and keep her ideals that long.

And of Ma Goldberg she says:

I have no such hysteria and excitement as Ma Goldberg has. I would never butt into other people's lives as she does.

Why does she go on listening if she disapproves of the leading characters? Obviously she would not be able to bear the thought that other women are so much more successful than she if she could not find any fault with them. She has to tell herself that the stories are not quite true to life or that MA GOLDBERG is not a pleasant personality type if she wants to enjoy listening to them. Her superficial criticism of the stories is the condition for her being able to use them as fully as substitutes as she actually does.

Betting on Outcomes as a Means of Feeling Superior.

A few of the better educated among the respondents disclaimed any personal interest in the stories and said they listened only for entertainment. They were interested in seeing "how problems are treated" or "how things come out." One of them said:

I used to go to work previously. This always gave me a lift. I have nothing to keep me busy now. I listen to the programs for no personal reasons. I want to see how problems are treated. I'm usually right in my predictions.

These listeners do not have a "personal" interest in the stories in the sense that they want to identify with, or escape into, the content of the stories. They use the stories chiefly as a means to demonstrate to themselves or some of their co-listeners that they were right in predicting the outcome.⁵ If things do not turn out as they predicted, they can always claim that the stories aren't true to life. In passing judgment on script writers and actors they consider themselves

⁵A similar reaction was also found among listeners to the Professor Quiz program. See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Radio and the Printed Page*, page 87. There it took the form of the listeners' selecting the potential winner from among all the contestants right after the beginning of the program and following it through like a race.

superior to those who "take such stories seriously." They feel on a level with powerful people who are controlling things rather than being controlled.

The feeling of superiority connected with such a "detached" appraisal of the stories is illustrated in the following comment:

I like SCATTERGOOD BAINES. It is a New England situation. He is one of Clarence Budington Kelland's best characters. He has possibility and flexibility . . . I bet with my daughter on the endings. It all fits into my interest in social work. Of course, I would never take anything seriously in them, but I suppose some people do.

The stories provide this listener with substitutes just as they do the more naive listener. Betting on the outcome is a chance to be right. Thus it works as compensation for the listener's lack of success in other fields. Judging the characters of the script writer seems to be a substitute for being a real friend of his or of other "interesting" people.

III. LISTENING FOR RECIPES MAKING FOR ADJUSTMENT.

In the types of gratification described as "remodelling of drudgery" the story content serves as a means wishfully to change the listener's life. Many listeners, however, do not identify themselves with the stories to the extent of accepting them as substitutes for reality. They identify themselves with them only insofar as they provide adjustment to the kind of life they are living. The stories provide such adjustment in three main forms. They give meaning to a world which seems nothing but a humdrum existence by offering a continuous sequence of events. Second, they give the listener a sense that the world is not as threatening as it might seem by supplying them with formulas of behaviour for various troublesome situations. Third, they explain things by providing labels for them. Happenings in a marriage, in a family, in a community are verbalized in the programs and the listeners are made to feel that they understand better what is going on around them. Listening provides them with an ideology to be applied in the appraisal of the world which is actually confronting them.

The following analysis aims to show in greater detail how each of these "recipes for adjustment" comes about and with what elements in the stories they tie up particularly.

"I don't feel empty any longer."

A number of respondents claimed that the stories had filled their "empty lives" with content. The mere fact that something is

scheduled to occur every day provides an element of adventure⁶ in their daily drudgery. Life becomes meaningful as a sequence of daily fifteen minute broadcasts.

... the stories have really given me something. I don't feel empty any longer.

Nothing ever happens in my life, but I have the sketches. It is something to look forward to every day.

But for the sketches, this listener feels she would have nothing to look forward to from one day to the next. The stories make for adjustment to an otherwise empty and meaningless life because of their continued character.

When asked how long a radio story should last, only 12 per cent of the respondents placed a limit in terms of months. The rest wanted them to last at least a year or longer. Some suggested that a story should go on "as long as it was interesting," or "forever." Here are some comments on this aspect:

I want the story to go on for years so that my family can grow up right along with it.

They should go on as long as they are interesting. One gets to know the people and they are like one of the family. I would hate to lose them.

The listeners do not want to lose the story-family which is the model for their actual family. They do not want to lose the story characters they have grown to consider as belonging to their family. They want the stories to go on because they hate to lose the sense of an eventful life they built up listening to them. This is true even for the women who wanted a limit put on the length of the stories. Their objections are not directed against "serial" stories as such; they want a limited length only to avoid "dragging." Thus:

If they keep them too long they have to drag them. They should get things settled once in a while so they can get a fresh start.

By "dragging," the listeners mean too much talking, as interfering with the progress of the action. They dislike it because it spoils the illusion of a life full of happenings. Here is a typical comment of a woman who was "bored" by too much talking:

Last time I listened to BIC SISTER they wanted to get somebody to help this boy who has a tumor. They wanted to get a specialist. It wasn't so interesting. The two of them (Ruth and John) just sat and

⁶In a way the radio stories have taken up the old epic form which describes life as a series of adventures. This form is also still alive in the "funnies."

talked. They didn't do anything. I thought the boy might die in the meantime. Why didn't they get going?

The listener disliked the lengthy discussion between Ruth and John because she feared "the boy might die in the meantime." This would have put a sudden end to his part in the story and thus destroyed the sense of a continuously eventful life she had enjoyed in listening.

The desire to have things "go on" seems really a desire to have them continue in the expected way, along accepted patterns. In a culture which represses curiosity, first of all in the sexual sphere, people are made to cling to stereotyped solutions. The deeper the frustrations the greater the needs for such stereotypes.

An interesting corroboration of this hypothesis was found in correlating the desired length of the stories with the total number of stories listened to. Among the women listening to fewer than five programs a day, for each ten who gave any limitation for the stories or said they had no opinion, there were three who wanted the stories to go on "forever" or "as long as they were good." Among those who listened to five or more programs the number rose to seven.

If, in this connection, we take the number of programs listened to as an index of the listener's insecurity and needs, we can then say that the more troubles the listener has the longer she wants the stories to last. And it is probably no mere coincidence that the movie most frequently mentioned as best liked should be *GONE WITH THE WIND*, the longest of all the most recent pictures. As one woman put it, when asked how long a story should last:

It should just go on like *GONE WITH THE WIND*. It can have no end.

"They teach me what to do."

Another form of listening which makes for adjustment of the listener to her own life is related to the advice obtained from hearing the various stories. Many of the respondents explained spontaneously that they liked listening because the stories taught them what to do or how to behave. Following are a few comments:

I listen for what good it will do me. The end of the story in *AUNT JENNY* always settles problems and sometimes the way they settle them would help me if the same thing happened to me.

If you listen to these programs and something turns up in your own life, you would know what to do about it.

I like to listen to Ma Goldberg and see how she goes about fixing things. It gives me something to think about when I am sewing. She teaches me what to do.

The listeners feel prepared for the complexities of their own lives in the conviction that there are formulas of behavior ready for all situations and that they can acquire them from listening to the stories. This conviction is closely tied up with the assumption that the stories are "true stories." This is a claim made by some of the programs and accepted by the listeners.

I like AUNT JENNIE'S STORIES because they are real everyday people that you might meet. They even tell you so—that they are real-life stories. I think they could happen.

The following incident shows that such a claim fits into the desires of the listeners who want the stories to be "true stories." A hypothetical question was posed: A new sponsor wants to introduce some changes in a program. Should he change the actors and leave the story the same, or would the respondent prefer to have him change the story but keep the same actors on the program?

A very great number of the women interviewed could not answer the question. They were unable to differentiate between the actor as a character and the actor as a person. The strength of the listeners' desire to believe that the stories are real is indicated even in the answer of a woman who supposedly understood the question and voted against a change in actors. She said:

The Youngs, Mr. and Mrs., used to have these long talks in bed, and now when they do I can't stand it. She is in bed with another man, now that they have changed actors.

The "truth" of the stories is defined in those terms which are most comforting to the listener. This is illustrated in the following comment of a listener who explained why she preferred listening to the stories to going to the movies:

I am not so crazy about the movies. The sketches are more real, more like my own life. The things that happen in the movies seldom happen to people that I know. I like to listen about plain, everyday people.

She considers the stories more "real" because they concern "average" people similar to herself so that she can identify herself with them. At the same time, however, she wants them to be sufficiently superior to herself to make the identification worth while. The characters in the stories have to be "plain" and at the same time exercise a "wonderful philosophy." The stories have to concern things which happen in "everyday life" while at the same time following the pattern of "getting into trouble *and out again*." In their demands upon the

story contents the listeners fluctuate between the two desires of wanting to learn from the stories and to use them as a means of escape. For learning's sake they want them to portray reality. As a means of escape they want them to picture a "better world." These two demands are not contradictory, as it seems at first. They have a common root in the insecurity of the listeners.

The Need for Advice.

The listeners would not seek advice in the stories if they did not need it and if the advice obtained did not, in a way, fit into their needs. A great number of the regular listeners to serial stories are lower income group housewives who see it as their duty to manage the home on what their husbands make. Many of them seem extremely insecure. This was brought out most strikingly in the answers to a question as to what three things they most wanted to have. In only 12% of the answers were such things as interesting friends, travel, sports, etc., important. All the rest wished for a secure home.

Advice, on the other hand, seems to be particularly inaccessible to the listeners studied. The husband shows up in the interviews as the economic provider rather than as a consultant in family affairs. Only one-fifth of the respondents mentioned that they see a great many friends. Various reasons are given for this. Seeing friends "costs money," which is not available. Seeing friends is an "effort," while listening to the stories is not. Friends have the same troubles as the listener, and since they cannot take care of their own, they wouldn't be of any help to the listener.

Lots of people have problems like mine or the ones told in the stories, but they would not be able to explain them.

Finally, the listener does not ask advice from friends because she would be ashamed to admit that she needs it.

It is altogether different with the radio. The listeners feel they have a right to expect and accept help because they patronize the companies which sponsor the programs. Of the women interviewed, 61% said that they used some of the products of sponsoring companies. Said one of them:

I am kidded by everybody because my pantry shelf is full of radio brands. The programs help me, so I've got to help the products.

In a way the radio seems to have taken the place of the neighbor. The neighbor as a competitor has become the stranger, while the radio in its aloofness is the thing humanly near to the listener. It

offers friends who are "wonderful and kind," and the listeners tend to forget that this kindness is designed to make them buy. They are enchanted by a one-sided relationship which fits into their isolationist desires. The radio people give advice and never ask for it, they provide help without the listeners having to reveal their need for it.

Last, but not least, the radio people and the occupations they portray are frequently socially superior to the listener. The listener enjoys their company because it raises her own social level. This was illustrated in the following comment of a lower income group housewife:

If you have friends in, you have to go down to their level. They are sometimes so dumb. The radio people are more interesting. I love being with them.

For many a listener actual friends seem to have acquired a new function. They are the people with whom she talks over the programs. The study shows that 41 per cent of the listeners discuss the stories with their friends.⁷ This discussion is of great psychological importance to the listener in that it allows for the transformation of the stories into something that is her own property. Thus, one of the respondents makes an out-of-town call every day to New Jersey to tell her girl friend about "her sketches." Very likely the girl friend in this case listens to the same stories. However, the respondent feels she discusses "her" stories with her. In a world which offers so few chances for real experiences, any happening must be made immediately into something owned. "Try to live today so tomorrow you can say what a wonderful yesterday," a sentiment expressed by a theme song, embodies the same desire to live so as to have memories.

"Potential" Advice.

The great majority of listeners spontaneously stated that they had learned something from listening to the stories. However, when asked whether any of the stories had ever indicated to them what to do in a particular situation or how to get along with people, only one-third said that they had. The reason for the drop lies in the listeners' preference for "potential" advice rather than a concrete application.

⁷Only 14 per cent discussed them with their husbands. 10 per cent talk them over with their children. 37 per cent do not discuss them with anyone. The percentages refer to the number of respondents mentioning each category.

The listeners enjoy getting a kind of advice which allows for wishful thinking. We happened to interview one woman on the day that the heroine in her favorite story had come into a lot of money. She was concerned with how she might keep her children from throwing it away. The listener felt that there was no chance of ever getting so much money herself, but still felt that she had learned from the program. She said:

It is a good idea to know and to be prepared for what I would do with so much money.

Although this listener knew the need for this advice would never come up, she enjoyed playing around with the idea. The advice works as a substitute for the condition of its applicability.

Similarly, a number of listeners claimed they enjoyed seeing how other people solved their troubles because it made them feel that "if the radio people can manage their troubles I might be able to also." In drawing the parallel they liked to overlook that the story situation might not be quite so complicated as their own, and that the story's heroine had more resources available than they had.

In line with this, the listeners are all in favor of a "beautiful philosophy" as long as they are not really expected to use it themselves. Thus, when asked why they liked the programs their answers were frequently like the following:

I like David Harum. He lives in the country and is a philosopher. He settles the problems of all the people who come to him. He helps those who have not against those who have. There are still good people left in the world.

I like THE GUIDING LIGHT. The minister there takes care of everybody who needs him. He keeps a light burning at night for people in distress to find him.

Listening to such kind people fills the respondents with the hope that a "guiding light" may burn for them also. That they are interested in the benefits of kindness rather than in its performance was brought out quite clearly in the answers to the question as to whether the listeners, at any point in their favorite story, would have acted differently from the characters in the story. They were split into two groups, those who talked about what "they would have done" and those who talked about what "the actors should have done." The former group disagreed on the ground of too much sacrifice in words like the following:

I would not have forgiven my husband that often. One has a right to happiness.

The latter group disagreed on the ground of too little sacrifice and said, for instance:

She went on the stage after her second marriage. The children did not like her new husband. She should not have done it. It was her fault they did not like him; she should have stayed at home.

The seriousness of the desire to learn paired with the desire for a comfortable solution is also demonstrated in the comments made in answer to the question whether the listeners knew of any problems they would like to have presented in a story. About one-third of the listeners answered in the affirmative. Here are a few quotations:

When a man's disposition changes suddenly after being married for a long time. He starts gambling and to be unfaithful. What's the explanation?

I should like to know how much a daughter should give her mother from the money she makes. I give everything I earn to my mother. Do I have to?

Whether I should marry if I have to live with my mother-in-law.

A story which would teach people not to put things over.

About religious and racial differences.

About mixed marriages.

The comments indicate a very great faith put in radio. People want the stories to solve their most specific and private problems. In the omission of controversial issues, the stories probably leave unsatisfied just those people who are the most eager searchers for means of adjustment. The comments also indicate that the listeners hope for a comforting solution. They would like to be told, for instance, that it is not necessary to give one's whole salary to the family. They would like a story which teaches "other people" not to put things over.

"They explain things to me."

Listening not only provides the respondents with formulas for behaviour in various situations, it also gives them sets of explanations with which they may appraise happenings. In following a story and hearing the characters discuss what occurs to them and how they feel about it, the listener feels she is made to "see things."

I like Papa David in LIFE CAN BE BEAUTIFUL. He always uses very much psychology.

I do not know much about life and I am sometimes scared seeing how things happen to people. It does me good to listen to these stories. They explain things to you.

I like family stories best. If I get married I want to get an idea of how a wife should be to a husband. Some of the stories show how a wife butts into everybody's business, and the husband gets mad and they start quarrelling. The stories make you see things.

In listening to the stories the often inarticulate listener finds that feelings can be expressed. She is made aware of a meaning to things which goes beyond the mere surface appearance. She realizes the existence of causal relations between happenings. There is, however, the danger that such "understanding" is paired with the illusion of a simple and ready explanation being available for every situation and every happening. The listener quoted last, for instance, seems satisfied with labelling a "good marriage" as one where the wife "does not butt into everybody's business."

Thus the question of what the listeners do with the knowledge acquired from listening becomes of paramount importance.

The Application of the Stories.

As mentioned above, one-third of the listeners stated that the stories had helped them "in indicating what to do in a particular situation or how to get along with other people." Following are some of the comments which show how the "advice" obtained has actually been applied by the listeners.

Listening to AUNT JENNIE'S STORIES today was very important for me. The fellow had an argument with the uncle and he blamed it on the girl. That was wrong of him. It was just like my boy friend. The other night I went to a wedding in the neighborhood where there were a lot of girl friends. Some of the boys told my boy friend. He has been mad at me ever since. Listening to the stories lets me know how other girls act, and listening to the way that girl argued today, I know how to tell my boy friend where he can get off. Life is so confusing sometimes.

Bess Johnson shows you how to handle children. She handles all ages. Most mothers slap their children. She deprives them of something. That is better. I use what she does with my own children.

When my lawsuit was on, it helped me to listen to Dr. Brent and how calm he was.

When my boy did not come home till late one night from the movies and I was so worried it helped me to remember how they had been worried in the story and he came home safely.

When Clifford's wife died in childbirth the advice Paul gave him I used for my nephew when his wife died.

The spheres of influence of the stories are quite diversified. The respondents feel they have been helped by being told how to get

along with other people, how to handle their boy friends or bring up their children. They feel they have learned how to express themselves in a particular situation. They have learned how to comfort themselves if worried.

In many cases these seem to be potential rather than fulfilled goals. The stories obviously released the worries of a mother by helping her pretend that everything will turn out all right and that her young son will come home safely; they have provided for an escape into calmness for a highly upset listener.

It is doubtful whether the girl's relationship to her boy friend is put on a sounder basis and a "confusing life" really understood when she has learned "how to tell her boy friend where he can get off." The woman who has learned to deprive her children rather than slap them seems to do the first thing in substitution for the other without understanding the underlying pedagogical doctrine. One might wonder how much the bereaved nephew appreciated the speech his aunt had borrowed from her favorite story.

Without a careful content analysis and a more elaborate study of the effects of listening upon the psychological make-up of the listeners it is impossible to give a final interpretation of the comments quoted above. It can not be decided from this material whether the stories are qualified to awaken or increase the psychological articulateness of the listener and have just been misunderstood or abused in some cases, or whether they themselves tend to foster a superficial orientation rather than true psychological understanding.

The analysis of gratifications, which was the problem of this study, has shown that the stories have become an integral part of the lives of many listeners. They are not only successful means of temporary emotional release or escape from a disliked reality. To many listeners they seem to have become a model of reality by which one is to be taught how to think and how to act. As such they must be written not only with an eye to their entertainment value, but also in the awareness of a great social responsibility.

Appendix.

Interviewer's Name:.....Number of Interview:.....

Women's Daytime Serial Programs.

I. GENERAL LISTENING HABITS

1. To which daytime serial programs do you listen fairly regularly?
Since when? How did you start listening to each of them?
Name of Program *Listened to since when* *How started*
2. How does listening to them fit into respondent's daily schedule?
 - a. Generally speaking, which of the following is true for you:
Programs are selected to fit into your daily work schedule.....
Efforts are made to fit your work into the program schedule.....
Neither is entirely true.....

Details:

- b. (*Interviewer*: Find out on what station and at what time each of the programs listed under #1 is heard: then fill in.)
Programs come one after the other, without interruption.....
with interruption.....
How many switches of stations are made during total listening period?.....
If any switches of station: does respondent know about programs following? What is her opinion about them?
3. Do you listen to other daytime serial programs occasionally?
Yes.....No.....
4. If you could listen to just one, or a limited number of the programs listed under #1, which would be your first choice? Second? Third? Fourth? Fifth?
1..... 2..... 3.....
4..... 5.....
5. What is the content of the three best liked programs? (*Interviewer*: Get description of the three best liked programs by saying that you do not happen to know them.)
1.....:
2.....:
3.....:
6. Have you listened fairly regularly to any serials before to which you do not listen now? Yes.....No.....
If Yes: Which programs? Why did you give up listening to them?
(*Interviewer*: Differentiate between objective reasons, such as programs going off the air, and subjective ones, such as dislike or being bored. If the latter, find out why.)
Programs no longer listened to *Reasons*

7. (Ask this question only if #6 was answered with "No," or "Yes, program went off the air.") Are there any programs which you dislike or would not be at all interested in listening to? Yes.....No.....
If Yes: Which programs are they and why do you not care to listen to them?
8. Can you remember how long ago you first started listening to any daytime series? What first made you interested in them?

II. WHY LISTENING: GENERAL APPEAL

1. Various people listen to serials for various reasons. Which of the following points would you say are important to you? (*Interviewer:* Use free space on right hand side for respondent's comments.)
 - a. To have company when nobody else is around
 - b. To hear about somebody else's problems rather than your own for a while
 - c. To keep informed about how your radio friends are making out
 - d. Because you can count on something to happen every day
 - e. Because the people in the stories are a nice sort of people with a philosophy you approve of
 - f. Because you like to see how other people with problems similar to your own are making out
 - g. Because you like to hear about romance and family life and other things which have happened to you or might happen to you
 - h. Because it is a good way to find out what other people are concerned with
 - i. Because there is nothing else you can get at this time of the day
 - j. Because being at home a great deal of the day, you like to have your mind occupied.
2. Which do you like better: Listening to serials over the radio.....; Going to the movies.....; Why?
3. Which do you like better: Listening to serials over the radio.....; Reading a magazine.....; Why?
4. Which do you like better: Listening to serials over the radio.....; Being invited out or having company in.....; Why?
5. Which would you prefer: Having the stories told over the radio.....; Having the things told happen to you in real life.....; Why?

III. WHY LISTENING: APPEAL IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC EPISODES

A. FAVORITE PROGRAM

Ask the following in terms of the favorite program. Only when the question cannot be answered for the favorite program should it be asked for another serial. Be sure always to mention the name of the serial to which the answer refers.

1. Can you describe any events in your favorite story which you liked particularly? Yes.....No.....Details.
2. Can you describe any events for which you did not care at all?
3. Have you ever been bored at any point? Yes.....No.....
If Yes: When?
4. Do you find it hard to visualize the actors? Yes.....No.....
How do you picture them?
 - a. Does any of them remind you of a person you know? Yes.....
No.....*If Yes: Get details.*
 - b. *If No:* Does any actor in any other story remind you of somebody you know? Yes.....No.....
If Yes to 4b, get details.
5. If there was a change in your favorite program, which of the following would you mind less:

If the story remained the same but the actors changed.....

If the story changed but the actors remained.....

Why?
6. How do you think your favorite story is going to continue? (In the next week? Later on?)
7. What product do they advertise?.....
Do you use it? Not at all.....; Use since started listening.....; Used before already.....
 - a. Do you use the products of other stories you listen to?.....
All.....; Some.....; None.....

B. ANY SERIAL PROGRAM

8. In this or any other program, was there ever a situation where you would have acted differently from how it happened in the story? Yes.....No.....Explain.
9. Can you mention a story or episode which meant a great deal to you in indicating what to do in a particular situation or how to get along with people? Yes.....No.....Details.
10. Did you ever come across a problem or a situation in any of the stories which had occurred to somebody you know, or to yourself? Yes.....No.....Details.
11. Do you remember ever having gotten quite excited about a story? Yes.....No.....*If Yes: When, and which story?*

IV. GENERAL APPRAISAL

1. As a rule, which of the following is more true: The various stories are quite similar.....; rather different from each other.....
Explain:
2. Which of the following is true, as a rule: The people in the various stories have about the same amount of troubles as you have.....; more troubles.....; less troubles..... Explain:
3. How do you like the episodes to end: Happily.....; sad.....; mixed..... Explain:

4. What do you prefer: Stories with problems similar to your own; stories with problems quite different from your own.....?
Explain:
5. Is there any particular problem you would want to have treated in a story? Which?
6. Do you have any definite opinion about how many months or years a serial story should last?
7. Would you like a new station to bring out one complete half-hour story every day? Yes.....No.....Explain:
8. Do you talk about the stories with your friends.....; your husband.....; your children.....; nobody.....?

V. DESCRIPTION OF RESPONDENT

Address..... Age..... Education.....
Single..... Married..... If married: Number and age range of children.....

Occupation: (Own or husband's if she is a housewife).....

Phone: Yes.....No.....Car: Yes.....No.....Description of type of place she lives in.....

Last book read.....When finished.....

Magazines read.....

Does she read serial stories there? Yes.....No.....

Newspapers read fairly regularly.....

Attends meetings of any clubs or organizations.....

Do friends visit her: During the day: A great deal.....Sometimes
Rarely.....

Evenings: A great deal.....Sometimes.....Rarely.....

Any hobbies or special interests?.....

What radio programs liked best?.....

Three movies liked very well.....

What are the three things she would be most interested to have.....

If not working now: Ever worked before? Yes.....No.....If Yes:
Would she like to return to it? Why?.....

Additional data:

Hollywood and the European Crisis.

By William Dieterle.

Faced with its first great crisis since gaining world supremacy during the last war, Hollywood is a melancholy place now that another conflict threatens to strip it of its throne. It has begun, at last, to toy with the idea of a Hitler-governed Europe of tomorrow, and its first reaction to a situation, as yet purely theoretical, is one of unmitigated gloom.

"What will happen to the motion picture industry if Hitler wins this war?" That is what all Hollywood is asking, and those who propose to answer agree in a common pessimism.

In the light of past events it is strange indeed to find such speculations in the cinema capital. When the war broke out last September, no place on earth could have given less serious reflection to the war's potentialities than did Hollywood. The town's bitter hatred of Hitler and all he represented was one of the few genuine things about it. Therefore, basing its assumption on a vast emotional bias, it predicted that a crushing Nazi defeat was but a matter of a few weeks. I wish that I might here be accused of overstatement, but I can not. That precisely was the town's attitude. That, so far as Hollywood was concerned, ended the affair, except for time which would bring fulfillment to its prophecy.

And time marched on. The winter passed, and with the spring came the bright blue weather of May. Hitler struck on the Western front. The terror of the "Blitzkrieg" was born.

The ensuing headlines bewildered the entire world and horrified the most of it. But to say that Hollywood was puzzled by the news would in no sense express the town's reactions. Hollywood was stunned. A blow in the head with an axe could not have put the town's ill-prepared faculties in a more helpless condition. And when it recovered from its daze, Hollywood went hysterical. It borders now upon a panic which, with a slight impetus, could ripen overnight into catastrophic dimensions.

The hysteria is founded upon the claim that the back-bone of American industry is its foreign markets. At least, that is the only logical conclusion to be drawn from the bare facts of recent happenings. The studios are calling mass meetings of their employees, and from the tenor of the producers' sentimental pleas one is led to

believe that without its foreign markets the motion picture industry in America can no longer operate with profit.

It is a new note for Hollywood, which, if anything, is usually overly optimistic; and as such, it has attracted the suspicions, rather than the sympathies, of the film industry's cynical critics. Several individuals have insisted in uncompromising terminology that the war scare is but a convenient device for the studio heads to use in coercing their labor. By painting the situation as dark as possible, claim these critics, the studio heads hope to convince their dissatisfied workers that they should be happy with what they have and not be trying to get more.

I do not agree with these contentions. Having been closely associated with Hollywood's motion picture industry for the past ten years, I think that I know the difference between its sham and sincerity. And I believe, in this instance, that the film heads are genuinely alarmed over the cataclysmic aspects this war has assumed. When they imply that a Hitler victory would ruin Hollywood, they mean it. They may be mistaken, but not insincere.

It does seem, however, that the conclusion, if justified, is a bit belated. Before an impending crisis, any careful merchant reorganizes his enterprise to meet all possible eventualities. Must we then suppose that Hollywood did not? Or, to bring the matter potently up to date, are we to believe that Hollywood can not?

There's no denying that its foreign markets is a potent item in the film industry. In normal times thirty-five percent of Hollywood's annual take came from foreign countries. Changed continental conditions have already cut to the heart of this snug source of income. Pleading for drastic cuts in R.K.O.'s allowance, George Schaeffer, the company's president, revealed that that studio alone had lost \$400,000 in foreign revenues during the last four months of 1939. That sum would have doubtless saved R.K.O. from ending its last fiscal year \$180,000 on the red side of the company ledgers. From this it can be imagined what Hollywood will suffer if it loses the entire European market, which is almost a certain eventuality if Hitler wins this war.

It is true that extreme optimists in the film industry are still looking at the situation through rose-colored glasses. They believe that Hitler, for purely economic reasons, can not afford to abandon American films entirely. They will be too important as commercial factors in stabilizing the financial structure of his new organization once the conflict has ended. There would be some glimmering of hope in this viewpoint if Hitler could regard the facts dispassionately. But this he can not.

The whole world knows that Hitler has a psychopathic penchant for revenge. One only has to recall what has happened to his critics in previous days to predict his attitude toward Hollywood, which more than any other group of people has attacked the dictator most virulently. With that vast enthusiasm for doing a thing up properly it has smeared the critic-hating chancellor from one end of creation to the other.

Not only did the town cold-shoulder his goodwill ambassador, Leni Riefenstahl, until she's still perhaps sneezing from that frosty reception, but it has, with a crusader's enthusiasm, strewn the screen with Anti-Nazi pictures until Job himself, if he were a Nazi, could not endure it. And Hitler, by a couple thousand light-years, is not Job. To believe that he would allow economic considerations to stand in the way of his wreaking a personal revenge upon those who have so bitterly assailed him is ludicrous.

Lest the industry should blame itself—and certainly it should not—for its treatment of the chancellor, let it remember Russia and what happened to its markets there. Immediately after coming into power Stalin banned American films, with but few exceptions, from the Soviet Union. Pictures produced by other countries fared no better. It is only since the Russo-German treaty that a few Nazi films have been admitted into Russia.

Both, Hitler and Stalin, openly express their bitter hatred of the American concept of life. Then for political reasons alone, why should Hitler tolerate films based upon a capitalistic philosophy in a Nazi-controlled Europe? The logical answer is that he will not.

Motion pictures are of no vital necessity to totalitarian countries. Furthermore, if Hitler decides that he needs films, he, unfortunately for Hollywood's last hope in case of a Nazi victory, is in a position to make them. In addition to his German facilities he will have control of the movie industries of a half-dozen countries. Already the French studios, which have turned out undoubtedly some of the finest films ever produced, are in his hands. The French industry has previously been handicapped only by the lack of funds and organization, both of which the Germans can provide.

Poland, Czechoslovakia, Holland, and Sweden, Italy, and Spain all turned out creditable films; and if Great Britain falls, all of the old Europe falls. The totalitarians will be in complete domination. It is my belief in such a case, that the various film centers of the continent may again resume their work, but under Nazi control. Competition will thus be eliminated. The studios will be bound together in a sort of pan-European film union. Pictures will be freely exchanged between the separate countries. The necessity for

Hollywood as far as Europe is concerned will have completely disappeared.

These facts are presented on the supposition that Hitler wins this war. Suppose he loses. An Allied victory will not, as Hollywood is prone to believe, bring back the fat European markets of former days. Regardless of the outcome, the war will have left its devastating mark upon the continent. The old Europe is definitely gone; the new one will have to be handled with extreme care.

It is logical to assume that films made for the American audience will no longer fit the psychology of a people embittered and saddened by the terrible hell they have been through. With completely open markets, Hollywood would have to produce for two entirely different audiences. That, according to Hollywood's viewpoint, could not be done with profit; only under the old system permitting it to market the same films in both Europe and America can the industry survive. Let's look at the facts underlying this contention.

There are in the world 67,030 motion picture theatres wired for sound. Of this number 35,963 are found in Europe, 19,032 in the United States, 6,568 in the Far East, 5,403 in Latin America, 1,246 in Canada, and 968 in Africa and the Near East. The European figure does not include some 30,000 theatres and "Workers Halls" in Russia, where pictures are shown without admission charges.

In 1938, the last of Hollywood's good years, sixty-five percent of the world's entire screen time was monopolized by American films. To this proportion Hollywood was at the service of a three billion dollar investment, which is the estimated value of the world's motion picture equipment. In return, according to Department of Commerce estimates, Hollywood could attribute from thirty-five to forty percent of its total gross to its foreign markets.

Europe was naturally its greatest source of foreign revenue. Film theatres in France grossed around a billion francs in 1938. Forty-five percent of the films shown were produced by Hollywood. Belgium used sixty percent American films. Italy, with a decree requiring the showing of one Italian film for every two foreign, exhibited about thirty American pictures; the remainder came from Germany as a friendly concession to the axis alliance.

Germany itself was not an entirely negligible market for Hollywood. In 1937 fifty-two American films were exhibited by the Nazi theatres as compared with ninety-six of German production. But evidently it was Hitler's intention to eliminate Hollywood's products. Even had the war not started, Germany's exhibition plans called for the use of not more than thirty American films in 1939. It is an

ironically odd fact that the United States, on the other hand, imported and exhibited last year eighty-five German films.

Hollywood's most important European market, however, was the United Kingdom, which spoke the language sound-tracked on American films. Of all the pictures shown in the British Isles in 1938, eighty-one percent came from Hollywood. In that year Great Britain did an estimated business of \$35,000,000 with Hollywood. With 5,300 theatres attended by an average weekly audience of 18,000,000 in normal times, the British exhibitors in 1939 grossed \$250,000,000, which is no small item in the world's annual motion picture income.

It should be pointed out, however, that before the war Hollywood was losing its grip upon the British market. England was becoming more self-sufficient in its own film production; quotas were hamstringing activities. Despite the \$35,000,000, Hollywood's business with the United Kingdom in 1938 represented a drop of fifty percent from a previous high. In that year the United Kingdom stood but fourth in importance among Hollywood's foreign markets. Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico all preceded it.

Optimists attribute this disastrous slash in the British market to the crisis which for years hung over England before the actual commencement of hostilities. They explain that the public's interest had been diverted from the theatre by the seriousness of the threatened conflict.

With the easing up of tension, argue the optimists, the British market would have resumed its former status. One can do no more now than speculate upon the soundness of this point of view. There's little need of discussing it today. Whatever possibilities it possessed ended with the outbreak of the war.

However, war or no war, world conditions are very unstable. There is nothing to indicate that they will be any different for many years to come. Civilization seems in the grip of gigantic birth-throes. Whether it is being born into death or into an abundant life is beside the point in this article. The fact is that it's suffering. And with pain comes suspicion and fear.

Under the stress we seek refuge in the strength of our national unities. More and more are individual countries attempting to insure the maintenance of national entity through the increase of economic self-sufficiency. It stands to reason then that they will be increasingly reluctant toward seeing their capital leave for foreign shores with a no more solid substance left in exchange than dubious entertainment.

Hollywood's heyday in foreign markets has passed. For the future the American motion picture industry would be more than

wise in considering only the business which the United States alone is capable of giving it. *Hic Rhodos, hic salta!* Whatever happens, Hollywood can at least depend upon its American market. Let's forget world markets for a moment and see what the United States has to offer its film industry.

At present there are 17,003 theatres operating in America, which last year served an average weekly attendance of 85,000,000 people, more than a third of world's entire audience. With proper methods this number may be increased. In the peak attendance year of 1930 America's cinema audience averaged 110,000,000 people weekly.

Twenty-three cents was the average admission paid last year. The film box-office grossed in the United States alone nearly one billion dollars, a stupendous figure that placed the motion picture business seventh in rank among the leading American industries.

Since approximately one-fourth of the box office dollar is allotted to film production, the studios, which last year spent an estimated \$165,000,000, received in return about \$250,000,000 from America alone. The difference, of course, was far from being net profit.

Beside its production expenses, the studio paid out \$46,000,000 on supplies and maintenance. A six percent interest on the original \$125,000,000 investment in studio materials would account for another \$7,500,000. State and Federal taxes sliced \$10,000,000 more from the gross income. So by subtracting these total expenditures estimates from the gross income, we can see that Hollywood's net profits from its American audience amounted to not over \$21,500,000.

To the average eye this is a sizeable sum, but not to Hollywood, which remembers that four of its eight major studios could cover that figure with their net earnings of the last year. A single company counted its net profits for the last fiscal year at \$9,841,530.61.

The drastic cut in figures is at the base of Hollywood's panicky outlook on the future. It sees the situation in terms of proportions, and not in terms of its ultimate possibilities. Thus once again it has jumped headlong into a conclusion that seems not justified.

Let's not forget that beside the United States, the industry still has access to the Orient and to Latin America. In the prime days Hollywood was too busy raking in its European gold to take either of these commercial fields very seriously. But Latin America alone has 5,400 theatres, seventy-six percent of whose entire screen fare is made up of American films.

It is true that both the Oriental and Latin American markets may go the way of the European ones. Japan already has rather stringent quota regulations, and production in Latin America is increasing yearly.

However, even if the entire foreign markets are eventually wiped out, I insist that Hollywood can maintain its functioning, and functioning with profit. Let it take a lesson from other American enterprises. Macy's, for instance, which caters to a purely American trade, has been able to offer the public quality products at moderate prices and still enjoy a reasonable income. Woolworth's, which could not, as Hollywood says it would be forced to do, decrease the quality of its goods, is continuing satisfactory operations regardless of the effects of world-conditions on its wide-spread foreign markets. And Hollywood will likewise be able to make money on readjusted budgets.

There will have to be reorganization in the studios, drastic reorganization. To get a clearer picture of the inner-financial workings of the studio, let's look at a breakdown of the production dollar, on which the budgets are determined. It is divided as follows:

Cast 25%; extras, bits, and characters 5%; director 10%; director's assistant 2%; cameraman and crew 1.5%; lights 2%; makeup, hair-dressers, and supplies 0.9%; teachers 0.2%; crew and labor 1.2%; story preparation 7%; story costs 5%; costumes and designers 0.2%; sets and art directors 12.5%; insurance 2%; stills and photographs 0.4%; cutters 1%; film negative 1%; tests 1.2%; sound negatives and engineering 3.1%; publicity, transportation, research, technical, miscellaneous 2%; indirect costs 15%.

One does not have to be a financial expert to see the disproportionate nature of these figures. Anyone can understand that budgets, based upon the given percentage allotments, can be enormously cut without harming the essential requirements of picture production. So if Hollywood claims that it can not make quality films on reduced expenditures, it should start an unbiased consideration of its possibilities. It will find that a newer and more economical system of operation is absolutely practical.

Besides, it is time for Hollywood to begin recognizing its responsibility to the millions of workers who, either directly or indirectly, depend upon it for a living. There is an estimated \$1,900,000,000 in film theatres in America. The owners of most of these are small-town people who ask no more than a modest living for their investments.

Around 300,000 people are in the actual employment of the industry. The exhibition field alone uses 255,000; an additional 13,000 work in the distributing departments; and the studios themselves have 30,000 individuals on their payrolls. Have the producers forgotten these people? If not their brothers keepers, it is a matter of good insurance to remember that their destinies are also interwoven

with that of the nation of which, regardless of future positions, they will always be a part. It is up to Hollywood to keep its share of the nation's employees drawing a paycheck.

There is still another factor which the industry must accept as its obligation. As a pure economic catalyst, so vital to prosperity in this country, Hollywood's importance can not be over-estimated. It touches the nation's pocket-book in devious ways. For instance, the newspapers and magazines of America depended upon the motion picture industry last year for \$77,000,000 of their paid advertisements.

The theatres of small towns are like small hearts in circulating and redistributing the money. Sixty-five percent of the cash taken in at the box-office is retained for use in the places where the theatres are located. It goes to pay the janitor, the coal bill, taxes, the ushers, the projectionist, insurance, advertisement in local papers, the girls that sell tickets, the real-estate agent, and the management.

Of the actual production money twenty-eight percent is spent among the people of Los Angeles and its environment. There is hardly an individual in that vast city of a million and a half population who is not affected economically by the motion picture industry. Last year the weekly payroll of the studios amounted to \$2,557,692.30.

Therefore, it is perilous to the economic stability of this country to assume that all of this will come to an end if Hitler wins this war. The industry still has its twenty years of experience in picture-making; it still has its enormous technical resources; it still has its vast abundance of creative manpower. And if the worst happens, it will still have the support of 85,000,000 people. What else, besides reorganization itself to meet circumstances, does Hollywood need?

Radio and Education.

By Charles A. Siepmann.

Over a hundred million people in this country listen more or less regularly to the radio. The average American has his set tuned in for some four hours a day. These are striking facts which, with others no less striking, never fail to attract attention to the subject. But the real interest of radio lies back of the statistics. Moreover it is not only with their implications that we are concerned, but with the bearing of purpose on practice in the wider social context of our common plight today.

The commodity which radio purveys and the structure of the industry as we know it are no mere accidents. Both are the product of circumstances and forces which have brought them into being, which condition the structure and affect the service. Radio does not exist in a vacuum.

Neither radio nor education, nor the relation of one to the other, can therefore usefully be studied except in this wider context. More, perhaps, than any other invention of modern science, radio mirrors back to us our present state, the forces with which we contend and the decisions of purpose and of practice which confront us.

My approach itself requires clearer definition, for it conditions at once the aspects of radio to be studied and the conclusions to be drawn. To clarify my purpose, I venture to quote Thomas Jefferson. "This country, which has given to the world the example of physical liberty, owes to it that of moral emancipation also, for as yet it is but nominal with us." The moral implications of radio's influence on people are, then, chosen as the basis of appraisal of what it does and what it may yet do. These are chosen advisedly because we face a moral issue in the revolutionary situation which confronts us. From this standpoint, radio may seem to be in the position of the rich man in the parable, who went away sorrowing "for he had great possessions." The parallel, of course, is not exact in that the radio industry, unlike the rich man of the parable, is not confronted, in the matter of choice and of decision, by one who was himself the incarnation of the good. Radio, rather, stands over against a public, and agents of the public, as divided and confused about ends as is radio itself.

If, at this early stage, then, we may hazard a generalization, it is that this infant prodigy, this new instrument of power, as yet lacks consistent purpose. It is with the absence of policy and the reasons for that absence that we shall be concerned, and with an attempt to clarify what in the course of time may yet emerge as policy enriched and fortified by purpose.

In recognition of the fact that undivided purpose is absent, and that its absence is characteristic of our state, as of that of radio, is to be found the corrective to false hopes and a clue to the proper context of thought about the problem. Science and invention have tempted us to exaggerated hopes, to an undue preoccupation with the unlimited means at our disposal, to concern with processes, and to oversight of ends, ends, mark you, that are unattainable and yet to be pursued. The prevalent disillusionment among the young and the general perplexity stem largely from this source of error. We emerge from an era of shallow optimism only to realize that in a quite fundamental sense, whether the context is that of education, of politics, or of society, "the road winds up hill all the way, yes, to the very end." In spite of all the ballyhoo and promotional extravagances of the radio industry, which flatter only to deceive, radio offers no prospect of a cultural millennium. It is a two-edged weapon, capable of great service but adding equally to the complexity of our problems as persons and as collective members of society. Like other instruments of power, radio is there to use and the outcome of its use depends on the integrity and purpose of those who control it, on the powers of response of those who listen, and on the emergent pattern in the kaleidoscope of interacting forces—those "objective influences" of which we hear so much and by which industry and listener alike are held to be affected.

Our concern, then, is with the moralities of broadcasting. To assess them fairly and relevantly we shall have to concern ourselves with three aspects of the problem, first with the inherent possibilities of the medium itself, second, with the limitations imposed upon their use by the structure of the industry, and, third, with limitations and opportunities determined by the nature and circumstance of radio's listening public.

First, then, radio's distinctive attributes. Radio has unique resources. What are they? One can cite but a few. It has range, what is technically known as coverage. It disposes of time and distance. It at once rids us in some measure of the solitude of isolation, and imposes upon us that deeper solitude which comes of wider knowledge and experience. In this, as in so many other respects that we shall touch on, radio at once exemplifies and aggravates conditions

peculiar to our time. The implications of this first attribute of radio are too many and too complex to name. A few may serve as illustration. Radio has range. It, therefore, increases and accelerates the impact of ideas, of information, of events, of a multitude of stimuli, which by their very quantity affect our outlook and our poise. "The world," as Wordsworth put it, "is too much with us; late and soon, getting and spending, we lay waste our powers." As we shall see later, the nature of such impact is affected by the purposes and interests of those who control radio. Where values are concerned, everything depends upon the accent of emphasis. If we are concerned with the moral implications of the radio, we shall, therefore, do well to identify the accent of its emphasis, those implications of value, which are residual in the listener's consciousness as consequence of the total impact of what he hears. Radio thus, inherently and without willing it, aggravates what Professor Dewey calls "the ratio of impersonal to personal activities which determine the course of events." It constitutes yet another of those objective forces which have induced a sense of helplessness among individuals and robbed them of any real feeling of participation in events.

Radio in one sense, by eliminating spatial isolation, makes of us citizens of the world. Does it, or can it, also make us good citizens? One may at least hazard the view that the very power and opportunity inherent in this instrument may defeat its own ends by the very wealth of the resources which it offers. Our minds and our emotions are on the whole less efficiently organized than our stomachs; but even the stomach has limited powers of digestion. It is arguable that radio creates for us a surfeit of stimulus, of information, and suggestion, which *unless counterbalanced by controls of purpose, selection, and direction*, may well wreak more havoc than advantage.

Another corollary of radio's resource of coverage is that it constitutes the people's instrument. It reaches all, and, therefore, must serve all. The implications of this fact for education will be touched on later. The abuse of the fact in terms of the misleading cliché that radio must therefore "give the people what it wants" will also be referred to when we survey the structure of the industry. But a challenge to that assertion must be offered here and now. Who are the people? And what are their wants? In a final and decisive sense the people are persons, individuals demanding of us that reverence for personality which is inherent in democratic thought. The yardstick of radio's achievement, the measure of its constructive, as against its potentially destructive, influence, is the degree to which it enhances in individuals that sense of and that capacity for being

persons—individual, discriminating, morally, sensitively aware, which is the final object of all education. In the matter of purely literary taste and judgment, Matthew Arnold once suggested that the reader should have in mind lines chosen from some great passage in literature by which to test the inherent quality of what he reads. Extreme as it may sound, a similar yardstick might well prove useful for the listener over against every program that he hears in terms of a question as to whether this or that that comes over the radio contributes to freedom, freedom, that is, conceived of as an enhancement of personality. Is he more or is he less a person for the experience which radio offers? It is by some such yardstick that the structure of our society and the contributory elements therein are likely to be judged in a decisive hour, if not consciously, at least subconsciously by what, for want of a better term, we may call the will of the people. The revolutionary context of our time has reference to this very issue. Radio is merely a microcosm of the wider context of politics and of society.

Radio not only has great range but great resources of technique. American radio in all but one significant field has carried these techniques to a greater degree of skillful perfection than that which obtains in any country. Again the subject is one too vast to be adequately covered, but three instances at least of the peculiar techniques of radio may be mentioned, enhanced as they are by the vast, sweeping range and reach of the wave lengths of the air. Even in this sophisticated age, there attaches still to radio some of the attributes of magic. Its disposal of space and time still carries a romantic appeal which holds our interest. There is an expectancy associated with all listening, a wonder not unlike that associated with the working of a miracle. Communication between persons, wonderful as it is, we take for granted. But communication over the air still has this attribute of wonder. It is for this reason that the spoken word, the radio talk, is, potentially at any rate, charged with such great possibilities. President Roosevelt's fireside talks are an outstanding example of that contagion of personality which is associated with good radio talk. The skills which go to it and their variant potentialities deserve a chapter of their own. But suffice it here to say that to convey intimacy and absolute sincerity is of the essence of the matter. Few men achieve these skills and, for reasons peculiar to broadcasting in this country, their development has gone relatively by default. There are, of course, signal exceptions, but they are few. But the fact remains that the spoken word over the radio constitutes, perhaps, the most powerful integrating force that we have yet enjoyed. There is, of course, much that radio cannot communicate, as we shall

see later. But the resources of the spoken word, still to be developed and exploited beyond anything we now dream of, stand as a signal example of a technique that has attached to it one attribute at least of very special significance. That attribute is associated with the two words already mentioned—intimacy and sincerity. Circumstances recently forced on radio a serious and dangerous distortion of this unique resource. It was inevitable that in a presidential election the microphone should be set up in places and under circumstances alien to radio's true purpose and sphere of service. Candidates and candidates' supporters spoke before vast crowds, playing upon mass emotions, evoking mass response. The atmosphere of the hustings was carried into millions of homes as a brutal assault on privacy and as a travesty of that art of quiet, personal communication, which is, potentially at least, one of the glories of radio technique. Here again we come upon the two-edged weapon. There is no need to point to the analogy of its destructive use in the totalitarian countries where contempt for persons has become an axiom of politics. Let the matter rest at that.

Let us now turn briefly to a technique of a very different order. Radio drama, not itself very significant as a new form of art and soon, no doubt, to be discarded altogether with the advent of television, today commands perhaps the greatest and the most consistent audience of any programs broadcast. The fact that in radio the stage is the listener's imagination, coupled with that element of magic already spoken of, gives to this technique a power over emotion and imagination with which the student of "soap opera" is familiar. The fact that this technique is used for purposes with which education can have no dealings cannot conceal or dispose of the fact that we have here a powerful means of influence where influence is most needed, that is, where values are concerned and the purging rather than the prostitution of emotional response. From the point of view of Jefferson's moral emancipation, what is significant is that we have here again the means to destroy or, not to cure, but to alleviate. Cure there is none, for us or for any generation. Yet in the range, the coverage of radio, and its resources of technique we have, as has been said, an instrument which is the peoples' instrument, available to us at a time when claims upon the peoples' intelligence and understanding are greater in extent and in intensity than they have ever been. How comes it then that we are so far short of that illusory millennium, that, indeed, we may not even be upon the road which leads somewhere? At least part of the answer can be found in observation of the structure of the industry, which now constitutes our second port of call.

Here, as throughout this study, it will be well to stress again the wider implications of the radio both in respect of cause and of effect. Radio is what it is because we are what we are, habituated to a circumstance and outlook which not only derive from past history and tradition, but are themselves in some measure out of date. It is in this sense that the structure of the radio industry is not an accident. It derives from principles of policy which rest upon past precedent and are inherent in the pattern of American thought and practice. Radio as an industry stands for the principle of free, competitive enterprise associated with the profit motive. By such a practice and by such motive forces the resources of invention and experiment have been made available to the public. It was so that radio was launched, but it was not so entirely that radio developed. (Here again radio illustrates trends and developments of outlook and organization which hopefully affect one's estimate of what is yet to come.) Only a few years elapsed before it became evident that unrestricted competition was impracticable. A gentlemen's agreement between the contestants for channels of the air broke down and led to chaos, and the industry itself sought regulation and protection from government. From Mr. Hoover, then Acting Secretary of Commerce, came a first definition of principles which in the same breath acknowledged the validity of free enterprise and introduced an element of control by government restricting the wanton ravages of cut-throat competition. These three principles are worth quotation. They claim first that government and, therefore, the people have today the control of the channels of the air, in itself a new and significant departure of principle and policy. They claim, secondly, that radio activities are largely free, free of monopoly, free in program and free in speech. The third is a moral principle. "We can protect the home by preventing the entry of printed matter destructive to its ideals, but we must double guard the radio." But, as has been rightly pointed out, no protection of specific ideals is possible unless they are determined and used as a basis for restricting program content. The agency later created to define these ideals in terms of "the public interest, convenience and necessity" was the Federal Communications Commission. Years have passed, but little flesh has been put upon the bare bones of that equivocal phrase. Yet, tardy and tentative as the Commission has proved in practice, its continuing existence is significant, a sign of the emergence of a new concept in politics which is slowly, painfully gaining acceptance. That concept has to do with the new and wider scope and responsibility of government. It is paralleled by the emergent conception of public service, to be associated with, and a prior condition of, continued private enterprise. The activities of the F.C.C. continue

to be resented by the trade, but its influence cannot be questioned, even if it is indirect. Uneasy about further regulation and control, the industry has in some measure put its own house in order. It has its own moral code, excellent within the rather narrow limits which it has so far reached. Moreover, "public service" has been adopted by the industry as the specific label for certain aspects of its work. Under this head, to be sure, we find an odd miscellany. The motive back of its compilation is not wholly disinterested, but it remains significant as a laggard trend.

If thus far there seems to be but grudging recognition of what radio has done, let us at once and with admiration concede two signal achievements in the field of public service. Whatever qualifications, in respect of countervailing practice, we must add, regardless of how far research may disclose limits of actual effectiveness, no one can lightly question the efficiency or the integrity of American radio in offering its listeners a full and constant service of news, and in maintaining the principle of free and fair expression of opinion on a wide range of controversial questions. These entries on the credit side are not unique, but they are outstanding. The question they raise—and it is vital from the point of view of education, the effectiveness of which depends upon consistent purpose—is why such credit entries are so far offset by debit entries, which at some points detract from, and at others wholly nullify, the value of such service rendered. The nature of these defects has to be cited. They have, also, to be traced to their source, if we are fairly to appraise radio and education as they stand and as the relation between them may develop in the future. The source appears to be the structure of the industry, the motive forces which have brought it into being. Can man serve God and Mammon? Is the profit motive, in fact, compatible with public service? The point I would here stress is that the posing of such a question implies, and falsely, an absolute choice between positive and negative reply. There are no such absolutes where human practice is concerned. Free enterprise, associated with the profit motive, is the occasion both of merits and defects of radio in America. The total elimination of defects we shall not see; nor shall we taste perfection. The problem is one of adjustment, of the elimination of a self-destructive conflict of purpose. The nature of that conflict we can, as I say, discover only by examination of defects and by diagnosis of their cause. The following are samples.

Radio's coverage is centered on densely populated areas where large audiences and big profits can be realized. Rural listeners are penalized, have relatively inferior service and choice. Competition runs counter to public service in respect of program balance. Dupli-

cation of programs on different wave lengths is monotonously evident throughout the day and night. Concern for profit leads to a concentration on programs judged to be most "popular." Minorities are neglected and even the limited potentialities of listeners with the lowest intelligence are seldom exploited. There is a monotony of entertainment, even though that entertainment masters at times greater resourcefulness and skill than anywhere on earth. Further, the large expenditures which radio involves tend, as in industry, towards centralization of control. The advantages are obvious. Resources become available which could not otherwise be afforded. But the disadvantages, which receive less advertisement, are serious. That culture is most enduring which is native, which springs from the soil. Culture cannot be distributed by mail order. It is in this sense above all others that New York is not America; still less is Hollywood. As radio becomes centralized, the role and status of local stations diminish. They become increasingly the retail distributors of a large central store. And yet for that large percentage of the population which lives in rural or small urban districts research has shown that the influence of local personality, the voice of the neighbor, still is greater than that of radio's giant creations. It is not insignificant, for instance, that in Iowa loyalty to a familiar local personality has secured, in one instance, for news interpretations and in another for musical appreciation audiences greater even than that for some of radio's top flight entertainment stars. For the better interpretation of the whole to the part, and even more of the part to the whole, we should do well still to foster that local initiative which centralization is rapidly destroying. Even more dangerous is that further consequence of centralized control by which the contact of the men of radio with their public becomes increasingly remote and impersonal. The listener is reduced to a bare statistic, an object of manipulation and exploitation which, as we shall see later, conflicts with that conception of human relations on which democratic faith itself is based.

The above considerations may seem remote from the problems of education. But they are strictly relevant, for education's influence, the accent of its emphasis, *even its opportunity to function*, depend upon the pattern of society which results from the interaction of individual parts. The above are but some of the defects of radio that stem directly from the motive forces inherent in its structure. Profit and competition in the old accepted sense of *laissez-faire* have had their day, and above all where the commodity purveyed is of such social consequence as that of radio. Hence that inauguration

of control by government as trustee for the public which has been mentioned.

But the worst and the most dangerous feature of American radio also stems directly from the profit motive. Promotional excesses, the ballyhoo of advertising, the high pitched appeals to the sensational, the constant holding of the top notes of the superlative, all these combine to achieve effects, the harmfulness of which is not capable of statistical analysis, but which with some justification one can claim *a priori* to be inherent in the process. Their danger, in a word, is the inducement of a slave mentality. They further, instead of countering, influences at work in other spheres of our experience. They aggravate that impression of individual helplessness over against objective forces which is a symptom of our neurotic state. The process, as I say, is inherent in the structure of the industry. It is the dialectic of large-scale manipulation, which, because involved in the necessity to secure a mass response to wholesale distribution of commodities, has to induce as far as possible an enslavement of the individual in matters of choice and discrimination, a constant of passivity. It has to induce the illusion of unity by methods of organized ballyhoo and the creation of stereotypes in the pattern of our likes and dislikes. Here again, radio is at once victim and agent. Because of their purposes, in this case the pursuit of profit, men become involved in a dialectic of behavior and of practice which assumes aspects of inevitability which are in fact illusory (because what a man wills conditions essentially what he does), but which assume such proportions of power as to *appear* to be beyond control. This from the point of view of education, or as I prefer to put it, from the point of view of morals is the crux of the whole matter.

The illusion of inevitability must be destroyed, or it will destroy us. If this analysis has any value, it centers on the passionate assertion that man today, as at all times, is not the victim of his circumstance but of his own blindness and deluded will. There is, indeed, a dialectic of events, an inescapable logic of consequence attendant upon any course of action. But it is our will, our purpose, which sets us upon the course. If a concern for profit or loyalties no longer compatible with the public interest outweigh in us that desire for moral emancipation which Jefferson sought, the consequence is clear. But let us not delude ourselves by substituting helplessness for irresponsibility as cause and as occasion. "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars but in ourselves that we are underlings."

But how, it may be asked, does it come about that such enslavement is in fact practicable, that the public should prove such easy game? Is it fair to cast the whole blame in such a complex situation

on those who control radio? The answer is clear and certain. It is not fair, and no such blame is cast. Those in charge of radio are but part authors of the plot. Nor is it a plot of strict design, of sheer malign purpose. Radio, as I have attempted to point out, has interest only in a context far wider than that of the industry itself. We suffer, all of us, as members of society from a kind of moral jaundice. The blame is indeed distributed. Yet we must face the fact that those who are privileged in circumstance, in the possession of power, in the administration of high office, are in a very real and crucial sense their brother's keeper. There is emergent in the history of radio, as in the developing history of this country, a new and fuller realization of the meaning of trusteeship. It would be arrogant for any man to claim as his responsibility the changing of human nature. But human nature needs to be safeguarded. It is for us to cherish in ourselves and, according to our power and our position, still more for others the possibility of growth, to be vigilant lest "we lay waste our powers." The glaring disparities in opportunity for growth which have resulted from the particular direction of our wills in the context that we have studied are evident but still too little recognized in the society in which we live and from which we glean our comforts and our satisfactions. Concern for that disparity brings us to our third port of call, to radio's listening audience, to that state of the nation to which Mr. Roosevelt in early days persistently and properly drew our attention.

Over a hundred million citizens of the United States devote to radio time and attention only less than that which they devote to work and sleep. The reason why the process of enslavement, unwittingly being realized from day to day, is possible is largely to be found in circumstances common to the large majority of these hundred million people. These circumstances can here be stated only in terms of crude statistics. These listeners are uneducated. Thirty-four million adults have never enjoyed education beyond that of the fifth grade. These listeners are poor. Fourteen millions earn incomes of no more than \$26.00 a month. The vast majority of radio's audience enjoy incomes of less than \$1500 a year, millions of them much less. These listeners are poor, uneducated, lonely. Their circumstances make them such. That sense of belonging, to which Professor Lasswell has constantly referred, is taken from them by the privations of economic circumstance and the still more devastating inroads on their self-respect of the inhuman tasks which they are called to undertake in industry. The sense of personal participation diminishes. The social fabric of loyalties is undermined. The personal relations of employer and employed that once gave meaning and value to labor disappear

as the forces of centralized control work upon them. As Bacon put it, "Little do men perceive what solitude is and how far it extendeth. For a crowd is not company and faces are but a gallery of pictures and talk but a tinkling symbol where there is no love. *Magna civitas, magna solitudo.*" Radio's audience is the human stuff on which huge objective forces, or as I prefer to say, the misdirected wills of men, have worked this havoc of solitude.

Some of the consequences, for radio and education, are beginning to emerge from the findings of research. The evidence is still inadequate for full and effective diagnosis and ameliorative measures. But it is ample (and for our major purposes we can forget statistics), to throw light upon the problem which educators are still slow and even reluctant to face. cursory as this survey has been, inadequate as it must be as even a blueprint for action, it will, I hope, have suggested an approach by suggesting a new perspective, a transfer of our attention, and by demolishing the great illusion of inevitability.

In radio, in education, in the sum total of our living we face a moral issue. A choice is forced upon us by the progress of events which follow, as night follows day, the misdirection of our will. It is a choice admitting of no piecemeal answer, not an answer of lip service only but of a dominating purpose permeating all activities in which we are concerned as members of society. The choice has to do with two alternative attitudes to people. We can despise them, or we may reverence them, as we must reverence ourselves if life is to have meaning. In terms of society we can, according to our choice, manipulate people or serve them. The first is easier, the second harder than it has ever been. Easier because the status of the individual has been reduced by the inhuman factors inherent in industrial development, by the decrease of economic self-dependence and of that residuum of self-respect which men salvage from the wreckage of the conflicts of human greed and aspiration. Easier, too, because of the perfected instruments for dominating men's minds and emotions of which the radio is the supreme example. The alternative choice is the harder for the same reasons. We are far gone in circumstance. Over against the manipulative point of view of the authoritarian, we have, as President Hutchins has pointed out, little to offer in terms of superior efficiency or of material circumstance. All we have left is the remnant of a faith in persons, most positive and clear in its passionate rejection of the evil that it recognizes in the challenge which the man manipulators have flung down, too positive in terms of lip service to the mere vocabulary of freedom and emancipation, and as yet scarcely positive at all, considering the immanence of crisis, in terms of action carried into the field of government, of

administration, and private industry. We are involved today as never before; and the paradox of the centripetal forces manifest in industry and government, resulting as they do in a centrifugal reaction, where the sense of individual belonging, of pride and purpose are concerned, has been touched on in this study. The situation is, indeed, grave, and only a colossal effort of the will, a supreme sense of responsibility for public service, can keep at bay the evils and the dangers at our door. This is the context by reference to which we may consider the challenge, the hope and the opportunity which radio offers us.

Radio, as has been said, is inherently and as of right the peoples' instrument. The challenge to educators implicit in this fact is that of a redirection of attention, an emphasis on education of the people, the urgency of which at this stage scarcely needs to be pressed home. Radio as a means is thus timely, almost heaven sent as opportunity.

Devotion and enterprise on the part of those concerned with radio have developed skills most apt for communication with the people. That these are much abused by standards of the peoples' needs is not here relevant. For education the relevant consideration is the existence of a new medium and method of interpretation. The impatience of the industry with educators over their tardy recognition of the absolute necessity to find the appropriate means by which to convey truths and values, means that take account of the pathetic helplessness, the intellectual immaturity, the life and circumstance of those whom radio serves, is in large measure justified. The counter objection of the educators is no less true, namely that radio, while master of many skills, has all too often lamentably failed in exercising them for ends that correspond to peoples' true, as against their superficial, needs. It is uncomfortably true that what radio gives with one hand it takes away with the other. The virtue of education is in consistent purpose. Without adjustment of the proportions of radio's constructive and destructive influence, there is small hope that it can realize its manifest destiny in the wider context of crisis with which we are concerned. Radio has rightly stressed the need to gild the pill which is to be offered to a sick and undernourished patient. As a point of technique, this is at once appropriate to the condition of the listener and to the circumstance of radio as servant of men's leisure. Radio is right again (where it in fact succeeds in doing so), in adapting its techniques (as in the quiz program) to a frame of reference relevant to the background of experience of the listener. Radio's contributions in these respects have been both shrewd and realistic. Its shortcomings have to do with that tendency which we have noted to think of the listener in static rather than in dynamic

terms. Skills of technique are nothing worth except as vehicles of matter that is significant and by which the seeds of growth and sensitive awareness can be sown. "Soap opera" attracts by its relevance to the anxieties and morbid propensities of those who listen. It offers a context which is recognizable. Therein lies its technical merit. Its defect is that it evokes no response in which is inherent the possibility for growth of understanding. It adds nothing to experience. The present failure and the future opportunity of radio is to be found in the fruitful exploitation of techniques. And it is here that service may yet be rendered by those best fitted to charge communication with significance. The poet, the writer of genius and distinction if, while maintaining his integrity, he can keep the common touch, eschew the esoteric, has in radio a means of significant communication through which the writer's art itself may find a new lease of life and by which a truly democratic culture may yet come into being. Remember W. B. Yeats' dictum, "Think like a wise man but communicate in the language of the people."

The impatience of radio men with educators is no less justified in one other respect. There are aspects of education irrelevant to radio because alien to its resources of techniques. Alien, too, to the more pressing needs of radio's audience. It is in this connection, as with respect to the two matters above referred to, that a transfer of attention on the part of educators is necessary. Radio cannot teach. Teaching involves communication of a kind that radio cannot attempt,—a discipline, a concentration, a circumstance that have nothing to do with radio's circumstance. Nor can radio communicate the subtleties and refinements of thought and feeling that are the product of higher education. Radio can achieve little more than a stimulus. By constantly repeated injections, such stimulus may induce some modifications in our system. But it is most dangerous in education to project on others our own experience, to assume similar susceptibilities where background and circumstance are as tragically different as we have seen them to be. The men of radio are more realist than educators in recognition of ordinary peoples' priorities of need. Their fault, as we have noted, is in the too frequent exploitation instead of service to such needs. Of these priorities of need, something must here be said.

The fruits of culture in the proper sense of that term stand unassailable in their own right. But these are fruits we gather at the end of a long journey, and few have had opportunity to make that journey. For the mass audience of radio, apart from the need (which stems directly from their circumstance) of escape into a world of glamorous distraction, the first concern is with material needs, with

problems of health, of food, and the handling of children, the practices and the concerns of their humdrum day-to-day existence. Radio has found ready response to service for such needs. Whether what is communicated on such topics is always the best and the wisest that can be communicated is a moot question. Too often, preoccupation with a quick return of interest, associated with the profit motive of the advertiser, runs counter to genuine concern for service which the gilding of the pill, the simplification of things inherently not simple, may dangerously imperil. Radio both gives and takes away.

Whereas material needs are the most obvious, the listeners' psychological needs are probably the more urgent. A pathetic example of such need and of the morbid sympathetic interest which it arouses is the Good Will Court of Mr. Anthony. That Mr. Anthony dispenses but rough justice those who have listened are hardly likely to question. Doctors, psychologists, and social workers may be provoked to indignation, disgust, or to despair, by what transpires at these striptease acts of the human soul. Yet from a social point of view, these tawdry proceedings challenge us to thought. Rough justice may be dispensed, *but the courtroom is crammed*. The pathetic helplessness of people is here exposed in all its nakedness. Is there nothing to be done about it? Are doctors and educators, confident that they know better than Mr. Anthony, going to stand by while radio in this instance, as in many others, dips down into the unsavory depths of peoples' need? Here are priorities of need, and the rough justice dispensed over the radio may, from the point of view of these poor creatures, prove more valuable than the superior integrity of those whose knowledge stays them from rushing in where angels fear to tread. Here at least is an instance of the level at which education is urgently required. If, through the voice of Mr. Anthony, radio does disservice, it at least voices a challenge of attention to educators in their ivory towers.

What, next, of society's need of the listener? Reference having been made to radio's power of integration, we must pause a moment at least to suggest the possibilities yet to be realized by the proper adaptation of techniques for integrating our society in respect of social purpose. The new and expanding role of government demands of us accelerated powers of adaptation, of quick release from those adhesions of the past, those habituations of thought and prejudice which make us reluctant to face manifest necessities of social change. As the activities of government increase, more and more persons are affected by it. Yet it stands remote, impersonal, symbol again of the objective forces which in our confusion of purpose and of insight we are coming to believe in as disembodied powers. The new role of

government requires, and urgently, a new and intensified degree of apt interpretation. For the distortion, for selfish and disingenuous ends, of such verbal symbols as unity and patriotism, we need to substitute dynamic symbols of true unity. These can only be created and they can only be understood by the wider dissemination of knowledge about social circumstance and by the realization through government and in society of projects and activities, the constructive purpose of which can be vividly brought home to people. Radio in this matter cannot, of course, act as pioneer but merely as interpreter. It must wait upon events. Yet in respect of a more widespread consciousness of social facts, there is already work enough to do. One instance drawn from British experience may illustrate the point.

Some years ago it was decided to communicate through radio facts relevant to housing conditions in Great Britain. Week by week over a period of three months a popular sports commentator (chosen advisedly for this purpose) visited the slums and the rehousing projects of the country and reported what he saw to radio's listening audience. As a result, awareness took the place of ignorance, of that indifference to the unknown which, as society becomes more complex, becomes increasingly a source of danger and dissension. The significance of the achievement was the creation of an "area of consciousness." The public conscience was stirred. Radio was not concerned, as it must never be, to influence opinion on public policy. Its range and its resources, however, are available to us to quicken conscience, to integrate experience, by extending knowledge and promoting sympathy. The subject is, alas, too large for proper development here.

One final point, however, must be made that bears on radio's possibilities in education. Seeing that it adds to the complication of our living by the increased impact of ideas and information, it must, unless confusion is to be worse confounded, offer to a bewildered public something by way of what I term selective direction through the maze of issues and impressions with which the listener is confronted. In its interpretation of the war in Europe through news reporters and commentators, radio has rendered this very service. It is curious, though perhaps not surprising if we think of the deterrent influences, that small attempt at similar interpretation of domestic issues has been made. The need for interpretation is, as I have said, inherent in the very circumstance of radio. Its very power and range demand some such corrective to confusion and distraction. The achievement of one of these commentators must be referred to as illustrating aspects of radio most relevant to education and charged

with hopeful possibilities. Let us examine the record of Mr. Raymond Gram Swing.

The Crossley ratings show that he commands a regular listening audience of over eight millions. How and why is this significant? How has this following been achieved? By perseverance, by integrity, and by mastery of the techniques of radio talk. Each point has a special significance. Three years ago the name of Raymond Swing was scarcely known to listeners. Today for millions it has the connotation of a trusted and a needed friend. Concern over the war created, of course, the necessary frame of reference to which his commentary could be related. But his regular, recurrent presence at the microphone, together with the inherent merits of the man, created this vast audience. As with the plugging of a song, as with the constant repetition of advertisement, so with Mr. Swing. Merit given time, given also a context relevant to men's preoccupations, wins through. Relatively few such personalities have been created at the microphone because of the advertisers' concern with quick returns. It is for this reason, among others, that I stressed earlier the as yet unexplored resources of the spoken word available to radio, given time for their development. Raymond Swing's achievement is remarkable no less for the integrity of his performance. He, above all others, has recognized and cherished the ideal of realizing through radio something that I can only call a convention of good manners in communication. The integrity of his approach and of his subject has at no time been compromised. Statistics cannot prove the worth of such achievement. But Raymond Swing's eight million listeners stand as proof that the dynamic conception of human personality, the belief that discrimination is not confined to men of education is not a mere delusion.

It is, however, time to bring this study to a close. Let me summarize the argument.

The interest of radio lies in its bearing on the wider social context of crisis that has been discussed. It at once exemplifies new trends and the persistence of attitudes and loyalties no longer apt. A conflict of purpose results which is evidenced by confusions and incompatibilities in its practice. Radio exemplifies the emergent social concept of trusteeship. It is, therefore, subject to control which is as yet inadequate because it rests on no clear formulation of radio's function in society. The official agency of such control is governmental. But in a democracy such agencies of government must function as a filter of public opinion. Thus radio involves a partnership with its own public. But public opinion is as yet inadequately mobilized; and the relationship of the two partners, the balance of

power is, therefore, dangerously maladjusted. This has made possible the heresy that radio gives the public what it wants and has obscured the vital truth that the public is incapable of articulating its true needs.

It is with this issue that educators are, or should be concerned. They can voice the public's need and define that body of consistent principles on which true education rests. But they can only do so by a transfer of their attention to the priorities of need of those whom radio, the peoples' instrument, serves, and by a more practical familiarity with the resources of interpretation which radio offers. Educators can foster criticism. It is most necessary, its absence a singularity, and a measure of our tardy recognition of the power and influence and potentialities of radio.

As a basis for criticism education should foster research by means of which a nicer adaptation of the resources of radio to the ends of education may be realized. Radio integrates experience, and it can to some degree integrate society. It will do so the more and the better for collaboration by educators in securing wider frames of reference (in the experience and activities of the public) with which what radio offers can be associated and to which its developing services may be related. Is this the conclusion of the whole matter? It is not, for there is none such. We can look for no more than partial achievement. But in one respect we face a choice more absolute than relative, a choice which has to do, not with particularities of radio technique or organization, but with that issue of moral emancipation which Jefferson foresaw as America's paramount objective. With the issue of private enterprise or public control of unrestricted or restricted opportunity for profit, we are not concerned except by inference. The bearing of radio on education has finally, fundamentally, to do with the will, the purpose of those who control it, with the sincerity of their concern, as a first and dominant concern, for persons; for "faces are but a gallery of pictures and talk but a tinkling symbol where there is no love. *Magna civitas, magna solitudo.*"

NOTES ON INSTITUTE ACTIVITIES.¹

The research project summarized below formulates certain problems which the Institute of Social Research intended to investigate about a year ago. General world conditions, however, brought to the fore other social problems more urgently connected with American interests and compelled us to postpone our original intention. The Institute plans, nevertheless, to return to this project in due time.

As published here, the project contains not only research problems but theoretical conceptions which were in part arrived at through previous research and which would in some measure have to be probed through further investigations. It goes without saying that none of these theses will be treated as dogmas once the actual research is carried through.

The publication of the project in the present issue may help further to clarify the conception of critical social research. The prevailing methodological viewpoints of this approach may briefly be characterized as follows.

I. Concepts Are Historically Formed. *The categories we intend to use are not generalizations to be attained by a process of abstraction from various individuals and species, nor are they axiomatic definitions and postulates. The process of forming these categories must take account of the historical character of the subject matter to which they pertain, and in such a way that the categories are made to include the actual genesis of that subject matter. This unique character of the relation of the concept to its "material" does not allow of such abstract concepts as "social change," "association," "collective behavior," "masses," unless these are used as mere formalistic classifications of phenomena common to all forms of society. The proper meaning of "masses," for example, cannot be derived through an essentially quantitative analysis or from certain isolated types of "collective behavior," even though such analysis may be an integral part of any attempt at a theoretical interpretation of the term. Proper methodological usage must recognize that the masses are basically different at the different stages of the socio-historical process and that their function in society is essentially determined by that of other social strata as well as by the peculiar social and*

¹Under this heading we shall publish from time to time reports on programmatic and other activities undertaken by the Institute of Social Research.

economic mechanisms that produce and perpetuate the masses. The category is thus led, by the very nature of its concrete content, to take in other, different sectors of the given social configuration and to follow out the genesis and import of its content within the social totality. The general concept is thus not dissolved into a multitude of empirical facts but is concretized in a theoretical analysis of a given social configuration and related to the whole of the historical process of which it is an indissoluble part. Such analysis is essentially critical in character.

II. Concepts Are Critically Formed. *The critical nature of societal concepts may best be elucidated through the problem of value judgments that animates current discussion among social scientists. The latter is much more than a methodological problem today. The totalitarian states are imposing the political values of imperialist power politics upon all scientific, cultural, and economic activities. This engenders all too much readiness in democratic countries to interpret freedom of science (which is held to include freedom from value judgments) as a drawback of the democratic forms of life. Hence derives a positivist and even skeptical attitude. The attempt has been made to overcome this by a return to old metaphysics, such as neo-Thomism. But this proposed return to the supposedly absolute values of past theological and metaphysical systems may facilitate the destruction of individual liberties to an even greater degree than would the conscious and honest skepticism of the positivists. Social theory may be able to circumvent a skeptical spurning of value judgments without succumbing to normative dogmatism. This may be accomplished by relating social institutions and activities to the values they themselves set forth as their standards and ideals. Thus, the activities of a political party may be investigated in the light of the avowed aims and ends of the party without accepting these as valid or evident. If subjected to such an analysis, the social agencies most representative of the present pattern of society will disclose a pervasive discrepancy between what they actually are and the values they accept. To take an example, the media of public communication, radio, press, and film, constantly profess their adherence to the individual's ultimate value and his inalienable freedom, but they operate in such a way that they tend to forswear such values by fettering the individual to prescribed attitudes, thoughts, and buying habits. The ambivalent relation between prevailing values and the social context forces the categories of social theory to become critical and thus to reflect the actual rift between the social reality and the values it posits.*

III. Societal Concepts Are "Inductively" Formed. *Social concepts derive their critical coloring from the fact that the rift between value and reality is typical of the totality of modern culture. This leads to the hypothesis that society is a "system" in the material sense that every single social field or relation contains and reflects, in various ways, the whole itself. Consequently, an intensive analysis of a single relation or institution that is particularly representative of the prevailing pattern of reality may be far better able to develop and grasp the nature of the pattern than would an extensive compilation and description of assorted facts. The "pervasive" character of our society, the fact that it makes its peculiar relations felt in every nook and cranny of the social whole, calls for a methodologic conception that will take account of this fact. Categories have to be formed through a process of induction that is the reverse of the traditional inductive method which verified its hypotheses by collecting individual experiences until they attained the weight of universal laws. Induction in social theory, per contra, should seek the universal within the particular, not above or beyond it, and, instead of moving from one particular to another and then to the heights of abstraction, should delve deeper and deeper into the particular and discover the universal law therein.*

IV. Social Concepts Are Integrative. *The peculiar kind of induction we have just outlined makes the formation of social concepts an empirical process and yet distinguishes this from the empirical method employed in the specialized sciences. For example, the concept "youth," denoting a particular entity in present-day society, is not a biological, psychological, or sociological concept, for it takes in the entire social and historical process that influences the mentality and orientation of youth and that constantly transforms these. Consequently, our concept will assume different functions paripassu with the changing composition, function, and attitudes of youth within the shifting social pattern. And owing to the fact that the concept is to be formed under the aspect of the historical totality to which it pertains, sociology should be able to develop this changing pattern from the very content of the concept instead of adding specific contents from without.*

In this way, the various categories will be integrative ones through their very content and may themselves serve as the basis for combining the experiences and results of the various special sciences without being impeded by their several fixed boundaries.

MAX HORKHEIMER.

RESEARCH PROJECT ON ANTI-SEMITISM.

Idea of the Project.

A. Specific Character of the Project.

Propaganda to combat anti-Semitism has often been crude and ineffective because of a lack of knowledge of its psychological roots, individual as well as social. In spite of the many excellent works written on the subject, anti-Semitism is still regarded too casually and viewed too superficially, even by those whom it immediately affects. For too many people anti-Semitism is nothing more than a pitiable aberration, a relapse into the Dark Ages; and while its presence is understandable in those nations of middle and Eastern Europe whose post-war status made the permanent achievement of democracy impossible, it is on the whole viewed as an element foreign to the spirit of modern society. From this point of view, it would follow logically that anti-Semitism is an anachronism, incapable of securing a world-wide hold. This is not true. Hatred of the Jews, despite the proclamation of human rights during the most progressive periods and in the most progressive countries, has never really been vanquished and is capable of flaring up anew at any moment.

The purpose of this project is to show that anti-Semitism is one of the dangers inherent in all more recent culture. The project will combine historical, psychological, and economic research with experimental studies. Several new hypotheses will be presented which are the result of former studies of the Institute, such as that progressive modern thought has an ambivalent attitude toward the concept of human rights, that the persecution of the aristocrats in the French Revolution bears a resemblance to anti-Semitism in modern Germany, that the foreign rather than the German masses are the spectators for whom German pogroms are arranged, and so forth.

More concretely, the project will analyze the representative thought of more recent European literature and of specific historical events in order to reveal the deep roots of anti-Semitism, and a series of experiments will reveal the characteristic features of anti-Semitism in order to make it more easily recognizable in countries where it is now largely latent.

A weighty objection might be raised against a thorough scientific treatment of anti-Semitism. In dealing with the deeper mechanisms of anti-Semitism one cannot avoid mentioning things which will not be entirely agreeable to Jews. We are thinking especially of our subsection on the so-called character traits of the Jews and the genesis of these traits. One might raise the issue that anti-Semitic propagandists could misuse this and other results of our research.

We do not share this point of view. The fear that truth can also be put to bad use should never paralyze the energy needed to uncover it in its entirety, especially in such vital problems. The growing custom of suppressing important elements of the truth for so-called tactical reasons is taking on

more and more dangerous traits. It easily leads to an optimism which is satisfied to bask in general concepts such as the rights of man, progress, enlightenment, etc., without realizing that in the present phase of society these concepts tend to become mere phrases, just as the fascist advocates of persecution cynically charge.

Furthermore, it is exceedingly important for the struggle against anti-Semitism that those Jewish and non-Jewish progressive circles, which even today close their eyes to the gravity of the problem, become stirred by a scientific demonstration of its underlying causes. They must be freed from the erroneous belief that anti-Semitism exists only where it is openly expressed, for it finds nooks even in the hearts of the noblest of humans. To activate the Jews who feel reassured by the sincere protests against the German pogroms uttered by many important personalities in this and other countries, it is less important to analyze the statements of Julius Streicher than the correspondence of Voltaire and other philosophers of the Enlightenment. As long as anti-Semitism exists as a constant undercurrent in social life, its influence reaches all groups of the population and it can always be rekindled by suitable propaganda.

B. Division of the Project.

Section I: — CURRENT THEORIES ABOUT ANTI-SEMITISM

The traditional theories about anti-Semitism, of which but a few will be mentioned here, fall roughly into two groups: the rationalistic and the anti-Semitic.

A. Among the rationalistic theses, the following deserve special mention:

(1) "There is in fact no anti-Semitism at all." That is, there are no real psychological reactions which could be regarded as primarily anti-Semitic. All anti-Semitism is artificially made up and propagated as a manœuvre for mass betrayal, or for the sake of distraction or robbery. The anti-Semitic reactions of the masses have merely been invented. In essence, this theory is most closely related to the idea held by many enlighteners who denounce religion as a mere "hoax of the clergy." In our view, it is much too superficial. It overlooks the fact that the actual anti-Semitic reactions themselves fulfill a decided social and psychological function. In the struggle against anti-Semitism we cannot content ourselves solely with unmasking it as a mere ideology, but must get at the roots of those of its elements which are genuine. Among these, the apparently irrational ones, the idiosyncrasies, are preeminent.

(2) The apologetic thesis that all the objections to the Jew raised by anti-Semites are frame-ups and lies—a thesis closely related to the one above. The discrediting of cheap apologetics is of central importance in the project. It is necessary to analyze the alleged qualities of the Jew which elicit anti-Semitism in order to discover which of them have a basis in reality and which are invented. The "inferiority" which is most frequently mentioned in this connection today (cf. Lee J. Levinger, *The Causes of Anti-Semitism in the United States*. Philadelphia, 1925, p. 102 ff.) is an illustration of the former category, although not the most important. The qualities to which anti-Semites constantly refer with apparent justification

cannot be understood as natural constants, as eternal biological laws; they must be regarded as character traits that may disappear along with the conditions which gave rise to them, as their disappearance in some countries already indicates.

(3) The formal sociological thesis reduces hatred for the Jews and for their specific qualities to the general category of strangeness (for example, Simmel's discourse on the stranger in his *Sociology*, Leipzig, 1908). It assumes the national cohesion of the Jews and a tenacious adherence on their part to their religion. This thesis, like the preceding ones, is just one side of the truth, particularly applicable to older features of anti-Semitism.

(4) The theory of envy holds that anti-Semitism is rooted in the superior intelligence and efficiency of the Jews. Because of their outstanding qualities the Jews achieve high positions in every field, thus provoking the resentment of the materially and psychologically handicapped. This thesis is too rationalistic, psychologically speaking. It assumes that anti-Semitism is caused by entirely conscious experiences and considerations, whereas such considerations actually play a relatively small part. The element of envy is of some importance, in a shifted or perverted form (e. g. the supposition of the physical, psychological, and social inferiority of the Jews) rather than in a direct form. More details concerning the conscious and subconscious envy of the Jews will be developed in the typological section.

(5) Anti-Semitism is the "socialism of fools." This theory was brought forward by social democrats (Bebel). It implies that the lower middle class in rural and metropolitan areas regards the destruction of its Jewish creditor and competitor as the easiest way out of its economic distress. This economic interpretation contains some truth, too, but it must be supplemented by an analysis of the psychological mechanisms which make even those sections of the masses which are not at all dependent on Jewish business particularly susceptible to anti-Semitic propaganda.

B. Finally, there are the actually anti-Semitic theories, particularly the thesis that Jews are by nature extreme revolutionists and have provided a large number of the leaders of the labor movement. The degree of truth in this view can be checked only by a careful comparison of the histories and social conditions of different countries. A similar analysis is to be made of the parallel thesis that the Jews are extremely capitalistic. Sombart's work, which took on a slight pro-Semitic veneer, has furthered this view considerably. He even hinted at the National Socialist equation, democratic-liberalistic-capitalistic, as well as at the myth of the power of Jewish money.

Section II. — ANTI-SEMITISM AND MASS MOVEMENTS.

This section is not intended as a history of anti-Semitism. Its aim is to reveal, by selected historical events, a set of socio-psychological trends which are characteristic of anti-Semitism as a whole. These trends are not manifested exclusively in anti-Semitic outbreaks; their basic structure can be seen in activities which have been conducted against other social groups as well. The recurrence of punishment and destruction throughout more recent history throws some light upon destructive character traits which remained latent in broad sections of the population even during "quiet" periods. It is

generally overlooked that present day National Socialism contains potentialities which have been dormant not only in Germany but also in many other parts of the world. Many phenomena familiar in totalitarian countries (for instance, the role of the leader, mass meetings, fraternizing, drunken enthusiasm, the myth of sacrifice, the contempt of the individual, etc.,) can be understood only historically—that is, from the foundations of the whole of modern history. In this section, relatively well known facts will be treated by contrasting them anew with descriptions of current problems of anti-Semitism, and socio-psychological mechanisms that are still effective will be analyzed.

A. The First Crusade.

The popular leaders under whom massacres were committed generally display ascetic features. One has only to think of Peter of Amiens, the priests Gottschalk and Volkmer, and of other preachers. The role of short slogans is also characteristic. At that time the cry, "God wills it," seized literally all Europe (cf. the cry of the National Socialists, "Germany awake!") The masses followed that slogan, feeling themselves part of a mystic community and filled with the certainty of forgiveness for their sins. Staking one's individual life and happiness mattered little (cf. the National Socialist doctrine of the unimportance of the individual and the pillarizing of egoism). Everyone subordinated himself to a "great idea." The annihilation of the inhabitants of whole provinces by enthusiastic Crusaders was fortified by the assertion that the action was directed against the foes of the highest leader, quite similar to the purges of the National Socialists. The unbelievers included not only the Turks and the Saracens but also the Jews and others whom the masses could overwhelm and pillage. Something which allegedly has languished for a long period must always be freed in order to serve as rationalization for the fury which explodes in such actions—either the holy sepulchre under the thumb of the heathen, or Germany under the Versailles treaty. The mass psychological significance of such ideologies will be explained.

B. The Albigensian Crusade.

In the Crusade against the Albigenses, a clergyman leader, Arnold of Citeaux, again held first rank. No distinction was made between Christian heretics and Jews. Both were struck by the same fury. The war was an attempt by the old bureaucracy of the church, which was being reorganized, to suppress the rising bourgeoisie. (Similarly, from the inception of National Socialism to the first years of its rule, 1927-1934, the old powers, Junkers, sections of the officer corps, Protestant clergymen, civil servants, and bankrupt munitions industrialists had reorganized themselves against the young democratic republic.) The political character of the war against the Albigenses also manifests itself in the fact that belief did not matter much to the Knights of the Crusade. Many Catholics were killed along with Protestants and Jews. They too belonged to the South, progressive in commerce and crafts. Unconcern about differences in ideology is characteristic of such uprisings. It reveals the fact that the fight against heresies or criminal elements is only a pretext for more underlying economic and socio-psychological tendencies.

C. Jew-baiting in twelfth and thirteenth century England.

During the Crusades and the first war against the Albigenses, pogroms spread over Germany, France and the East. In England, Richard the Lion-Hearted originally showed no anti-Semitic tendencies; he actually protected the Jews. But popular clergymen, especially the Archbishops of Canterbury, Thomas à Becket and Baldwin, made their appearance as anti-Semitic mass leaders. The people knelt before Thomas à Becket and were gripped by collective infatuation (cf. intoxicated enthusiasm in modern mass meetings). The connection between a special type of leader cult, mass fraternizing, and pogroms is one of the most important socio-psychological subjects for investigation. In England, which was touched by the anti-Semitic wave a hundred years later than the Continent, the cool-headedness and resistance shown at first by the British Islanders did not impair the mechanisms which impel anti-Semitism. The Channel was no barrier against social contagion.

D. The Reformation.

During the time of the Reformation the Jews were not persecuted along with the heretics, as they were during the war against the Albigenses, but with the Catholics. Just as monks and nuns were accused of hoarding secret treasures in their cloisters and indulging in unnatural practices, the Jews were blamed for lurid secret crimes in addition to their superstitious rites (cf. the present accusations in Germany against Jewish Lodges and charges of vice against Catholic clergymen). The repressed drives of the population, diverted by reformers into internal discipline and fear of conscience, come forth in the inventions about Catholics and Jews.

There were young people who, leading their elders, forced their way into churches and monasteries, destroyed works of art and made fun of priests during their sermons. Again it was chiefly young people who delighted in caricatures of Jews (cf. the role of youth in the so-called years of struggle for National Socialism).

In Martin Luther the anti-Semitic arsenal is fully equipped. The anti-rationalist Luther compares reason with a wild beast and with a whore, and lumps Jews together with prostitutes (cf. *Von den Juden und ihren Lügen*,¹ p. 94-95). Hitler forbids discussions between National Socialists and members of the other race; Luther said, "Don't dispute much with Jews about the articles of our faith" (p. 63). Luther wanted the Jews out of Germany. "Country and streets are open to them so they might move to the country if they like. We'll give them gifts, with pleasure, in order to get rid of them because they are a heavy burden, like a plague, pestilence and misfortune in our country" (p. 187). His concrete suggestions, however, do not advocate presenting them with gifts and letting them go. This is how they go: "and take away from them all their cash and jewels of silver and gold, and set it apart, to be guarded" (p. 191). "That into the hands of the young strong Jews and Jewesses are placed flails, axes, mattocks, trowels, distaffs and spindles, and they are made to earn their daily bread by the sweat of their brows (Luther says literally 'of their noses') as it is put upon the shoulders of the children of Adam" (p. 193). "That their synagogues or schools be set on fire" (p. 189). "That their houses be broken up and

¹Ausgewählte Werke, Ergänzungsreihe dritter Band, München 1936.

destroyed . . . they be put under a roof or stable, like the Gypsies, in order to let them know that they are no longer masters in our country as they flatter themselves, but in misery and captivity as they incessantly lament and complain to God about us" (p. 190). "That their right of escort on the streets be altogether abolished. For they have nothing to do in the country because they are neither knights nor officials nor merchants, nor anything of that sort, and they ought to stay at home" (p. 191).

E. The French Revolution.

Sociological trends can be found in the French Revolution which are similar to those in popular uprisings that have an anti-Semitic flavor. Anti-Semitism is pushed into the background by the specifically equalitarian ideology. The objects of the terror are the aristocrats who, significantly enough, are branded as a race. Legislative measures, agitation, and popular uprisings against the aristocracy bear comparison to the racial upheavals of our time. There are a number of accusations against the aristocrats which correspond to the usual charges against the Jews—shirking work, parasitic character, luxury, viciousness, international connections, their claim to be chosen, etc. Similar technique can be found in mass meetings of the French Revolution and of the present time—speeches of the leaders, the power of the sub-leaders in the provinces, fear of spies and traitors, corruption scandals, the practice of denunciation, allegedly spontaneous mass action, hatred of bank capital, hatred of foreigners, and new heathen cults. Despite their diametrically opposite aims, National Socialism has more in common with the French Revolution than is generally assumed.

F. Wars of German Independence and other German uprisings.

In the wars of German Independence in 1813-1915 and in the ensuing uprisings, several features of National Socialism are heralded. The eagerness of the free cities and of the German principalities to revoke the emancipation achieved during Napoleonic rule corresponds to the National Socialist passion to avenge the "fourteen years of disgrace," that is, the Weimar Republic in which the Jews actually possessed full civil rights. In the emancipation movements of the German bourgeoisie the universities combined anti-Semitism with the German ideology of freedom. The close relation between German Protestantism, Germanic paganism, community socialism, and German ideals of unitarian government becomes obvious. Burning of books appeared in this period. Books designated by the so-called democratic papers as unpatriotic (e. g. *The Code Napoleon*), and writings of Jewish authors were cast into the flames with the cry, "Woe to the Jews." In Würzburg, Karlsruhe, Heidelberg, Darmstadt, and Frankfurt, Jewish houses were branded and the inhabitants mistreated. All this occurred under liberal and patriotic slogans.

The movement of the "awakening" people is also found in Holland and Scandinavia. Metternich and the conservative governments had to take strong measures against the allegedly democratic masses. The farthest seeing German thinkers, for instance Goethe, Schelling and Hegel, stood against the "liberals" and on the side of the "reactionaries."

Section III. — ANTI-SEMITISM IN MODERN HUMANISM.

During the so-called enlightened era of the last 200 years, no stratum of the population has been free from anti-Semitism.

Some statements of an anti-Semitic nature can be found even in the works championing tolerance and humanism. It is important to investigate whether the passages dealing with the Jews disclose an ambivalence toward the concept of universal love for man, despite the fact that the authors present that concept quite sincerely. It is also important to investigate the relevance of the less exposed portions of the works of most writers who "stuck up for" the Jews. We must finally find out whether in an unguarded moment they betrayed the fact that their pro-Semitism did not overcome a deep feeling of alienation.

Proof that such contradictions exist within the individual in modern society would be particularly important for the evaluation of the many indignant declarations against anti-Semitism. Such declarations are dangerous in that they might easily lead to the erroneous belief that anti-Semitism has disappeared, at least among educated people.

The contradictions which may be found even with the most sincere proponents of the humanitarian ideal could throw light on the status of the reactionary and uneducated sections of the population. If ambivalence is present in the most progressive personalities, it will be all the sharper in the less cultured and enlightened individuals. Some scattered examples follow, in the hope that they make clear what is meant by these contradictions in the works of great thinkers.

A. French Enlightenment.

Voltaire: His name is a symbol of philosophical enlightenment and bourgeois freedom. He, more than any of his contemporaries, recognized the sufferings of the Jews and the injustices inflicted upon them. His attacks upon the Biblical history of the Jewish people are actually directed against the Christian Church belief. The Old Testament was a somewhat vulnerable point in the Church dogma because, unlike the wonders of the New Testament, it was not well protected by the authority of the Church and removed from profane thinking, but was left largely to the mercy of profane thinking; at the same time it plays its role in the canon of the Holy Writ, and the disenchantment of the Old Testament's wonders throws its light indirectly on those of the New. One can say that Voltaire's attacks against the Old Testament, insofar as they are not really directed at the Jews but indirectly against the Christian dogma which hindered the emancipation of the Jews, benefitted the latter indirectly. Nevertheless, perhaps not even Voltaire was free from anti-Semitic prejudice. In the *Essai sur les mœurs* (Chapter 103) he says that one is "amazed at the hatred and contempt which all nations have continually shown toward the Jews; this attitude is the necessary outcome of the Jewish law. Either they must subdue everything, or they must be thrown into the dust themselves. . . Later, when their eyes were opened a little more by victor nations, who taught them that the world was larger than they believed, their law itself made them natural fools of these nations, and finally of the whole human race." "I know," he says in a letter, "that some Jews live in the English colonies. These crooks go wherever money can be made, like the Parsees, the Banians, and the Armenians. . . But if these circumcised Israelites who sell old trousers to the savages, trace themselves back to the tribes of Naphtalimuch or Issachar, it does not make any difference. Anyhow, they are the greatest scoundrels who have ever besmirched the face of the earth." (Dec. 15, 1773, letter to Chevalier de Lisle.)

B. German Philosophy.

Herder: He is the author of *The Letters for the Promulgation of Humanism*. Consciously he always advocated humanitarianism and justice. His glorification of Hebrew poetry seems to protect him from any suspicion of anti-Semitism. But there are passages which might lead us to believe that there also exists a totally different Herder. He says in *Adrastea*, V, 7 (Conversion of the Jews) that Luther's utterances about the Jews were often too callous, in accordance with his time. "They have since been reaffirmed to such a degree that around the end of the last century, when some Jewish fathers of the family tried conditionally to associate and affiliate themselves to a newly built and enlightened Christendom, no one paid much attention to them." He does not consider it reasonable to talk too much about human rights when faced with the concrete issues of the Jewish problem: "As the business of the Jews has been known for more than three thousand years, the influence which it has had and immutably still has upon the character of that people shows itself throughout their history. Why then those more distant, far-fetched discussions, for instance, about the rights of humanity, if the question is only this: How many of this foreign people shall be allowed to conduct *this, their business*, in this European state, without detriment to the natives? Under what conditions? With what limitations? Under whose supervision? For, unfortunately, history provides sad proof that an unlimited number of them corrupt a European state, particularly one which is badly organized. Not general *humanitarian principles*, but the constitution of the nation in which the Jews carry on their profession, answers these questions." Herder expressly polemicizes against other countries patterning their attitude on the treatment of the Jews in Holland, at that time a progressive country.

Kant: According to Kant, it is an unconditional task to regard every man not as a means but as an end. By "end" Kant refers to man's position of esteem because he is a free, autonomous, rational being. His remarks about the Jews, however, do not seem at all in accord with his postulate of practical reason. The contradiction to his universal principle of morals is evident; it is hopeless to improve the Jews. "The Palestinians living among us, even the bulk of them, have earned the not unfounded reputation of cheats because of their usurious minds. It seems strange to think of a nation of cheats. But it is just as strange to think of a nation of merchants . . . acknowledged by the state, who not receiving any civic honor, desire to compensate for their loss, by outwitting the people under whose protection they live, and even each other. . . . Instead of the futile plan to "moralize" this people with regard to fraud and honesty, I'd rather like to profess my hypothesis . . . about that odd status." (*Anthropology*, Part k, B § 46, footnote.)

Fichte: Fichte's theories of freedom, and later, of socialism, have, rightly or wrongly, been enthusiastically accepted by many European liberals and Socialists. His moral rigorism, which, like Kant's, urges that man be judged not according to natural (i.e., racial) criteria but according to his fulfillment of duty, nevertheless condemned the Jews: "Throughout almost all European countries, a mighty, hostile state is expanding. It is constantly at war with them, and in some countries it weighs horribly upon the inhabitants. I don't believe that Jewry has become so terrible because it constitutes a separate and tightly chained state of its own . . . but because this state is based upon the hatred of the entire human race . . . Does not the reasonable thought

occur to you here that the Jews, who have a state of their own without you, will grind you other inhabitants under their heels as soon as you give them civic rights?" He comments upon these remarks in the footnote: "Let the poisoned breath of intolerance be far from these pages, as it is from my heart." And yet, "To give civic rights to the Jews, I see no measure but cutting off all their heads, and replacing them by other heads in which there is not a single Jewish idea left. To protect us from them, again, I see no other means but to conquer their Promised Land for them in order to send them there altogether." (About the French Revolution, Book I, Chapter III, pp. 114 and 115.)

Hegel: Hegel is distinguished from most philosophers of his time by his insight into the world historical situation. He showed only contempt for the Teutonic and anti-Semitic currents in the German universities. He staunchly advocated the granting of civic rights to the Jews. Some statements can be found which might contain hints of hatred for Jews: "The great tragedy of the Jewish people . . . can only create disgust. . . The fate of the Jewish people is the fate of Macbeth who overstepped the boundaries of Nature itself, clung to heterogeneous, weird beings, trod upon and murdered in their service everything that is sacred to human nature, was abandoned by his gods (for they were objects and he was a slave), and finally was smitten as a consequence of his own belief." (Fragments of Theological Studies, published by Karl Rosenkranz, in G. W. F. Hegel's Life, Berlin 1844, p. 492). "The Jewish people have been driven to Hell in the infamy of their hatred. Whoever of them has been left stalking the earth has remained as a memento" (Ibid., p. 522). According to Hegel's philosophy one can say about the Jewish people "that just because they were at the threshold of salvation, they are and have been the most object of all." (Phenomenology of Mind, II, p. 257.)

Goethe: Goethe was no anti-Semite. On the contrary, there are many highly positive remarks in his writings about the qualities of the Jews, about their practical minds, their perseverance and tenacity. Anti-Semitic sentences are not phrased directly, but as opinions of poetic characters, whom, however, he frequently draws with sympathy. Characteristic of the time in which Goethe lived is the way in which he associates Jews and Catholic priests, e.g., Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre (Book II, Chapters VI and XI); "Cowls for magicians, Jews and sky-pilots." They "wrangled over whether he was a sky-pilot or a Jew." Mephistopheles says "The Church alone, be it confessed, Daughters, can ill-got wealth digest." And Faust remarks, "It is a general custom, too, Practiced alike by king and Jew." (Faust, verse 2839-1842; transl. Anna Swanwick, London, 1886). In Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre the principles of a Utopian community are described. One passage reads: We do not tolerate "any Jews among us, for how could we grant them participation in the highest culture, whose origin and descent they deny?" (Book III, Chapter XI). Goethe writes in the Swiss Journey: "The people there are thoroughly polite, and in their behavior show a good, natural, quiet burgher way of thinking. Jews are not tolerated there."

Such an analysis lies at the bottom of Treitschke's judgment of anti-Semitism throughout the history of the German mind. "From Luther on down to Goethe, Herder, Kant and Fichte, almost all great Germanic thinkers agreed

in this feeling. Lessing, with his predilection for the Jews, was quite singular." The only one among the later writers who resembled Lessing in this respect was Nietzsche. (We do not give any examples of pro-Semitic statements here. In the study itself we shall deal extensively with Nietzsche's positive attitude toward the Jews.)

Such inconsistency as may exist between the concrete utterances about the Jews and the humanitarian ideal within individuals would be only part of the universal contradiction between the dire reality of modern society and the dream of harmony among all humanity. The latter was consciously proclaimed by all the above thinkers. They devoted all the spiritual powers at their disposal to it. They were rooted, however, in the reality of their environment; their impulses, their intimate sympathies, and aversions derived therefrom.

D. French Novel.

No matter how energetically Zola, the defender of Captain Dreyfuss, fought against hatred of the Jews, elements can be found in his own works which could be classed as identical with official anti-Semitism. In his novel, *L'Argent*, Zola pictures a Jew of whom he says, "The public wealth was devoured by the ever increasing fortune of a single individual. Gundermann (the Jew in question) was, in fact, the master, the almighty king. Paris and the whole world lay trembling and obedient at his feet." Fantastic conceptions about Jewish riches and power, about the coldness and calculation of the Jews, keep recurring in French literature since Balzac.

Our analyses of these anti-Semitic tendencies of philosophers and writers are not undertaken in order to blame them for subjective insincerity. Our purpose is rather, through the revelation of these unconscious and hidden germs of anti-Semitism, to expose the problem in all its seriousness.

Section IV. — TYPES OF PRESENT DAY ANTI-SEMITES.

Much of the misunderstanding about anti-Semitism has its roots in the confusion of its very different types. The success of any attempt to fight anti-Semitism depends largely on knowledge of the social and psychological genesis of its various species, often indiscernible in daily life. The types of anti-Semites are here considered from both the historical and psychological points of view.

We believe ourselves safe from the misunderstanding that according to this typology (in which even the pro-Semites are mentioned) all Christians are anti-Semites. The classification does not intend to distribute large groups of individuals among these types, but merely to formulate with theoretical precision a number of extreme possibilities of anti-Semitic attitudes. Neither do we claim that any individual who shows any of the character traits mentioned in the typology is an anti-Semite merely because of those traits, nor do we even assert that actual anti-Semites can be classified entirely according to the principles indicated. In reality the anti-Semites will often appear as combinations and intermediate forms of the "ideal possibilities" mentioned here.

A. The "born" anti-Semite.

The basic quality of this type is the renunciation of rational justification. He reacts with apparent "instinct" against so-called Jewish racial traits—flat feet, smell, hooked nose, Jewish accent, gesticulation, etc. His nausea is a reaction to the scars of mutilation which history has stamped upon the Jews. Even their names (Itzig, Levy, Cohn) are repugnant to him. He simply cannot stand the Jews. It can often be observed that this type appreciates so-called "racy" women akin to the Jewish type if they are presented to him as Gentile (note the success of Pola Negri with the National Socialists). This trend indicates that the allegedly natural anti-Semitism in some of its representatives is actually an over-compensation for suppressed or inhibited desires.

B. The religious-philosophical anti-Semite.

Although this type has largely disappeared, there are still a good many left who regard the Jews as adherents of a hostile religion. The Jews have crucified Christ. They have remained impenitent for thousands of years. They particularly ought to have been summoned to recognize him since they were witnesses of his activity and of his passion, but they have persisted in denying him. Hence the Jewish religion is in effect equivalent to absolute disbelief. The Jew is Judas. He is the stranger who deliberately excludes himself from the Christian community. He can compensate for his guilt by baptism, but even then he deserves distrust until he can prove that he has seriously atoned. Many non-believing Christians resent the Jew's tenacious adherence to outdated superstitious rites. They feel that he should have joined the dominant religion, for social and humanitarian if not for religious reasons. This category includes many humanists, Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Hegel, insofar as they attach reservations to their favorable comments on Jews.

C. The back-woods or sectarian anti-Semite.

This type has made anti-Semitism a substitute for religion, as other groups have vegetarianism, Krishna Murti, or any other physical or psychical panacea. The imaginary world of the sectarian anti-Semite is dominated by the notion of conspiracy. He believes in Jewish world domination; he swears by the Elders of Zion. On the other hand, he himself tends to favor conspiracies which have much in common, structurally, with the images he fears (Ku Klux Klan, etc.). He considers Freemasonry and other fraternal orders to be the greatest of world perils, but he himself founds lodge-like congregations whenever possible. He has the reverence of the semi-erudite for science and believes that non-intercourse with Jews is a sort of natural cure for rejuvenating man and world.

D. The vanquished competitor.

The place of this type in the processes of production necessarily brings him into conflict with the Jews. He comes from the lower strata who are compelled to buy from Jews and to fall into their debt, from among the owners of specialty shops who are forced out of business by the competition of Jewish owned department stores, etc. His hatred does not stem from specific

characteristics of the Jews but rather from certain economic relationships through which he suffers.

Since this type of anti-Semitism has some basis in reality, it also has a certain rational character. Under certain conditions therefore, it can disappear easily. For example, during the last few years in Germany, National Socialism has, to a great extent, been deserted by these people (innkeepers, provision dealers, peasants, etc.). The promised improvement of conditions by anti-Semitic measures did not materialize. Therefore, these groups have abandoned anti-Semitism as a panacea.

E. The well-bred anti-Semite.

This is the anti-Semitism of the upper bourgeois strata who want to emulate the exclusiveness of the aristocrats which was formerly directed against them. This type of anti-Semitism, prevalent in all nations, is particularly common in the Anglo-Saxon world. Whatever may be the elements of truth in the reason usually adduced by its representatives (for instance the failure of some groups of immigrants to assimilate themselves to their new surroundings) the attitude as a whole is a phenomenon of imitation, similar to fox-hunts, chateau-like country estates, etc. Rationalizations are manifold. In addition to the religious and political arguments, those aimed at Jewish manners are particularly numerous. The Jews are supposed to be loud, unreserved, obtrusive; their inferiority complex necessitates their pushing themselves into the foreground; they are grumbling and querulous; they want the best for the least money. One always has unfortunate experiences with them. Jewish intellectuals are as impossible as Jewish business men. Their intellectual conversations break the rules of the game. They resemble shop talk. Anyone whose emotions are too easily stirred is ignoble. Here the proverbial exception actually has the function of proving the rule.

F. The "Condottiere" anti-Semite.

This type has arisen with the increased insecurity of post-war existence. He is convinced that what matters is not life but chance. He is nihilistic, not out of a "drive for destruction" but because he is indifferent to individual existence. One of the reservoirs out of which this type arises is the modern unemployed. He differs from former unemployed in that his contact with the sphere of production is sporadic, if any. Individuals belonging to his category can no longer expect to be regularly absorbed by the labor process. From their youth they have been ready to act wherever they could grab something. They are inclined to hate the Jew partly because his cautiousness and physical inefficacy, partly because, being themselves unemployed, they are economically uprooted, unusually susceptible to any propaganda, and ready to follow any leader. The other reservoir, at the opposite pole of society, is the group belonging to the dangerous professions, colonial adventures, racing motorists, airplane aces. They are the born leaders of the former group. Their ideal, actually an heroic one, is all the more sensitive to the "destructive," critical intellect of the Jews because they themselves are not quite convinced of their ideal in the depths of their hearts, but have developed it as a rationalization of their dangerous way of living. The anti-Semitic tendencies within certain groups of the German youth movement follow the same direction.

G. The "Jew-baiter".

All types are potentially sadistic. Here, however, anti-Semitism is a relatively thin pretext for repressed fury. This type hates the alleged weakness of humanitarianism, which he brands as cowardice, and which he characterizes as *Duselei* (somnolence or reverie). What he hates most of all is the Jew's allegedly higher psychological faculty for "enjoying life."

This type hates the revolutionary Jew because he "wants to have it better." Nevertheless, he is himself pseudo-revolutionary, insofar as his fury is basically the naked drive for destruction, although that drive realizes itself only in excesses allowed from above. Hence he calls his own counter-revolutionary addiction to action, revolution, and the revolution, Capitalism. Many of the more radical people liquidated by Hitler in his purges and a large number of the present SS leaders fall in this category. The relation of this type of anti-Semitism to sexual drives, which incidentally has much in common with the earlier *Radauantisemitismus* (rowdy anti-Semitism), is comparatively unconcealed. It is often based upon unconscious or conscious homosexuality.

H. The Fascist-political anti-Semite.

This type is characterized by sober intelligence. He is cold, without affections, and is perhaps the most merciless of all. He deals with anti-Semitism as an export article. He has no immediate gratification from the persecution of the Jews, and if he has, it is only incidental. He deliberately plans their annihilation. He fulfills his task by administrative measures without any personal contact with the victims. He does not have to hate the Jews; he is able to negotiate with foreign ones most amiably. To him anti-Semitism is reified. It must function. He organizes the "spontaneous" actions of the people against the Jews. He holds in contempt the henchmen of his own will, perhaps even more than the Jews. He is nihilistic, too, but in a cynical way. "The Jewish question will be solved strictly legally," is the way he talks about the cold pogrom. Whereas Streicher is representative of the Jew-baiter, Goebbels is the incarnation of the fascist-political anti-Semite. The tremendous propaganda value of anti-Semitism throughout the world may be the only reason the fascist leaders keep anti-Semitism alive.

I. The Jew-lover.

Those persons are really free of anti-Semitism to whom the distinction makes no difference, to whom the so-called racial traits appear unessential.

There are people, however, who stress the differences between Jews and Christians in a way friendly to the Jews. This type of thinking contains an anti-Semitic nucleus which has its origin in racial discrimination. The Jews are exceedingly sensitive to this kind of anti-Semitism. The declaration of a man who professes to be particularly fond of the Jews because of their "prophetic" or other qualities discomferts them. They discover here the admission of and even the apology for that secret discrimination. The anti-Semitic types mentioned above can shift by certain mechanisms into different brands of Jew-lovers and overcompensate their hatred by a somewhat exaggerated and therefore fundamentally unreliable adoration. For instance, corresponding to the "born" anti-Semite is the man who always speaks of

his enjoyable experiences with the Jewish people; to the anti-Semitic sectarian, all the Christian religious sects which venerate the Jews as the people of the Bible, keep the Sabbath, etc.; to the socialite anti-Semite, the well-bred gentleman who finds rowdy anti-Semitism repulsive.

Section V. — THE JEWS IN SOCIETY.

It is necessary to seek an explanation of the causes of certain Jewish character traits to which the anti-Semite reacts negatively. These causes find their roots in the economic life of the Jew, in his particular function in society and in the consequences of his economic activity.

A. The "Dirty work."

The economic activity of the Jews is largely restricted to commerce and finance because of their exclusion from the immediately productive occupations. With the increasing significance of the market in capitalist economy, the importance of trade and finance increases too. A market economy accentuates the differences among the various strata of society. The lower strata become aware of their miserable conditions not so much through intercourse with those who are really mighty (the leaders of industry and politics) but through contact with the middleman, the merchant and banker. Their hatred of these middlemen explodes in the direction of the Jews who symbolize this element.

From olden times the practice of extending credit has prevented the antagonism between the possessors of power and the economically oppressed population from leading to recurrent catastrophes. The peasant and burgher, heavily burdened by taxes, could keep their heads above water for a long time by the utilization of credit. Yet the real economic situation about which they are deceived by the institution of credit does not improve, but becomes worse; one day the bill will be presented. And the middleman, largely the Jew, who has fulfilled a function indispensable to the existence of that society, appears as the casual factor of impoverishment. The outdated theories of Sombart about the role of the Jews in modern economy will be criticized in the course of this presentation.

B. Non-productive capital.

The diffusion of slogans about the difference between productive and non-productive capital originates as a manœuvre of distraction. This thesis, quite old in itself, was propagated during the struggle between the individual industrial groups and banking capital, between export industry and heavy industry, and between general directors and shareholders. During the period of inflation and deflation, the big German concerns deposited the burdens of the World War upon the shoulders of the middle and lower classes and renewed their productive equipment. They used the bankers and the Jews, together with the originators of the Versailles Treaty, as scapegoats for the misery of the post-war period. The figure of the so-called productive man was contrasted with that of the parasite. The experiences of the masses with the middleman serve to facilitate the resurrection and acceptance of the myth of the Jew as a non-productive parasite. It is difficult for the consumer to

understand the economic necessity of the intermediary functions (commerce, advertising, achievements of financial technique) which serve to raise the price of a product; it is easier for him to understand the immediate functions of the production of goods. Hence, so many of the Utopian schemes of the last few centuries proposed a society in which the intermediary functions would be completely eliminated. Such a proposal, for example, appears in Richard Wagner's imaginary world. He contrasts the heroic productive Siegfried, a mixture of the munition manufacturer, the condottiere, and the rowdy, with the dwarf, a symbol of the owners, merchants, and the resentful, eternally complaining proletariat. The anti-Semitic declaration that one part of society consists of parasites feeding upon the other social strata cannot be overcome simply by being labelled a frame-up. Its historical origin must be clarified and understood.

C. Rational law.

Since its Roman origin, civil law has been the law of creditors. Whereas it recognizes no difference between any groups or individuals but aims at the universal protection of property, it is a priori antagonistic to the debtor. Historically, because of the creditor role of the Jews, deriving from their functions as bankers and merchants, we find them usually on the side of rational law. Their foes, on the other hand, favor a vague natural law based on the "sound instinct of the people."

There is real justification for the indignation of the condemned and foreclosed peasant or the widow plunged into poverty by law. They feel that an injustice has been done them because they have fallen into misery without any moral guilt on their part. The law, however, acts only as the executor of economic tendencies within the totality of society, and these condemn certain social strata to annihilation. As an abstract category, the law is not only innocent but to a considerable degree often acts as a check upon those tendencies. The conscientious man, deprived of his property by judicial verdicts, struggling in vain against his Jewish adversary and his Jewish lawyer, is a standing figure (for example in literature, e.g., *The Merchant of Venice* and many modern works).

D. The Jewish mentality.

The psychological faculty of abstraction developed with the commercial and financial function. In the commodity economy, men face each other as equals, not according to distinctions of birth or religion. It does not matter who they are, but only what commodity they want to buy or sell. The abstract notion of the thing as a commodity corresponds to the abstract notion of man. It makes no difference if one sells art objects, cotton or guns. The psychological functions which are developed on the basis of such economic conditions and the mentality which corresponds to them are of course not limited to the Jews. Calculating, so-called rationalistic thinking, has been developed chiefly by non-Jewish philosophers. Anti-Semitism, however, seeks to identify the Jews with this school of thought. As a matter of fact, the Jews historically have always had an affinity for dauntless, abstract thinking which manifests itself in the idea of a god who regards all men as equal. But this is not the whole story. There is also a "night side" to the Jewish spirit, full of ir-

rationality and even mythology (one thinks of Jewish mystical sects such as Chassidism and of the Jewish superstition that still survives). In any event, even if one assumes that "rationalism" is the main trend among Jews, one has no reason whatsoever to bow to the verdict which anti-Semites reach on the basis of that assumption. The levelling that results from abstract thinking is a prerequisite for the development of the world, in a truly human sense, for this type of thinking divests human relationships and things of their taboos and brings them into the realm of reason. Jews have therefore always stood in the front ranks of the struggle for democracy and freedom.

The study of the so-called Jewish mentality explains why the Jews are blamed simultaneously for capitalistic and revolutionary relativistic and dogmatic, tolerant and intolerant "mindedness". Such contradictory accusations do not in fact reflect upon the Jews but rather upon the state of mankind in the present historical period. The Jews are but the bearers of society's inconsistencies.

E. The so-called race factor.

The question of the origin of those qualities which, in distorted form, are attributed to the Jews, must be answered first by refuting the race theory. As shown in the previous subsections, they are not biological but historical phenomena, characterized chiefly by the economic function into which the Jews have been forced. This explanation must not be applied automatically, however, for we see that certain intellectual and character traits are found, in a differentiated form, among Jewish individuals and families who have not themselves engaged in the occupations with which "Jewish" traits were originally connected. It is just this fact which is cited again and again by race theorists as proof of an alleged biological heritage.

The results of modern psychology may be applied to this social problem with good prospects of success. We follow the trend of modern psychology so far as to accept the thesis that just those decisive character traits which prove to be relatively constant in the individual's life may be traced back to the history and experiences of the child in his first years. In his earliest period of life, the child does not come into direct contact with the contemporary social milieu but only with his nearest of kin. Even they communicate with him less in accordance with their rational convictions than with behaviors (drive tendencies and impulses) which had been instilled in them during the earliest stages of their own lives. But it can be shown that the greatest impression on the infant is made not by the meaning of the words but by the expression, the voice, the movements of the parents. The soul of learning is imitation. The child's faculty of imitating the expressions of adults is exceedingly subtle. He observes the most unnoticeable and subtle shades of their gestures. Thus it happens that inclinations, skills, anxieties which have long lost their real meaning leave their mark on the faces and the behavior of later generations.

The development of this theory in detail can contribute not merely to a refutation of the race theory but to a positive replacement of it. It will throw light on the genesis of German, French, and English character traits as well as of Jewish traits. Even anti-Semitism itself will become more comprehensible in that the seemingly natural aversion to certain behaviors, for instance what might be called the home-grown anti-Semitism of some parts

of Germany before National Socialism, may be explained as a psychological transmission from earlier historical conditions.

Section VI.—FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL SOCIALIST ANTI-SEMITISM.

An understanding of anti-Jewish measures under National Socialism presupposes an understanding of the Nazi social and political system.

A. Antecedent History of National Socialism.

The roots of National Socialism in German and in European history in general have already been discussed in sections II and III. A survey of German philosophy and literature from the beginning of the twentieth century will show that most ideological features, such as anti-rationalism, community-madness, and the belief in a leader, have for some time dominated public thinking. We shall analyze the political pre-history of National Socialism, the Jingoism of the pre-war period to which, in spite of its anti-Semitic features, many Jews fell victim; we shall also seek to understand the specific characteristics on the basis of which the German people were aroused in 1914 and in the consequent war policy as features of the same historical roots from which National Socialism has developed. The political reasons for the decay of the Weimar Republic can be grouped into two categories: 1) The impossibility of a working parliament because of the dispossession of the middle classes. (The Communists, Social Democrats, and National Socialists together held 55.9% of all the votes in December 1930). The democratic parties therefore accepted the undemocratic practice of allowing the executive to rule by emergency decrees without the sanction of parliament, or at least of its committees. 2) The policy of toleration and alliance between the German democratic powers and the Prussian Junkers and the politically most backward sections of German heavy industry. The fact that the Junkers and heavy industry finally abandoned collaboration with the democrats and agreed to the seizure of power by the National Socialists cannot be explained primarily by their love for the new system. To face the dilemma of national as well as international danger, the help of the democratic forces was not strong enough. They chose dictatorship with no clear idea of what was to come. In the Weimar Republic the democratic powers were very weak from the beginning. As between the two extremes of the old ruling class and the radical sector of the workers, they decided in favor of the former without first being able to build up a strong policy of their own. (The project will carefully trace the individual stages of this process; alliances between the trade unions and Stinnes, between Ebert and Hindenburg, between the government and the fascist free corps, acceptance of the rearmament policy, and so forth. The terrorism of today's concentration camps was anticipated in the murder of republican leaders (Erzberger, Rathenau, Haase). The surrender of the executive powers to the Junker-loving Hindenburg, with the consent of all the democratic parties, sealed the fate of the Republic.

B. The change in the function of money.

In a laissez-faire economy the entrepreneur could tell by the increase or decrease of the money capital which he invested in an undertaking, the extent to which it was useful to society. If a factory or any other business could

not keep pace with general economic developments, this was expressed in its financial statements and finally in the disappearance of the undertaking itself. Its collapse was the judgment of the market as to its social usefulness, and this judgment was proclaimed in money. In the totalitarian state the free market is abolished, and the ability of money to "declare" ceases to exist. Now the government, together with rather small groups of the contemporary German bureaucracy, determines which undertakings are useful for its military and other purposes and which are not. The market, an anonymous and democratic tribunal, is replaced by the command and plan of those in power.

The importance of the initiative of private entrepreneurs, particularly of large and small private banks, disappears. Bankers in non-totalitarian countries sometimes reveal a sympathy for National Socialism but they have an incomplete understanding of its economic character. At this point certain figures may be mentioned: Total deposits in German private banks between 1929 and 1938 have decreased from 2,300,000,000 to 950,000,000 marks, and in all the large banking concerns, from 12,408,000,000 to 6,804,000,000. Restriction of new issues of bonds, shares, and mortgage bonds has reduced operations on the stock market to a minimum. State-directed foreign exchange control and the compulsion to sell foreign exchange, bonds, and shares to the Reichsbank further reduce banking activity. The amount of Reich loans to be subscribed by the banks is determined, to a large extent, by the Reich itself. Credit as a whole is replaced by government protection. What applies to the banks applies in part to commerce as well.

The decline in importance of the spheres of economic activity in which the German Jews were chiefly engaged is the basis of their becoming superfluous. Their economic existence was intimately connected with the liberal system of economy and with its judicial and political conditions. In liberalism, as already mentioned, the unfit are eliminated by the effectiveness of the mechanism of competition, no matter what their names are or what personal qualities they have. In the totalitarian system, however, individuals or entire social groups can be sent to the gallows at any moment for political or other reasons. The replacement of the market by a planned economy of the state bureaucracy and the decline of the power of money capital makes possible the policy against the Jews in the Third Reich.

C. The propaganda value of anti-Semitism.

The above conditions alone, however, are not sufficient to explain the maintenance and intensification of anti-Semitic measures. The weight of the fortunes stolen from the Jews for the totalitarian economy is only one of the factors operative, although quite a strong one. But what is the effect of anti-Semitic propaganda upon certain social strata of other countries? While frank disgust for the anti-Semitism of the government is revealed among the German masses, the promises of anti-Semitism are eagerly swallowed where fascist governments have never been attempted. Even where the anti-Semitic sympathies of the masses are not yet tolerated, or even not yet conscious to them because of a cultural democratic tradition, the social and psychological tendencies which veer in that direction are effective and can become activated from one day to the next. The German government is highly sensitive to these circumstances. Behind the pro-Semitic speeches of the educated it scents an opportunity for psychological guidance of the people

toward anti-Semitic aims. It is a master in linking its policies to existing or potential tensions in foreign countries. As religion formerly won foreign soil for civilization and for home industry, today the missionaries of anti-Semitism conquer the world for barbarism and German exports.

Section VII.—EXPERIMENTAL SECTION.

In this section the project plans to make the novel, and in the opinion of its directors, promising attempt to treat the phenomenon of anti-Semitism experimentally. This investigation will provide a series of experimental situations which approximate as closely as possible the concrete conditions of present day life. Its aim will be to visualize the mechanism of anti-Semitic reactions realistically. In this way it is hoped to develop the typology drafted in Section IV. At the same time, an attempt will be made to direct the experiments in such a way as to provide insights into differences of regional and social groupings in regard to anti-Semitism.

The most satisfactory method of experimentation appears to be the use of certain films to be presented to subjects of different regional and social groups. Reactions of the subjects will be obtained partly by observation of their behavior during the performances, partly by interviews, partly by their written reports of their impressions. Naturally, the element of introspection cannot be entirely eliminated, but by careful and critical interpretation of results it is hoped to reduce the flaws to a minimum.

The following example may give an idea of the plan:

A film will be made, showing boys of 12 to 15 at play. An argument and a fight ensue. The relation of guilt and innocence is difficult to untangle. The scene ends, however, with one boy being thrashed by the others. Two versions of the film will be made. In one, the thrashed boy will be played by a Gentile, in the other by a Jew. Another variation will be introduced by showing each of these versions with two different dramatis personæ. In one version, the thrashed boy will bear a Jewish name, and in the other a Christian name.

Thus the film will be shown in four different combinations:

- 1) The thrashed boy is a Gentile with a Gentile name.
- 2) " " " " " " " Jewish "
- 3) " " " " " Jew " " Gentile "
- 4) " " " " " " " Jewish "

In any one case each of these combinations will be shown to only one group of subjects, for instance, to high school boys or unemployed groups, who will not be informed in advance of the aim of the experiment. After the show, they will be told that the problem is the psychology of witness testimony. They will be cross-examined about what occurred, the question of guilt, the brave or cowardly behavior of the thrashed boy, etc. By comparing the testimony of the groups which have seen one version of the film with that of the groups which have seen the other version, it will be possible to reach conclusions about the extent of discrimination between Jews and Gentiles in perception and judgment.

Further variations are of course possible. For instance, all four versions may be presented to the same group in succession after longer intervals. The results of questioning immediately after the performance of the film will be supplemented by shorthand notes of remarks made by the audience during the performance. These notes will be taken by a person who will be present in the room but separated from the audience by a thin wall. If, for instance, it becomes evident that during the performance the thrashed boy with a Jewish name is defended by some of the participants and attacked by others, whereas at the end the witnesses reveal a united anti-Semitic influence, a contribution to the problem of susceptibility to anti-Semitic influence will have been made. The possibilities of variation are much richer than can be indicated here. It is planned to present the film not only in different social milieus in cities of the state of New York but also in other states. We hope to secure the collaboration of local universities and institutes for this purpose. The value of the results will depend to a large degree upon the number of experimental series undertaken in every milieu.

We believe that through this and similar experiments, a way will be found to study the distribution of anti-Semitism in the United States. Even though these methods have their margin of error, we believe that others have larger ones. When asked by questionnaires or interviewers, people will often reply, in accordance with their conscious conviction of the equality of human rights, that they have nothing against the Jews. In the experiment, however, where the question of anti-Semitism is not directly raised, the secret drives will appear clearly in the unconscious influencing of judgment. If extensive experimental series are undertaken in the various social milieus and in different parts of America, a rather objective picture of the anti-Semitic problem in this country may be gained. It will be especially interesting to reach those regions where few Jews live and where German propaganda works unfettered, for instance, in some states of the Northwest.

Reviews.

Dewey, John, *Theory of Valuation*. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Vol. II, No. 4. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, Ill. 1939. (67 pp.; \$1.00)

Faced as we are today with a thoroughgoing positivist repudiation of metaphysical concepts and transcendental principles, it may be well to recall the original relation of positivism to such concepts and principles. Ideas like natural law, the rights of man, the quest for happiness first gained momentum in the context of a positivist and not of a metaphysical philosophy (Locke, Montesquieu, the French enlighteners),—they could not be, and were not meant to be, verified by observation, because the reality they indicated did not belong to matter-of-fact reality, but presupposed the operation of certain laws and standards that contradicted those governing the matters-of-fact. It was of such laws and standards that the concept of reason was composed. Reason was an opposing force to the state of affairs as given; it asserted its own right as against that of authority. To think and to act according to reason was almost identical with thinking and acting in opposition to accepted norms and opinions. Reason was held to be the result of free and autonomous judgment, and the rational was that activity which followed this judgment. Appeal to the facts was meant to corroborate reason, not to override it; if the facts were at variance with reason's dictate, the former were "wrong" and had to be changed in conformity with the latter's demands.

The idea of reason which animated positivist philosophy in the 18th century was a critical one, in the sense we have just outlined. Within that same period, however, positivism began to relinquish its critical function and to replace it with a conformist and apologetic one. Both tendencies combine in Hume's philosophy, but the force of his struggle against oppressive religious and metaphysical concepts is attenuated by his concessions to "custom," which takes shape as the basic operative element in reasoning. Comte's positive philosophy completed the process of altering positivism's function. The principle of verification through facts, instead of serving to illuminate a truth which ought to be and yet is not, reenforced the truth of that which is. Reason was rendered subordinate to the observation of facts, and "facts as they are" became the final criteria of truth.

This apologetic form of positivism swept the second half of the 19th century. It did not stand alone in the struggle against autonomous and critical thought. After the breakdown of German idealism, metaphysics tried to outdo positivism in its apologetic for the given state of affairs. Freedom, critical reason, spontaneity were all relegated to a realm of "pure knowledge" where they could do no harm and generate no counter-drive against man's actual condition in empirical reality. In the latter reality, anti-positivist philosophy bound men as strongly to the authority of matters-of-fact as did positivism. In the current interchange of arguments concerning the supposed affinities between positivism and authoritarianism, one general misconception among many requires correction. The claim has been made that it was not

positivist but anti-positivist philosophy that held sway in the intellectual cultures of the authoritarian countries prior to the advent of fascism. This is correct, but anti-positivist philosophy was itself everywhere saturated with positivism, in Germany as well as in Italy. It may suffice to refer in this connection to the positivistic tendencies in *Lebensphilosophie* and Phenomenology, and in the pseudo-Hegelianism of Giovanni Gentile.

Even so, it is meaningless to ask whether positivism contributed to the rise of authoritarianism. Positivism cannot take active part in producing a change that involves and establishes total oppression, total warfare, total control and total intolerance. In a certain sense, indeed, freedom is of the very essence of positivism, the freedom to investigate, to observe, to experiment, to refrain from premature judgment and decision,—even the liberty to contradict. All this freedom, of course, occurs in the realm of science, and a scientific behavior is the condition of positivistic freedom. The truth which is to be verified by observation is, in principle at least, based upon free consent; recognition and not compulsion is its standard.

There is another reason why positivism cannot be held responsible for fascism. Positivism does not affirm anything unless it is an established fact. The positivist judgment hangs in the balance until a scientific verification has been provided. Positivism is of its very nature *ex post*. The conditions that prevail in matters-of-fact point the direction for numerous experiments, and positivism follows this lead: its approach is not an acquiescent but an experimental one, and it does not sanction change unless the experiment has been successfully completed.

It is precisely in this light that we must reformulate the question of the relation between positivism and authoritarianism. Experiments can be applied in the social as well as in the physical world. If the fascist experiment has been completed, if fascism has succeeded in organizing the world, does positivism possess any right to deny it sanction and acceptance? Is positivism not compelled, by its own principles, to comply with this world order and to work with, not against it? And, should we arrive at an affirmative answer, we can venture the further question: does not positivism "reflect" a reality in which man has surrendered to the authority of facts, in which reason, autonomous and critical thinking, is actually subordinate to observation of facts? Does the term "positive" in positivism not really imply a positive, that is to say, affirmative attitude towards the matters of fact—whatever they might be?

Dewey's *Theory of Valuation* provides an appropriate occasion for discussing the social function of positivism. Such discussion requires an analysis of positivism's attitude to value judgment, especially since positivism refers to experiments in the field of human behavior, and "human behavior *seems* to be influenced, if not controlled, by considerations such as are expressed in the words 'good—bad,' 'right—wrong,' 'admirable—hideous,' etc. All conduct that is not simply either blindly impulsive or mechanically routine seems to involve valuations" (p. 3). The experiment to create a new social and political order can be adequately described in a system of propositions about observable facts, but the description will be adequate only insofar as it contains "value concepts." Human desires and interests inevitably enter into an experiment that aims to create a new order of life, for such an experiment presupposes the judgment that the experiment is desirable. Valuations "occur only when it is necessary to bring something into existence, which is lacking,

or to conserve in existence something which is menaced by outside conditions" (p. 15). To a considerable extent, the impact of John Dewey's work and personality may have been responsible for the fact that positivism no longer maintains the ideal of a social science which is void of value judgments, but attempts to treat such judgments "in verifiable propositions." This attempt is based upon the fact that desires occur within definite "existential contexts," namely, those indicated in the last quotation above, and that they can be investigated with respect to the empirical possibility of their fulfillment and the consequences involved in it. This existential context places the propositions containing valuations in the relation of means-ends or means-consequences (p. 24), and the "continuum of ends—means" is the continuum in which the positivistic testing of valuations takes place.

Here, however, the limits of positivism have already been reached. For positivism is unable to state anything "scientific" about the desirability of the ends themselves. The positivist can weigh the ends against the means necessary to achieve them, he can investigate the conditions of their realization and ask whether it is "reasonable" to realize certain ends, he can show the consequences which are implied in this realization. But this is about all he can do. His analysis stops short at the prevailing desires and interests of men, which are the given facts, and therefore stops short at the multitude of ends prevalent in these desires and interests. He recognizes that desires and interests can still be submitted to the question as to whether they are reasonable or unreasonable (p. 29). This question is precisely the decisive one. For, if positivism measures human desires and interests according to whether they are or are not reasonable, then positivism, at least on one most fundamental point, aims at that which ought to be rather than at that which is. If the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable desires is meaningful at all, it cannot be derived from the given existential context which provoked the distinction. The standards of reason must somehow lead beyond this context,—nay, even question this context in its totality.

What are the standards according to which desires and interests can be classified as reasonable or unreasonable? Certainly not the accepted standards of custom, the current social taboos and awards—if this were the case, the very idea of real experiments in society would be destroyed; nor metaphysical norms and dogmas, which cannot be placed into an observable existential context. The positivistic answer leads definitely back to the given existential context. "The difference between reasonable and unreasonable desires and interests is precisely the difference between those which arise casually and are not reconstituted through consideration of the conditions that will actually decide the outcome and those which are formed on the basis of existing liabilities and potential resources" (p. 29). The distinction thus comes very close to what common-sense considers to be reasonable and unreasonable—a happy and successful adaptation to existing conditions, a thorough weighing of means and consequences, of liabilities and resources. The problem of the validity of the ends is replaced by the problem of the adequacy and consequences of the means. "Valuation of desire and interest, as means correlated with other means, is the sole condition for valid appraisal of objects as ends" (p. 29). If we accept this "sole condition" of appraisal, we also accept the ends that are reasonable in this sense, those

that take full account of the risks involved and of the "existing liabilities and potential resources."

Now it is obvious that desires and interests may be found that are reasonable on this ground and still aim at oppression and annihilation. The desires and interests that produced the fascist order might be such. They are frightfully reasonable if regarded in the continuum of ends and means; they did not arise "casually," and they were formed on the basis of existing liabilities and potential resources. Is there any way left for positivism to deny affirmative appraisal by applying scientific standards?

The case is explicitly stated by Dewey, and he points to a standard by which even successful interests and desires can be "revaluated." "On account of the continuity of human activities, personal and associated, the import of present valuations cannot be validly stated until they are placed in the perspective of the past valuation—events with which they are continuous" (p. 59). Such a perspective would show the continuous historical efforts of mankind to enhance and release individual potentialities, to widen the range of human desires and to provide the means for their fulfillment, without discrimination and in harmony with the perpetuation of the whole. In other words, it would show continuous striving for freedom. It would furthermore show that "a particular set of current valuations have as their antecedent historical conditions" the exact opposite, namely, "the interest of a small group or special class in maintaining certain exclusive privileges and advantages, and that this maintenance has the effect of limiting both the range of the desires of others and their capacity to actualize them (ibid.)."

Should man become conscious of these antecedents, "is it not obvious that this knowledge of conditions and consequences would surely lead to revaluation of the desires and ends that had been assumed to be authoritative sources of valuation?" (ibid.) Unfortunately, it is not obvious at all. Dewey's optimism is characterized by a neglect of the existential contexts in which the authoritarian desires and interests live. The order that maintains the exclusive privileges of a "small group or special class" responds to deep-rooted human desires, desires that are spread far beyond the governing strata. The desire for strong protection, the perverse lust for cruelty, the enjoyment of power over an impotent enemy and of liberation from the burden of autonomy, and numerous other desires that shaped the individual in the pre-history of fascism have been fulfilled to such an extent that, in comparison, the desire for freedom seems to aim at some suicidal jump into nothing. The form of freedom that the run-of-the-mill individual has enjoyed in the past century must only strengthen the desire to abandon it, while the super-human courage and loyalty of those who carry on their fight for freedom in the authoritarian states is "unreasonable" according to scientific standards; all consequences and all existing liabilities and resources speak against their efforts. They cannot test and verify their values, because in order to do so they must already have won. Their existence is "good," "right," and "valuable" beyond test and verification, and if their cause loses, the world, and not their values, will have been refuted.

In the present situation of material and intellectual culture, the problem of values is, in the last analysis, identical with the problem of freedom. The

conditions of matters of fact have become so unified that the one idea, freedom, covers all that is good, right and admirable in the world. And all efforts to place the value of freedom on the same scientific level with other current valuations is an affront to freedom. For science is essentially in itself freedom, and cannot verify freedom through anything other than freedom. Freedom—and this is the profound result of Kant's analysis—is the only "fact" that "is" only in its creation; it cannot be verified except by being exercised.

This conviction distinctly motivates Dewey's attempt to save the scientific validity of values from annihilation. In doing so, however, he seems to gainsay the very basis of his positivistic method, for his faith in the power of "revaluation" presupposes a definite preference prior to all test and verification, namely, that liberty and the "release of individual potentialities" is better than its opposite.

HERBERT MARCUSE (New York).

Wirth, Louis, ed., *Contemporary Social Problems*. A Tentative Formulation for Teachers of Social Problems. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago, Ill. 1939. (IX and 68 pp.; \$1.00)

This small book has a really great significance. If the program sketched in it were to be carried out, it might very well deeply affect the teaching of contemporary social problems. The book is the outcome of discussions among outstanding scholars in psychology, economics, political science, history, anthropology and sociology who were assembled to consider "contemporary social problems and issues in relation to social science education." The group had thus to determine the "criteria for the selection of the more significant problem"; the formulation of the problems; their classification; and the availability of scientific knowledge. The discussions were based on a statement which tentatively defined and classified the values of American liberal democracy and contained some methodological remarks on the distinction and the connection between "scientific" and "practical" problems. It insisted that the group discussions could only be fruitful if the many problems confronting America were reduced to a dozen or so "strategic social issues." The discussions "resulted in the formulation of a rough outline of the form that the analysis and presentation of a problem might have." This analysis distinguishes the nature of a problem (how the problem appears to the man in the street; whom it affects; why it is significant; what are the assumptions, divergence from which constitutes a problem); the method by which a social scientist formulates it; the etiology of the problem; the goals to be sought in its solution; the means for bringing about solution; and the best available sources for information. The present volume contains a brief but illuminating introduction by Mr. *Erling M. Hunt* of Teachers College (Columbia); a survey by Professor *Wirth* on the work of the study group; an article by Professor *Max Lerner*, entitled "What makes a social problem?" and a contribution from Professor *Louis Wirth* on "Housing." Further volumes are announced that will deal with "Freedom and Adequacy of Information furnished by Channels of Communication" by Professor *H. Cantril*; and one on "War" by Professor *P. E. Moseley* of Cornell.

Professor Lerner's memorandum is purely methodological, and, as he himself admits, written with an eclectic intent. It starts from the obvious point that all social problems are interrelated; it then proceeds to define "Central Problem Areas," which are determinate economic, governmental, psychological, institutional and attitudinal ones; there follow brief discussions of the genesis of a problem, its dynamics, its solution, and finally a summary of the Pedagogy of a Problem. While I can readily see the wisdom of the teaching recommendations (which indeed were also the principles of German adult labor education), I am unable to see the relevance of the methodological discussion. Interrelationships may mean everything or nothing. Taken literally, the view that all social problems are interconnected must make social research impossible. No social scientist, even if he should possess encyclopedic knowledge, can hope to set a problem in all its relationships, not to speak of analyzing it in all its ramifications. The art of the scientist and teacher alike will consist in the selection of *relevant* ramifications. Thus, the problem at once arises how to determine relevancy. One method would be the pragmatic, to decide the question according to the situation and the interest of teachers and students. The other way would be the theoretical, to base the selection on a definite sociological theory. Professor Lerner, without clearly saying so, apparently has a preference (as is proven by the chapter "Central Problem Areas" and the examples which he mentions throughout his memorandum) for the economic interpretation of social problems mediated by a psychological theory which distinguishes between "what is basic in human nature and what is socially conditioned."

One omission should be mentioned, the lack of a historical orientation. This has nothing to do with the study of history, which, as Professor Wirth mentions in his report, is not brought into consideration, but rather touches the method of research and still more of teaching. My own experience in adult education has time and again demonstrated that without tracing the historical foundations and changes of specific problems, the problems themselves will not be understood. It would be well to keep in mind Robert Lynd's remark on history in his "Knowledge for What."

Professor Wirth's paper on Housing is an example of how the results of the group's discussions can be translated into practice. The contribution is admirable in every respect, especially in the formulation of the possible lines of action for attacking the housing problem. The ramifications of the housing problem are clearly shown, even if they are, in my view, a little too narrow. I miss discussion of four specific problems: one, at least some hints as to how building construction would affect the whole economy (an analysis of the English experience would be desirable); second, an analysis of the transformation of the economic function of the mortgage lender through the operation of the Federal Housing Administration, referring to the fact that the federal insurance of mortgages makes the banks pensioners of the government. This leads to a third point: an attempt must be made to determine the ratio of costs of material, labor, interests on mortgage and financing costs. Professor Wirth, of course, mentions the high cost of the three factors, although no attempt is made to determine their relation. This discussion would in turn lead to an analysis of the policy of building unions, a necessary discussion in the light of the anti-trust action of the Department of Justice. If the other pamphlets come up to the standards of Professor Wirth's book the influence of the publications on the teaching of contemporary social problems may really become decisive.

FRANZ L. NEUMANN (New York).

Barnes, Harry Elmer, Howard Becker and Frances Bennett Becker (Editors), *Contemporary Social Theory*. D. Appleton-Century. New York, 1940. (XX and 947 pp.; \$5.00)

It has been but 15 years since Harry Elmer Barnes edited the compendium on *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, with a scope and perspective similar to that of the volume under review. A comparison of the two works shows a maturation of American social theory during the ensuing period. If in a brief time such significant advances can be made, hopes may be cherished for further progress. The level of discourse is more subtly philosophical and more sensitive to reality, the facets of approach to social data are more varied, and there is less of the callow authoritarianism and intellectual insularity that permeated the earlier volume. The contribution of the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, which appeared in the interim, to the enrichment of American social thought, is here clearly evidenced, as is the more active percolation of European social theory.

There is no essential unity, but on the contrary wide diversities in the points of view of the nineteen collaborators in this volume. The joint editors find it necessary to footnote their introductory remarks with the comment: "Each writer represents himself only. This also holds for the editors." Consequently there are repeated overlapping and contradictory positions, which are not clarified through frank analysis and reanalysis of differences with an effort to arrive at some consensus, but remain on the level of assertion and counterassertion. The claim put forth in the preface that the symposium represents a "logically organized and well-unified treatment" with a high degree of integration, is approximated only in terms of the structure of the book, but certainly not in its content.

The editors express the hope that the book might "canvass all salient aspects of contemporary social thinking and assess their significance for the current social scene . . . [that] it may help us bridge the gulf between contemporary social action and our social thought and institutions—an achievement which the editors hold to be the supreme task of the social sciences." This commendable "supreme task" of uniting theory and practice is scantily fulfilled in Part VII of the book devoted to "Some Applications of Sociological Theory to the Social Sciences and Public Problems." Except for William Seagle's original and challenging contribution on "Sociological Trends in Modern Jurisprudence," this section falls considerably below the others in its critical standards, in its coverage of the diverse approaches to the problems discussed and in the clarification of the alternatives present in thought and action.

In Part V, the discussion under the caption, "The Study of Mental Currents and Psychic Processes" is enriched by the late Alexander Goldenweiser's piece on "Some Contributions of Psychoanalysis to the Interpretation of Social Facts." While sympathetic with psychoanalysis and caustic with its critics, Goldenweiser declares *Totem and Taboo* to be an intellectual monstrosity. He ascribes Freud's partial failure to contribute constructively to an understanding of the crowd, totemism, religion and civilization to the fact that "psychoanalysis, as a general theory of the mind, is basically and emphatically a system of *individual* psychology." This system, he declares, has failed to function as a tool of social study because of the mistaken effort of Freud and his colleagues to bridge the gap between the individual and the social or cultural by introducing the erroneous concept of a racial uncon-

scious. Goldenweiser's interest in deepening the insights of social scientists by psychoanalysis purged of its aberrations, is evident likewise in his chapters on the contributions of anthropology and his appraisals of Dilthey and Rickert. In the section on anthropology, he supplements his review of earlier anthropological theory with a suggestive critical analysis of the functionalism of Malinowski and a commendation of the work of Radin and Benedict.

The articles by Howard Becker, while filled with many pertinent telling challenges, and not a few devastating and effective criticisms of the hypotheses of other social scientists, are too capricious for a volume of this type designed as a text. On the other extreme are the contributions of Harry Elmer Barnes which are, for the most part, merely expository summations of the literature of the fields which he is discussing, interspersed with casually informative critical comments. The articles of the book have helpful bibliographies, and there is also a supplementary bibliographical appendix.

BERNHARD J. STERN (New York).

Pratt, Carroll C., *The Logic of Modern Psychology*. Macmillan Company. New York 1939. (XVI, 185 pp.; \$2.00)

Ulich, Robert, *Fundamentals of Democratic Education*. American Book Company. New York 1940. (X, 326 pp.; \$2.25)

Smith, B. Othanel, *Logical Aspects of Educational Measurement*. Columbia University Press. New York 1938. (X, 182 pp.; \$2.50)

All facts in psychology, as in any other science, are functions of the method by which they are observed and there is an acute need for the guidance of logic in the working out and checking of the methods and concepts of present day psychology.

Pratt devotes his study to the renewing of interest in the basic assumptions of psychology and to the expanding of what strikes him as the "most important, though by no means most vigorous part of psychology," namely theoretical psychology. He elaborates his view in eight major points which he has summed up with striking definiteness in his introduction. There is no operational definition of "the mind," a concept which in fact has already completely vanished from psychology. "Psychology is a convenient division of labor, not a subject-matter." No conceivable sense can be discovered in formulating a problem like that of the body-mind problem. There is, in spite of the claim which common sense and intuition put forward, no hint that the material of psychology differs from that of any other science. The idea, therefore, of a "unique mental material" does not have any place in strict scientific terminology. The guiding laws of biology are, in fact, very similar to those of psychology. If the scientific picture of the self is different from the real self, this is to be ascribed to the fundamental quality of scientific description which does not intend to give the things themselves but a systematized account of them according to certain principles. The phenomenon of meaning does not change anything in the character of psychological data. To psychology as well as to physics may be applied Eddington's famous comparison between his real and his scientific table. "What psychology strives to do, all that it ever could want to do, is to explain the self in terms of physiological conditions."

Pratt makes the method of logical analysis proposed by positivism and by operationism the fundamental of his considerations. The methodological principle of operationism applied by Bridgeman to the concepts of physics is to inquire what operations were carried out before a specific concept came into use. Though essentially in favor of this method, in adapting it to psychology, *Pratt* makes it subject to substantial criticism and puts up a firm argument against tendencies of boundless purification as demonstrated in Steven's *Discriminating Psychology*. Operationism has nothing to offer toward the collecting of initial data of observation and not much so far as the testing of deductions is concerned. Nearly all psychological concepts being ambiguous, operationism cannot exclusively direct the construction of a concept. Absolutely "pure" concepts are practically impossible. Two habits of human thinking are particularly apt to cloud the exactness of concepts: reification which attributes factual existence to ordering forms of thought (as for instance type or contrast), and infiltration which refers to the seeping into a concept of meanings which are not consciously made explicit.

The merits of *Pratt's* attempt to survey the logical implications and problems of present psychology are obvious. However, the discussion of certain perennial problems in psychology would have yielded results of a wider range if the epistemological aspect would had been not only that of positivism. The principle that questions not strictly verifiable are meaningless is perhaps not sufficient for a comprehension of the intricate conditions which have led to the formulation of the psycho-physical problem. It cannot be disputed out of existence so smoothly, though this would certainly save quite a lot of trouble. Also derived from the positivistic ideology is the idea that the conversion of words furnishes the main source of error. It would seem here that the problem lies deeper down with the elementary condition that an originally a-rational experience has to be rationalized in the process of science.

If it is the task of psychology to give a picture of man, the objective approach yields an image clearly deprived of almost everything that can be indirectly comprehended through the concept of civilization. It is practically devoid of those particular phenomena which have, since the time of the Greeks, been considered the specific quality which makes man human. Although this is in *Pratt's* judgment the emotionalized opinion of laymen, there is evidence in this belief, vague though it may be, that the approach of objectivism is in some way not the right one.

Psychologists, as one might visualize them from *Pratt's* definition of psychology, would somehow appear as a group of intellects which investigate the shadowy image of man in a space bare of any other relation than their own abstract interest. A logic of psychology, of course, cannot be supposed to reach over into the immense psychological and sociological problems with which everything in the living body of society is infinitely linked up. But something of this, of the existence of psychology within a social reality, should be felt even on the ground of a strictly logical discussion of the ends and means of psychology. Thus, the casual way in which applied and educational psychology are dealt with, and the way the problem of psychotherapy is passed over, in elegant diction, as just a miracle, are strong arguments against the basic philosophy of this book.

Ulick's Fundamentals of Democratic Education are laid out as a more than empirical approach to the understanding of education as a phenomenon

of civilization. A philosophical groundwork has to be prepared in order that with its help education may be viewed in relation to other functions of society. Man cannot be understood through one principle only. His existence is biological as well as social, psychological as well as metaphysical, and is ultimately to be traced back to basic factors which defy further explanation. "The essence of man lies in his desire for life but as something which is worth having and which provides a reality which he can love for its inherent values."

The necessity for, if not the actual existence of values is one of the fundamental presuppositions of Ulich's philosophy. Ethical behavior is not arbitrary but natural and necessary; it is not artificially added to man's natural behavior but has its origin in our basic vital energies. Comprehension and consolidation of divergent aspects into one universal view, as in this case, may be seen as the working methodological principle of this book.

Discussing the values that should underlie every action in education, Ulich subjects pragmatism, the philosophical theory of the progressivists in education, to a thorough criticism. If the aims of the conditioning process in education are derived only from such ideas as happen to be ruling in the milieu, they may be modified or changed whenever there is any force strong enough to do so. Against this circumstantial interpretation of values, Ulich holds that the moral is the "normalcy of man." Since it is not any longer possible for us to accept the ethical position of the old idealistic schools, and since pragmatism did not succeed in building a coherent moral philosophy, the merits of both should be unified in what Ulich calls a "self-transcendent empiricism" which accepts the naturalist view as a foreground position but also points beyond man to the universal system of which he is a part. The urgent task for practical education is to find the right combination of growth and form. A new concept of education has to expand in the horizontal beyond the individual to the group, and in the vertical beyond the immediate biological existence, to man's interrelation with a system of values and superpersonal principles. "Education can discharge its obligation to modern man only if it succeeds in inculcating in him an ethical attitude that combines the spirit of experimentalism with a profound faith in a deeper meaning of life."

Opposing demands are made upon the teacher by state and by society. Ideas cannot be conveyed in a spiritual vacuum; free discussion and expression of opinion should not be restricted among students or teachers. Ulich recognizes the serious cultural and educational problem which is presented by the inadequate development of the emotional capacities of modern man. Here lies the great social importance of religious experience and metaphysical systems. After their decline in modern times their function has not been replaced by any other integrating force.

Education is not a solitary enterprise. The future of freedom makes the task of a constant reevaluation more imperative than ever before. It will be the common obligation of educators and statesmen, of scientists and parents to gain more and better insight into the dynamics of freedom in order that the failure of an utopian liberalism may be overcome by a deeper understanding of human relations. The spiritual future of democracy is visualized in the endeavor of "increasingly humanizing society by absorbing into it as

many constructive elements as possible." The contribution that education can make is to transcend a quantitative and merely scientific understanding by a profound conception of humanity.

There are some basic points in Ulich's book which, brought to bear upon present educational thinking, with its predominant pragmatist and behaviorist orientation, is bound to arouse intense antagonism. There is his rejection of pragmatism and operationalism, and of the "scientific" attitude in education and psychology. Against his philosophy of values and the elements of irrationalism, the adherents of naturalism and experimentalism will bring forward the charges customarily projected against those who dare storm their sanctuaries. Many of Ulich's positions will be scorned by the dogmatists of either radical or conservative beliefs. And there is, to a lesser extent, some reason to fear that a hypocritical obscurantism may derive arguments from some of his critical discourses—entirely against Ulich's belief, as one may safely assume. For in its basic character this philosophy is liberal, in the sense of the word which is not discredited by the defaults of a historical ideology.

There is no question that science, or the specific way of doing science, has not lived up to its claims and has not proved to be capable of helping us in our most ardent problems. But at least part of this failure can be credited to a questionable concept of the task and of the criteria of science. By adoption of operational criteria and inappropriately "objective" methods, psychological sciences, for instance, have paralyzed their advance toward some of the central questions of personality and social existence. A generalized philosophy of measurement, as we have it at present, is very probably the consequence of a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope and the peculiarity of psychological sciences. A much wider concept is feasible which, conscious enough of the specific nature of its task, will have to anticipate in its framework such experiences as do not submit to complete rationalization.

In a final analysis the feeling prevails that Ulich has left the nature of the fundamentals of his philosophy in suspense, as if he wanted to leave it open for either a universalistic (yet essentially immanent) or a metaphysical interpretation. One would wish that this position might be clarified in a future discourse. Ulich's criticism of the almost exclusive position of method in present educational thought will have little popularity in many educational quarters. Yet it should be highly appreciated that he has questioned a course of thought which had been considered almost self-evident. The importance of methods can not be doubted but it is of great value just now that the personality of the teacher is emphasized as the most intrinsic factor of education. It would have been interesting if Ulich had gone more into the acrimonious problem of reconciling the necessity for equipping the student for an existing reality—that is, for successful adjustment—and the ethical imperative to endow him with the desire to improve existing conditions of life. To the problem of the teacher Ulich has devoted a penetrating chapter and many excellent remarks. Yet one would wish that the specific psychological and social position of the teacher had been further analyzed.

Ulich's book is an important event in contemporary educational thinking, if it were only for the fact that somebody undertook to set a positive and

fruitful criticism against the dominance of a scientific approach which in spite of its undoubtable merits betrays a need for reconsideration and re-evaluation. In a very fortunate way Ulich has defined education as "the cultural conscience of man." This is, in fact, the leading motive of his book. From this point of view it is important that Ulich propounds the necessity of assigning to the quantitative study of education a more definitely circumscribed position; that he advocates the universality of methods and philosophies, and a firmer and more comprehensive frame of reference for our scientific endeavors; in short, that he deals with his problem from a universal point of view giving more attention to the grave problems below and beyond science than has been done before.

A philosophy like Ulich's, of which the fundamental tenet is universalism and the synthesis of different ideas, is bound to overlook conflicts which it may be essentially impossible to reconcile. But as a regulative one his principle is beyond question, particularly in a time when the debacle of all intellectual endeavors lurks behind a growing tendency toward indoctrination. It is the personal quality which gives human importance to scientific thought, no matter how clever. In this sense tribute should be paid to the gentleness and sincere modesty as well as to the intellectual courage and universal justice displayed in this book.

Smith undertakes to look into the conceptual framework and into the logical validity of the fundamental assumptions in educational measurement. "In far too many instances the results of experimental studies are conflicting and unconvincing," he says, "indicating that the sterility of much of educational research is due not to lack of precaution on the part of experimenters but to something more basic and subtle." Reconsideration, therefore, is indicated of the specific method upon which most educational research is based.

Smith defines measurement in general as "the quantitative evaluation of a property by means of an instrument which is constructed in accordance with certain general principles." A quality that is to be measured must be quantifiable in such a way that it satisfies the axiomatic conditions of measurement, namely those of order or series, and those of equality. Only practical experience can show whether a certain quality is amenable to these conditions or not.

It is to be regretted that Smith confines his investigation only to achievement tests. Transferred to the specific conditions of other instruments of psychological measurement his analysis would doubtlessly yield very fruitful results. He distinguishes two types of achievement tests: achievement tests proper, which measure the level of achievement or the intellectual growth of a person, and quality scales, dealing with subjects which can not be judged in terms of "right" or "wrong," but only in terms of "better" and "worse." Smith finds that "equality" and "order" have not been established genuinely in achievement tests and that assumptions and mathematical operations have been substituted for the experimental interpretation of the axioms of addition. A quantitative concept of learning is realized to be the principle upon which achievement tests have been developed. Knowledge in this sense is a stock of accomplished data; the process of its acquisition means an increase in data, not a change in personality. The demonstration of this principle in

testing represents a circular conclusion; there is, first, the preconceived principle of the quantitative character of learning upon which the test is founded. The results, in turn, which have been gained by means of this assumption are used to justify the principle.

With regard to quality scales, the claim of equal units rests on two assumptions. The one is that judgment of differences can be treated as errors of observation, allowing for statistical manipulation according to the normal law of error. This idea, originally going back to the Webner-Fechner law of psychophysics, was developed by Galton and Cattell, and given the formulation by Thorndike that differences noted equally often are equal. He implemented this principle in his Writing Test which has since set the pattern for quality scales. In this process of thought the idea of "merit," as expressed in the judgment of differences of quality, is given a quantitative meaning, suggesting that variations of judgment indicate different amounts of merit. But the judgment of merits is an extremely complex process; different persons may merit different things under seemingly identical terms, so that variations of judgment are more likely to express different qualities of merit than quantities.

The future development of educational measurement is seen in two directions. One points towards a refined elementarism. The systematic exploitation of factor analysis may surrender elements of behavior more apt for quantitative treatment than the ones now in use. On the other hand, quantitative measurement may be abandoned for the sake of a qualitative evaluation which is promoted by the increasing acceptance of an organistic philosophy.

Smith's study is a genuine contribution to educational, and beyond that, to psychological research in general. The philosophical platform, largely positivistic in its origin, upon which the argument is conducted, shows certain limitations if applied to the wide issue of psychological measurement. However, it proves of undoubtable value in the definitions of the axioms of measurement. The process of learning and its effect, as it is viewed here, is not entirely convincing. The interpretation of these phenomena would have gained if it had not been built strictly on Mead's concept of the self and on the concepts of Gestalt psychology. The most important and most regrettable limitation of this fine study is connected with the general concept of the mind which it utilizes. Proceeding from the axioms of measurement, Smith establishes with great clarity the incompatibility of the units in present educational measurement. But his appraisal does not lead to a principle and consequently admits of the possibility that qualities more adequate for measurement may be found. It is here that a general investigation into the aptness of psychological phenomena for genuine quantification should have been initiated in order to lead eventually not only to a methodological, but to an essential clarification of the problems of psychological measurement.

These questions, however, do not impair the significance of the fact that in Smith's book the premises of educational testing have been made subject to a comprehensive logical analysis. In recent years, a number of studies by G. W. Allport, Lawrence Frank, Mark May, and others have dealt with some of the principal aspects of testing. Smith has presented the first systematic investigation into the basic assumptions of educational measurement.

FREDERICK WYATT (Cambridge, Mass.).

Fuller, Lon L., *The Law in Quest of Itself*. Julius Rosenthal Foundation, Northwestern University Lectures. The Foundation Press, Chicago 1940. (147 pp.; \$2.00)

Radin, Max, *Law as Logic and Experience*. Yale University Press, New Haven 1940. (171 pp.; \$2.00)

Llewellyn, K. N., *The Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs*: The Problem of Juristic Method. The Yale Law Journal. Vol. 49, 1940. (pp. 1355-1400)

Baumgarten, Arthur, *Grundzüge der juristischen Methodenlehre*, Huber. Bern 1939. (192 pp.)

Bodenheimer, Edgar, *Jurisprudence*. McGraw-Hill, New York and London 1940. (357 pp.; \$3.50)

Legal theory must, obviously, serve two masters: the one is the lawyer (judge, counsel or administrator), the other is the theory of society. In its first function, legal theory becomes a mere technique, a pragmatic enterprise directed towards the fulfillment of specific and necessary ends. At best it is then jurisprudence or *Allgemeine Rechtslehre*, that is, a body of maxims derived from generalizations of specific codes. It defines notions like right, duty, objective and subjective law, definitions that have, of course, no philosophical validity, though they may be extremely useful. As a part of a theory of society, legal theory will primarily discuss the philosophical validity of the basic legal concepts and will be compelled to lay bare the relation between law and morality as well as to analyze the formal structure of the law and to develop the function of law in society.

American jurisprudence is by far the most enterprising and challenging discipline as far as the first task is concerned; and the most backward where genuine philosophical discussion is in question. Except for Morris R. Cohen's incisive criticisms and William Ernest Hocking's attempt to redefine the relation between law and morals, the theory of law has not advanced a step beyond the heritage of German idealism.

Professor Fuller's book seeks to fill this gap through an attempt to lay the foundation of a new legal philosophy. He starts from two competing directions of legal thought, the one positivism, the law that is; the second, natural law, the law that ought to be. The deficiencies of positivism and of its purest form, namely Kelsen's theory of law, and of the American realist school are set out in a series of brilliant observations. Fuller's own legal philosophy, however, may be open to some objections. He seems to overstep himself in attacking the divorce between legality and morality and in maintaining that natural law denies the possibility of such rigid distinction and "tolerates a confusion of them." Indeed, the theory of law will have to abdicate if a line cannot be drawn between morals and law.

On the other hand, there is no doubt (and Professor Radin's book again draws attention to this fact) that moral evaluations enter the legal system at many points, especially through equity and, as far as continental law is concerned, through the legal standards of conduct. No positivist will deny that. He will, however, and rightly so, maintain that in such cases the moral evaluations become legal principles subject to specific legal considerations. The rigid distinction between the *is* and the *ought* is a highly progressive

principle, today especially. It makes it impossible to surround any existing system of positive law with the halo of a moral order. Today, when we are facing a frontal attack against the foundations of law in its protective function, we should be careful before we abandon the one principle of our liberal legal system upon which this very protection rests, namely the rigid separation of legality from morality. It is not for nothing that National Socialist legal theory and practice have ultimately done away with this dividing line.

It is, of course, true that this distinction does not absolve us from searching for the philosophical criteria of right. But it is doubtful whether the confrontation of an "is" by an "ought" and the identification of the "ought" with natural law will help to achieve this aim. It is methodologically and historically difficult to assert that natural law is a philosophy of the "ought." At some times it was, at others it certainly was not. Natural law can very well be the philosophic basis of positivism, indeed, nearly all of our liberal legal concepts, especially that cornerstone of positivistic thought, the concept of sovereignty, have been fully and admirably developed by the rationalistic natural lawyers. I heartily agree with Professor Fuller that the contributions of the natural law theorists (he mentions only Ahrens) should be read and studied, but they will readily disclose that rationalistic natural law was definitely the philosophy of the "is" and not of the "ought." For Pufendorff the law of nature lacks the *vis coactiva*, and Christian Wolff considers moral obligations to be mere counsels. Further, to oppose positivism solely with natural law implies that natural law is identical with legal philosophy, whereas it is in fact but one branch within it, attacking the philosophical problem with one specific method.

The division of the world into an is and an ought is philosophically a rather doubtful affair. By accepting this division, Professor Fuller remains on the very ground of positivism, merely reversing the positivistic position, with the consequence that his own doctrine suffers, with positivism, the reproach of being arbitrary. Legal philosophy today cannot overlook the fact that we possess in Hegel's Philosophy of Right a contribution which attempts, by means of the dialectic method, to overcome the isolation in which each specific doctrine finds itself. Natural law, positivism, the historical approach, the realistic position, all are embraced in Hegel's legal philosophy. It is regrettable that Hegel's philosophy of right has been presented to the Anglo-American public in so unattractive a translation, because it appears to me that legal philosophy ought to build on Hegel's foundation by developing the basic concepts of our legal system from the "nature of things," that is, from the very structure of our society. It will then have to allocate each of the doctrines to its place in the final system, according to the amount of truth which each contains. Professor Fuller deserves our gratitude for having reopened a discussion that has long been overdue.

The lack of a philosophic foundation becomes very clear in Professor Radin's rich and extraordinarily stimulating book. He rejects every attempt to connect law with a philosophical principle. Law is a mere "technique of administering a complicated social mechanism." I would have no objection to any such pragmatic definition if the author were really to stick to it. But, unfortunately, philosophic problems enter Professor Radin's discussion on almost every page. To give but two examples, he rightly rejects the notion that "the law sees only artificial constructions before it, one man *qua* citizen,

another *qua* father. Human beings, for the purposes of law," ought not to be considered as "bundles of legal capacities. . . . They are . . . flesh-and-blood creatures." Very true, but impossible to maintain for a jurisprudence which is a mere technique. Why, if the social mechanisms make it necessary, should the law not consider man only in so far as the social mechanism requires it? The contrary can be maintained only if we accept a philosophy of law which starts from man as a rational creature. The second instance is his treatment of the equity problem, where considerations of justice enter directly into legal consideration. At the very end of his lectures, Professor Radin is compelled to admit that "humanity is, after all, the business of the law." What that really means has not been made clear. If humanity is the law's business, the law might not very well fit into an existing social mechanism. It might even become evident that the theory of law, if it is a true theory, will turn into an eminently critical theory denouncing the existing social mechanisms as incompatible with the tenets of the legal theory.

These critical remarks must, however, not detract from the great value of the sociological and historical analysis of Professor Radin's book. It is brilliantly written and richly illustrated. As for the opinion it holds that arbitration is superior over rational judicial decisions, I do not share this view. I rather maintain that rational law and legal positivism in our period, however defective they may be, are superior to equitable considerations, to the weighing of antagonistic interests instead of the deciding of conflicting claims. The little rationality which the law still has gives a minimum of the liberal guarantees which are in the process of disappearing and which Professor Radin recognizes as essential for criminal law.

A considerable advance on the part of American juristic thought is to be found in Professor Llewellyn's article which has been included in this review because it is the first systematic statement of the leader of the American realistic school on the nature of his juristic method. Unfortunately, the article is written in Professor Llewellyn's peculiar style which, though charming, is nevertheless extremely difficult to read and understand. If we succeed in piercing through his terminology we find, surprisingly enough, a rather conservative theory of law. This is in no way a reproach but rather a compliment. Professor Llewellyn very impressively states the need of divorcing law from morality, so that law "may be seen sharply as not enough for any decent system to rest content with." To his great merit, he has broken down the task of the lawyer into four different heads: that of litigation (the disposition of trouble cases); that of "preventive channelling and the re-orientation of conduct"; that of "allocation of authority . . . which legitimize action as being authoritative"; and finally that of the organization of society as a whole. It is thus clearly to be seen that the theory of juristic method must ultimately lead into political philosophy, which alone can deal with the legitimacy of obedience, and into a theory of society which alone can solve the problem of the best organization of society.

Professor Baumgarten's little book, written for young students, sums up his well-known empiricist theory of law. Though well written it is completely undocumented.

Dr. Bodenheimer's *Jurisprudence* has a misleading title. The book does not deal with jurisprudence but rather surveys specific philosophical doctrines concerned with basic concepts of law (law and justice, law and power, law and the state, natural law, law shaping forces, etc.). A jurisprudence

must analyze the concepts with which the lawyer and sociologist daily operate, namely sovereignty, administrative act, property, contract, tort and crime. The weakness of the rather ambitious attempt Dr. Bodenheimer makes is that the problems he discusses are not problems of law as it operates in society but problems of the history of ideas about law. Dr. Bodenheimer, for instance, considers law as a mean "between anarchy and despotism." Such definition, which has been developed before, is meaningful only if an attempt is made to show in historical and sociological studies the swing of the pendulum between anarchy and despotism. This is not attempted. Instead, theories like the theory of natural law, of the classical school, of institutionalism and so on are discussed. But the discussions move in the sphere of a certain unreality. For instance, in his analysis of institutionalism, Dr. Bodenheimer cannot but observe the connection of institutionalism with modern collectivism. Had the book been centered around the fundamental problems of law, like property and contract, the author might have seen that institutionalism becomes the legal theory of monopoly capitalism and has thus to be rejected in spite of the fact that it contains a limited amount of truth. The role which the various theories of law play today can much more easily be grasped from the analysis of the basic concepts of our legal system than from a discussion merely of the content of the various doctrines. Since the book is very carefully planned and scarcely overlooks a relevant theory it will well serve as an introduction to the main doctrines about the law for young students.

FRANZ L. NEUMANN (New York).

Propaganda Analysis. Volume I of the Publications of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. New York, 1938. (XVI + 84 pp.) (A)

Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee (editors). *The Fine Art of Propaganda*. Harcourt, Brace & Co. New York, 1939. (XI + 140 pp.) (B)

Lavine, Harold, and James Wechsler, War Propaganda and the United States. Yale University Press. New Haven 1940. (X and 363 pp.; \$2.75) (C)

Bartlett, F. C., Political Propaganda. Macmillan. New York and London 1940. (X and 158 pp.; \$1.25)

Carr, E. H., Propaganda in International Politics. Farrar and Rinehart. New York 1939. (30 pp.; \$0.15)

Chakotin, Serge, The Rape of the Masses. Alliance Book Corporation. New York 1940. (X and 310 pp.; \$3.00)

Taylor, Edmond, The Strategy of Terror. Houghton Mifflin Company. Boston 1940. (278 pp.; \$2.50)

Most recent writers on propaganda search less for an objective analysis than for methods of fighting its totalitarian forms. It is assumed that propaganda is one of the greatest dangers threatening democratic society. The proposed methods to further or combat propaganda, the views on its function and efficacy in the processes of social change, its very definition, depend, as

they must, on the various authors' views on what society is and what it should be. Only when this dependence is clearly recognized—this is not always the case—can confusions be avoided.

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis (the first three items reviewed are published under its auspices) has played a prominent role in making the American public aware of the existence of propaganda. The sociological assumptions on which the work of the Institute rests are stated in the prefaces written by Clyde R. Miller and Eduard C. Lindeman. According to these writers, democratic societies originally proceeded by "discussing and thinking together"; but today the country has grown large, the communities composing it are highly interdependent, and "we find ourselves becoming part of powerful pressure groups that have leaders who speak on behalf of large segments of the population" (B, p. 4). Pressure groups are not pernicious as such; indeed, they are necessary "in a large-scale democracy," and some of them are "admirable organizations: our churches, our trade and professional associations, our political parties, our patriotic societies, etc." (ibid.). But other pressure groups are dangerous, for they seek "to lead those who believe in them over paths other than those they announce. To such men, little matters except the power they obtain through the uses of rabble rousing propaganda" (ibid. p. 5).

The direct destruction of anti-democratic pressure groups would be contrary to the rules of the democratic game. "In a relatively free society it is to be assumed that each individual or each group which has a purpose also has the right to propagate that purpose. . . . We do not assume, at least at the outset, that those who believe in force rather than education are inferior to us either intellectually or morally" (C, p. VIII). The existence of "competing propagandas" is even described as a necessary feature of free societies (C, p. X). In this competition, however, only the anti-democratic forces enjoy complete laissez-faire freedom; those who fight for democracy are warned against "meeting dangerous propaganda with direct counter-propaganda" (B, p. VIII), for this would only focus unwarranted attention on the utterances of the enemies of democracy and stimulate their influence. What is recommended is defensive skirmishing—"the candid and impartial study of the devices and apparent objectives of specialists in the distortion of public opinion" (ibid.)—in the belief, which has so often been contradicted by experience, that once a trick is exposed it does not work any more. This is termed the "way of democratic education" (ib. p. IX), and the propaganda analyst's purpose is thus defined as merely to help the thoughtful citizen "to distinguish and choose rationally between rival propagandas" (C, p. VIII).

The Institute's definition of propaganda as "expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately assigned to influence actions of other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends" (B, p. 15) has been criticized for taking in too much, for leading to an uncritical rejection as propaganda of every appeal to act and to an ensuing collective indecision. To some extent these criticisms are justified: the Institute's opposition of propaganda to science, which is defined as "the discovery of new facts and principles" (B, p. 15) whereby the scientist has no desire to "put anything across" (ibid.) implies a depreciation of all forms of persuasion, allowing only purely factual evidence to be submitted to the public on the

basis of which each individual has to reach his decision alone. But the identification of propaganda with persuasion is consonant with the Institute's view that "in a democracy freedom of speech necessarily means freedom to propagandize" (A, p. IV). The absence of a dynamic conception of democracy leads to emphasizing the democratic form at the expense of democratic content, and this in turn determines not only the Institute's conception of propaganda and the methods advocated to combat it, but also the content of its analyses. They evidence an almost exclusive preoccupation with the technique of misrepresentation and misinformation, and with the apparent content of the propagandists' utterances. The readers of the Institute's *Bulletins* have even been offered exercises in formal logic as a prophylactic measure against seduction by logical fallacies. The more complex methods of totalitarian propaganda or the purely physical devices—like the constant reiteration of a slogan that may be, formally, a true factual statement—seem to escape these analysts. In practice, the wide definition, which includes "actions" as well as "opinions," is disregarded; propaganda is considered as a form of persuasion that plays on the emotions rather than the intellect. The simplicity of the solution only reflects the considerable simplification of the problem.

A good illustration of the Institute's treatment of propagandistic material can be found in "The Fine Art of Propaganda," where Father Coughlin's speeches, closely studied, are revealed to contain all possible forms of falsehood and emotional appeal. The devices used by the tricky demagogue are classified in seven groups, each group is given a name and a pictorial symbol, and a Coughlin speech is reprinted with the unmasking symbols in the appropriate passages. And there the analyst's task ends: propaganda having been conceived as an insubstantial shadow, as an aggregate of fascinating gestures and words, honest intellectual exorcism is deemed sufficient to dispel the charm.

"War Propaganda and the United States" by *Harold Lavine* and *James Wechsler* is for the most part a descriptive account of the various attempts to influence the American attitude toward the present war during its first six months. It devotes much more space to the "interventionists" than to the "isolationists." This is partly explained by the authors' obvious anti-war bias, but more so perhaps by their preoccupation with the direct forms of persuasion in which the British could indulge, thanks to the American sympathy to their cause, at the expense of the indirect and covert forms of action used by the Germans because of the different nature of their objective and because of hostile public opinion. The authors' attention is so strongly focused on the war issue that they often overlook important overtones and implications of the polemics they analyze: for example, they consider London's view of Roosevelt as a "real friend of democracy . . . who would be willing to fight for it but is held in check by his responsibility to his country" to be "fundamentally the same" as Berlin's explanation that he is "a tool of the plutocratic Jewish warmongers being restrained only by Aryan Americans" (p. 48).

Because the authors have a tendency to neglect analysis for the sake of description and compilation, they assumed that the "philosophy that guided French censorship was simple and logical . . . the fundamental purpose of censorship was to prevent the publication of news that might help the enemy" (p. 166). A more objective comparison between French propagandas in this

and the First World War would have revealed that this time French censorship was interested in suppressing democratic opinion almost as much as information helpful to the enemy. Instead, the authors merely note that Allied propaganda was often "inept." (In contrast, they clearly discern that in the battle of propagandists around the Finnish war the ostensible issues were only a pretext for diverting public feelings into anti-Soviet channels: "no other adversary could have united Rabbi Wise and Father Coughlin" (p. 324).)

The failure to discover concrete relations between the propagandists' ostensible activities around the war issue and more basic social and economic problems was bound to produce a negative result. The last chapter of the book seems to deprecate the role of propaganda: "Propaganda would help to shape the verdict. . . . But events themselves would do much to determine the outcome of propaganda war" (p. 325). Economic processes influence people more than conscious attempts: "factories bulging with unmarketable goods would be the most powerful propaganda of all" (p. 344). And, directly contradicting the statement made in the opening paragraph of the book, that "in our time public opinion is primarily a response to propaganda stimuli," its last paragraph concludes with the remark that "the great bulk of the people, as in most wars and in most eras, seemed to be watching the enactment of a drama in which their role had already been fixed. They neither clamored for war nor cried for peace. They waited and the words rolled over them" (p. 355). This remark seems to reduce propaganda to an epiphenomenon. But if it is meant to stress the determining role of automatic processes in our society, the propaganda analyst's task should begin here instead of ending.

F. C. Bartlett's little book on "Political Propaganda" represents views essentially similar to those expressed by the writers for the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, and a similar honest desire to preserve democratic institutions. Propaganda is described as an attempt to influence opinion and conduct by non-intellectual means, as an organized and public form of suggestion, as "whipping up emotion and excitement directly, by violent exaggeration and by manufactured crises," as relying "upon symbol and sentiment" (p. 66). The author makes many valuable distinctions—such as between short-range and long-range propaganda, and between propaganda directed to an enemy country and propaganda for home consumption, and tries to refute the legend that the Nazis' successes are based on a scientific analysis of the mass mind. He vigorously opposes the idea of imitating Fascist methods of propaganda for democratic purposes and thinks that "the basis of all effective propaganda in a democracy is a reliable news service." He expects a great deal for the success of democratic political organization from "a genuine knowledge of those human factors that determine friendliness and unfriendliness between differently organized social groups"—a knowledge that is only at its initial stages.

In his lucid little pamphlet *E. H. Carr* represents the ideas of liberalism gone "realistic." He compares the prejudice against propaganda with the prejudice against state control of industry. But the "hard fact" is that "the mass production of opinion is the corollary of the mass production of goods" (p. 7). Apparently the author's attitude toward "facts" is that of a blind beggar toward coins: he accepts them even if they are only analogies. It is not surprising that, according to him, "some control by the State, however

discreetly veiled, over the instruments of propaganda has become unavoidable if the public good is to be served and if the community is to survive" (p. 8), the sole reservation being that "this power is exercised for recognizably national, and not merely party, interests" (p. 9). Thus the categories of "the public good" and "the national interest"—probably the oldest ideological disguises—have once again performed their usual function.

Most democratic writers believe that the democracies must avoid using totalitarian propaganda methods. "The Rape of the Masses" by *Chakotin* is a systematic attempt to justify the opposite view. The author pursues a double aim: he wants to bare the essential mechanism of fascist propaganda and indicate a method of action which will realize socialism without violence. His excellent remarks on the technique of propaganda and his clear insight into the nature of the modern masses are unfortunately marred by grave theoretical misunderstandings which lead him to advocate the paradoxical plan of manipulating mankind into reason and freedom.

The author's confusion about the relations between biology and "culture" is especially noteworthy and no doubt helps to explain the rest. The two spheres are conceived not only as essentially dualistic: "Material benefits do not exhaust man's desires: when he secures them he aspires to higher things, to purely spiritual satisfactions and raptures, and these are inconceivable without freedom" (p. 3), but "instinct" and "social feeling" (= culture) are regarded as incompatible: social ideas are "anti-biological" (p. 296) and "culture leads us ultimately to destruction" (p. 298). In this conflict the author chooses the side of "culture" for the compensations it offers us in the form of "spiritual felicity" (p. 298) and calls his philosophy "compensated pessimism." At least this bluntness has the merit of laying bare one of the roots of all pessimistic doctrines: the academic conception of "culture" as a purely hedonistic enjoyment of the products of art and science.

A great part of his confusion may be traced to his biological conception of culture and psychology. He believes that "human action is nothing but a consequence of biological processes, indeed nervous processes, which take place in each individual" (p. 12) and even "political action is primarily a form of biological behavior." Conditioned reflexes founded on four basic instincts, those of struggle, nutrition, sexuality and maternity, explain all behavior and determine the propagandist's art of influencing people. The most important instinct is the first, identical with that of self-preservation, which is sublimated into fear, depression, aggressiveness and enthusiasm.

Whatever the general objections against this biological psychology, its appropriateness in describing the contemporary scene is striking. Our age, *Chakotin* justly observes, is not the age of the crowds, but of masses—and dispersion and isolation are precisely the characteristics of the "masses." "The mass is generally dispersed; its individuals are not in touch with one another" (p. 46). Of these masses only 10% are capable of a conscious active attitude; the remaining 90% are "lazy-minded, or tired out, or their whole attention is absorbed by the difficulties of everyday life" (p. 176)—that is, they are reduced to a biological level. This result of social developments is interpreted by the author as a biological law; for this reason it is natural that he should advocate "the bringing to heel" of the passive 90% "by dint of attention to their particular receptivity" (p. 128). This is what the Nazis did in Germany: according to *Chakotin*, Hitler's propaganda, which appealed to the instinct of struggle, was superior to the Social Democratic

propaganda, which appealed exclusively to the instinct of nutrition. Thus Hitler's triumph appears as the triumph of a propaganda that was not met by his own, "scientific" methods.

To corroborate this view the author produces "experimental" evidence: an anonymous report of a Socialist propaganda expert is quoted entire in chapter VII, from which we learn that "scientific" methods applied by the Social Democrats in one town produced excellent results. A more careful reading of the same report, however, shows that the crux of the matter was not propaganda, and that certain conditions are required before successful propaganda can even be applied. Attempts to spread the "scientific" methods to the whole of Germany failed because they were sabotaged by the leaders unwilling to accept the necessary corollary to the appeal to aggressive instincts: the actual readiness to risk and to fight. After July 20th 1932, we are told, "symbols were used; they had become official; but there was no enthusiasm, no spirit, no faith in the party slogans or in the ability of the party to put up a fight" (p. 243). It is clear that enthusiasm, courage and faith must come first—and even they are not sufficient, at least according to Chakotin, for on page 283 he tells us that "power is the first requisite," power for the democratic elements to safeguard the community. Thus, by the author's own admission, a minority seems unable to use the methods of propaganda he advocates, and his thesis is finally reduced to a pious wish that the "truly" democratic elements, once in power, should do their utmost in order to spread faith in human progress and the ideas of the true, the good and the beautiful. It is difficult to suppose that truly democratic elements could assume power without beginning the process of overcoming the present dispersal and isolation of the individual in the mass—and there is no doubt that once this stage is attained "violent methods of propaganda" based on biological urges will be obsolete. But even at our own stage no real insight into propaganda seems possible if it is detached from the social complex that defines its concrete content.

The inadequacies inherent in the purely technical approach to the problem of propaganda are clearly illustrated in *Edmond Taylor's* "Strategy of Terror"—an excellent first-hand document describing how French public opinion between 1938 and 1940 reacted to the continuous barrage of Nazi propaganda. At every stage of the process this propaganda reveals itself as a means of potential or actual warfare; the factor of communication is subordinated to the factor of force and in the end is entirely replaced by it. Exactitude or inexactitude of information play a minor role: instances are quoted to show that the German propagandists took care to deny false information they had previously issued themselves. "The Nazis," writes Taylor, "do not simply wage psychological warfare on a larger scale and more unscrupulously, but they coordinate their attacks in the way a good general coordinates all the arms in his command to attain precise objectives. Propagandists in the democratic countries still seem hypnotized by the conception of propaganda as a thing in itself, and do not see in true perspective its place in the strategy of total war" (p. 203). This true character of Nazi propaganda is misunderstood both by those who want to fight it by counter-propaganda and by those who think that a critical appraisal of the propagandists' utterances is a sufficient weapon. For in both cases propaganda is regarded as a form of communication, or persuasion by arguments; in fact it is persuasion by violence, or violence simulating persuasion. Those who are "persuaded"

by such methods are not really converts, they do not succumb to arguments; they merely adhere to the cause that, in their belief, is the winning one.

Like many others, Mr. Taylor is deeply disturbed by what he calls the fundamental problem of every democracy: "How can men be made to work together without thinking alike?" (p. 220). He fails to see that if this were really the problem, the solution would be simple: once people do work for a common purpose, they usually do think together—or when they do not it is more of an advantage than a drawback. What actually happened in the European democracies was that the governments tried to impose a unity of thought without first removing essential divisions of interest.

NORBERT GUTERMAN (New York).

Lazarsfeld, Paul F., *Radio and the Printed Page.* An Introduction to the Study of Radio and its Role in the Communication of Ideas. Duell, Sloan and Pearce. New York 1940. (XXII and 354 pp.; \$4.00)

This is by far the most competent, informative, and generally important study of the subject indicated in the title that has yet appeared. In addition to a wealth of new data gathered and analyzed by the Office of Radio Research (Columbia University), of which Dr. Lazarsfeld is the director, this study brings together and summarizes also the results of numerous other studies on the subject. The result is a research monograph of unusual interest both from the standpoint of methods employed and the results achieved.

The general justification for an inquiry of this sort has been well stated in the introduction: "The United States points with pride to its small and declining illiteracy rate. But at the same time science makes such rapid progress that the proportion of what a person does not know to what he knows is probably much greater nowadays than it was when very few knew how to write or to read. In fact, if literacy is defined as competence to understand the problems confronting us, there is ground for suggesting that we are becoming progressively illiterate today in handling life's options. And since it is no longer possible to make major decisions in local town meetings, the future of democracy depends upon whether we can find new ways for the formation and expression of public will without impairing our democratic form of government."

The importance of the radio and the newspaper as factors in the formation and expression of public opinion has, of course, been the subject of an extensive literature, largely of a speculative type. The present volume deals definitely with a variety of specific questions centering perhaps around the central theme of who listens to (or reads) what, and why. The answers are based on thousands of detailed interviews with people of all types throughout the country, as well as on other data drawn from the experience of advertising agencies, advertisers, broadcasting companies, and such organizations as the Book-of-the-Month Club.

A considerable portion of the book is devoted to the question of what cultural level of people listen to the different types of broadcasts and how this compares with newspaper reading habits. Briefly the findings show that "as we go down the cultural scale, there is more and more radio listening but less and less serious listening" (p. 43). For this reason, "the whole contention that *serious* broadcasts are so much more accessible than print is prob-

ably erroneous" (p. 44). Accordingly "the idea that radio is at this moment a tool for mass *education*, for considerably increasing *serious* responses in the community is groundless" (p. 48. *Italics mine*). The mass of evidence assembled (especially in Chapter 4) in support of this conclusion as well as the competence of the methods of inquiry leaves little escape from this and many other important findings.

It would be easy to fill many pages with interesting results of this exceptionally readable and informative monograph. Comparisons of the radio listening and newspaper reading habits of people by age, sex, education, economic condition, rural and urban residence, and illuminating cross-classifications and inter-relations of these and other factors provide a gold mine of information as to the type of public reached by different kinds of programs and materials. To present material of this kind in a style which will hold the interest of the general reader is itself somewhat of an achievement. Any appraisal of the implications of radio as a social influence will have to draw heavily upon this volume. It is to be hoped that the author and his able assistants will at some future time give us an equally illuminating analysis of the biases and discriminations which characterize the selection of programs and material of the "serious" broadcasts.

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG (Bennington College).

Hobson, Wilder, *American Jazz Music*. W. W. Norton & Company. New York 1939. (230 pp.; \$2.50)

Sargeant, Winthrop, *Jazz Hot and Hybrid*. Arrow Editions. New York 1938. (IX and 234 pp.; \$5.00)

Wilder Hobson's volume presents a survey of the history of jazz—or, more precisely, the "story" of it—intended for popular consumption. His point of departure is the thesis that jazz is a "language," not a mere agglomerate of tricks. The basis of this idea is not indicated in detail. The language of jazz is praised as being natural, original and spontaneous, without any attempt being made at an historical or pragmatic analysis of its elements. The notion of spontaneity is applied to the folk music features of jazz, particularly those taken from the musical store of the American Negro.

Hobson's folkloristic persuasion permits him to draw a sharp dichotomy between genuine jazz and the standardized mass article—current entertainment music is not covered in the plan of the book. However, the actual existence of a clear-cut distinction between spontaneous folk music and commercialized mass production is as problematic as it is alluring. Any attempt to abstract jazz from the features of commodity production inherent in it is prone to fall prey to that type of romanticism which is fostered by the music industry in order to increase its sales figures.

Hobson has not altogether escaped this danger. For him, the existence and success of jazz suffice to justify it, although with many reservations. The lack of critical perspective is responsible for the fact that in its latter part the book resolves itself more and more into a series of monographical sketches of the established band musicians, from Armstrong, Beiderbecke and Henderson to the heroes of swing. Incidentally, it is just these sketches which are somewhat vague. They do not contain any precise technical characterization

and are sometimes all too similar to the trade-marks under which today's bands are marketed.

Winthrop Sargeant's book has much more serious scientific intentions and is much more adequate to the subject matter. It offers very careful, minute descriptions of the technical peculiarities of jazz, especially its rhythm and melody. The penetrating analyses of the supposed jazz idiom yield the insight that jazz is far from a language. As a matter of fact, its superficial freedom and its improvisatory lack of restraint can be reduced to a few standardized formulas or "patterns": "Jazz, at its most complex, is still a very simple matter of incessantly repeated formulas" (Sargeant, p. 90). As early as 1905 and 1910 these formulas, particularly the rhythmical ones, were completely assembled in the ragtime-style—that ragtime style from which current opinion, shared by Hobson, is so eager to sever jazz. It may be concluded from Sargeant's book that there is as little fundamental difference between ragtime and jazz as between jazz and swing. What is called the development of syncopated popular music actually consists of presenting that which is always identical as something ever new. The styles commercially promoted at any given time are scarcely more than crude attempts to add a new glitter to shopworn material by changing its label and make-up.

Sargeant regards it as his main task to show the origins of jazz patterns in the forms of Negro folk music. This tendency seduces even him at times to overrate the improvisatory freedom of jazz production, although as soon as he carries through his technical analyses he becomes fully aware that it is not true freedom.

He regards it as the decisive difference between jazz and European art music that jazz is not molded according to the categories of "composing" and particularly of musical notation, but rather according to those of performance and immediate sound. This thesis is open to discussion. First, jazz improvisation is largely an interchangeable substitute for regular, fixed and written musical structures, and Sargeant as a musician knows this very well. The authority of the written music at any moment is still apparent behind the liberty of the performed music. Further, there are limits to the possibility of notating art music as well as folk music. A performance of a Beethoven quartet that conveyed exclusively what was prescribed in the music would not make sense. Finally, the art of rhythmical notation has been so far developed in advanced European art music, that these improvisations, which Sargeant regards as beyond the possibility of being written, fall strictly within the scope of notation. The idea that a solo chorus by Armstrong could not be written down, whereas a quartet by Webern could, is a somewhat shaky one to maintain—not to mention the difficulty of determining where and when improvisation still exists in actual jazz practice.

Both books avoid societal conclusions. Hobson consciously remains on the level of reportage, and Sargeant is understandably irritated by rubber-stamp phrases such as "jazz as the music of the machine age," or as "the stimulant of metropolitan vice" (cf. Sargeant, p. 9). He tries to escape beyond the boundary of such notions and to settle within the more secure borders of technological and ethnological scrutiny. Yet it is precisely the facts gathered here which almost force a societal interpretation.

With regard to the theoretical views represented by this periodical, especially in the matter of jazz and listening habits in the field of popular music, it may be appropriate to go into some of the details of both books.

First of all, it must be admitted that there is an undeniable connection between jazz and the folklore of the American Negro, although the commercialization of the concept of primitivity casts doubt on primitivity itself. Indeed, the interconnection is itself far from completely clear. Hobson says, "that there is a close connection between the Negro folk music and jazz is obvious; but it is not open to what might be called exact scholarship." (Hobson, p. 29.) One generally regards the Negro spirituals as a pre-form. However, there is at least a possibility that their melodies are of white origin and were merely transformed by the Negroes of the South (Sargeant, p. 25). There can be at best only negative proof of the Negro origin of jazz; the folk music of white Americans shows none of the characteristic elements of jazz (Sargeant, p. 103). On the other hand, even in the light of Sargeant's presentation, the results yielded by a comparison of American and African Negro music are so modest that an ethnological tracing of jazz is hardly feasible (Sargeant, p. 189f). Thus one is necessarily led to consider societal conditions. It may well be imagined that even the Negro spirituals which divert the impassioned outpourings of slaves and their grandchildren to Christian authority and subject them to this authority, reveal something societal. The pattern of pagan fetishism, Christian submissiveness and commodity-mindedness is clearly discernible in such scenes as the "evolution of a spiritual" described by Natalie Curtis-Burlin in her Hampton Collection of Negro Folk Songs (Sargeant, p. 19 f). The most decisive feature of today's current jazz, the fitting in of the break into the norm, can be spotted in the hymn singing of the South: "each singer would start off on a little vocal journey of his or her own, wandering up, down or around in strange pentatonic figures, but coming back at the appointed instant to common ground" (Hobson, p. 33—quotation from Abbe Niles' preface to W. C. Handy's Blues).

The Negro spirituals are vocal music; the apparent spontaneity of jazz is due largely to the transference of vocal particularities to instrumental media (Hobson, p. 31). Effects such as the laughing trumpet and the baby cry are vocalizations. They imitate inflections of the human voice in singing and speaking (Hobson, p. 43 f; Sargeant, p. 6). The instrumental music behaves as if it were vocal, the mechanism as if it had a voice of its own. Even in present-day swing, the pseudo-morphosis of speaking, singing and playing is highly significant. It has not escaped Hobson's attention (Hobson, p. 46). If there is a specific difference between jazz and ragtime, it lies within this pseudo-morphosis. Ragtime was exclusively instrumental, in fact, limited to the piano. Sargeant rightly defines the piano as the instrument of the ragtime epoch. The pseudo-vocalization of jazz corresponds to the elimination of the piano, the "private" middle-class instrument, in the era of the phonograph and radio.

The vocalization of instrumental sound means the introduction of certain irregularities into the realm of the instrumental. The characteristic "dirty tones" (Hobson, p. 45) and "worried notes" (Sargeant, p. 132) are effects of the deceptive "humanization" of the mechanism.

At this point the inadequacy of a merely descriptive method becomes obvious. Such a method cannot discover anything about the gratification associated with "dirty" and "worried" tones, which replace the normal tones and still allow them to be felt. This gratification is sadistic. It is the lust that the oppressed individual experiences when he mutilates the language in slang

and when he distorts the musical norm in jazz. This is his revenge for being subject to the objective media of communication without ever being allowed to command them himself. The false notes in jazz correspond socio-psychologically to the black teeth drawn by naughty pencils to deface the grinning beauties in subway advertisements. A two-fold protest is here, directed against the individual himself no less than against the trickery and the false promise of the object. The naughtiness is ready to submit to any punishment. The plaintiveness of its sound expresses the longing for such submission. The vocalization of the instrumental serves not only to produce the appearance of the human, it serves also to assimilate the voice into the realm of the instrumental: to make it, as it were, an appendage to the machine.

Hobson calls the "dirty tones," "sonorities suggestive of hoarse or harsh vocal effects." There is no historical doubt as to whose voice the hoarse one is: "the lost origins of these songs . . . were among 'barroom pianists, nomadic laborers, watchers of incoming trains and steamboats, streetcorner guitar players, strumpets, and outcasts'" (Hobson, p. 34). In this sphere of origins the more radical, unpolished jazz has its abode even now. Hobson says, ". . . its chief market was in big, lower-class dance halls, mostly Negro, where the dancers really meant business, and perhaps its only sizable 'respectable' market was at the more intoxicated college house parties of the Prohibition period" (Hobson, p. 131). Today's mass music stems from the *lumpenproletariat*, and it appears that it fulfills its promises only there, while it cheats the masses as soon as it holds them in its grip. Hence the reproach of pornography has been present from the very beginning and one might think sometimes that jazz invites it itself, masochistically aiming at its own liquidation. Simultaneously, the element of ill-repute assists commercial exploitation. It reflects, among other things, the prevailing social attitude toward the Negro and "in this connection it may be noted that despite the large number of brilliant Negro instrumentalists, there are none regularly engaged as radio 'house men' or in the motion picture studio orchestras. The inequality of opportunity for the negro is nowhere more clearly marked than in this field where he is often so specially talented" (Hobson, p. 172).

The tendency of jazz to satisfy the suppressed desires of the listeners by mutilating its own musical patterns reveals the aspect of jazz that once appeared to be modernistic. Jazz is prone to draw the supposedly noble—of which one knows oneself to be cheated—into the dirt; it tends to surrender altogether the magic language of music to the world of things, to permeate it with practical objects of all sorts which one scorns by denying them their actual function. This explains the intercommunication between jazz, certain cubistic manifestations and Dadaism. These intercommunications lie at hand in the *lumpenproletariat* atmosphere. "In the early years of the century Negro dance musicians played in the New Orleans bordellos, and the New Orleans City Guide states that the theatres and saloons of the city were ballyhooed by a white band, with a leader called Stale Bread (one of the players was known as Family Haircut), which improvised so-called 'spasm music' on such instruments as cigar-box violins, horns, pebble-filled gourds, and rude bass viols made out of half-casks" (Hobson, p. 38). But even from the West End of London comes an account of a jazz band of 1919 "consisting of piano, violin, two banjos, concertina, cornet, and . . . a 'utility man' playing traps, gongs, rattles, railway whistle, and motor hooter" (Hobson, p. 106). When jazz finally becomes tame these tendencies are softened into penchants for

artcraft; e. g., the use of picturesque percussion instruments which no longer have functional value within the music itself (see Sargeant, p. 198) and the preference for extra-musical objects falls into line with the general trend of debunking the dance. Hobson's explanation of this trend is well worth consideration: the will to make dancing easier for middle-aged people. "And if the ragtime two-steps or one-steps had been somewhat rapid for many of the middle-aged, that objection had been overcome in 1914 by the dance team of Jeanette Warner and Billy Kent, who had introduced the fox trot, the music for which, as Vernon Castle explained, was 'an ordinary rag half as fast as . . . the one-step'" (Hobson, p. 97). The triumph of the fox trot is the triumph of an apparently loose, irregular walking. This tendency is amalgamated with that towards vocalization. The "spoken" melody represents, as against the musical-symmetrical, the contingency of daily life. Sargeant says of the solo exhibitions of trumpet: "From the abstract musical point of view they are often chaotic, resembling recitative or even prose inflection. And the recitative and prose usually bear a close resemblance to Negro speech in their intonations" (Sargeant, p. 64). Music based upon the use of whiskey jugs as instruments tends toward prose (Hobson, p. 96).

That all these ambitions, however, stay within narrow limits, that they remain within the conventional and are themselves becoming conventionalized, is corroborated by Hobson as well as by Sargeant. The unremitting basic convention is the identical groundbeat: ". . . for those who enjoy jazz the beat has become a convention; the attention is naturally given to what the convention makes possible" (Hobson, p. 48). The excesses of jazz can be understood only in relation to the groundbeat. ". . . the polyrhythmic designs of a jazz band depend on the rocksteady maintenance of basic rhythmic suggestions on and around the 4-4 beat" (See Hobson, p. 52). Hobson raises the question of why the convention of the groundbeat is always observed. His answer is the common-sense one that it is difficult enough for most ears to understand improvisation within an established framework; without such a framework the listener would be altogether disorientated. In other words, the sacrifice of jazz liberty to convention springs from the postulate of easy understandability and therewith from the desiderata of the market. It is precisely at this point that the commodity character of jazz reveals itself as the very core of the whole *genre*. Moreover, the more the cross-rhythms are developed and the more the accents of the groundbeat are suspended, the more the cross-rhythms tend to become symmetrical in themselves as "pseudo-bars." They form a sort of second convention, a derivative, as it were, of the first one. The ground rhythm is projected obliquely upon the system of syncopation (see Hobson, p. 53). This regularization of improvisation is one of the main characteristics of swing and is evidently bound up with the total commercialization of improvising (Hobson, p. 87). Similar considerations lead Sargeant to formulations such as that about the pseudo-primitive orgies of juvenile jitterbugs (Sargeant, p. 5). Sargeant is prepared to be very skeptical about the spontaneity of improvisation in today's jazz: "Most of what is popularly known (even among swing fans) as 'hot jazz' belongs to this category of remembered and repeated, partially rehearsed, music" (Sargeant, p. 31).

The standardization of freedom has its technological as well as its societal aspects. Technologically it occurs as soon as the attempt is made to develop the cross-rhythms beyond their rudimentary single appearances. The ex-

pansion of the bands has an analogous effect. "... the more intricate the individual rhythms become, the fewer the players must be if the articulation of the whole is not to be lost, especially in jazz 'counterpoint,' where the players must be able to hear each other as they play" (Hobson, p. 71, cf. Sargeant, p. 200). However, the necessity to draw out the cross-rhythms as well as to expand the bands, is again prescribed by the market. "The natural music, as these men play it for their own pleasure, has a limited public market. Hence most of them make a living in the big business of popular dance music, all of which has been generally known as 'jazz,' and most of which, similarly, is rapidly coming to be known as 'swing'" (Hobson, p. 74). This desideratum of the market involves the predominance of the hit tune over the specific jazz treatment. "It is the popular tune which is important and this is stressed. As the pianist Arthur Schutt has said with some eloquence, in *Metronome*: 'By all means make the melody of any given song or tune predominant. . . . There is no misunderstanding when commercialism reigns supreme'" (Hobson, p. 85). In spite of his disregard of social influences, Hobson notes the following observation: "There is thus a constant pressure on the players to please the audience at the expense of relaxed invention—which they can practice at home, anyway. And under this pressure, also, the ensemble ease and sympathy are likely to disappear" (Hobson, p. 155). These are the very tendencies which are opposed by the swing "culture" of small, highly trained ensembles such as Benny Goodman's trio and quartet. The latter serve a small audience of expert, sportsmanlike enthusiasts who function as the vanguard and as propagandists among the majority of listeners. The rest of the music labeled as jazz belongs to that *juste milieu* visualized by Hobson as a product of commercial decay, by Sargeant as an inescapable and necessary "hybrid."

As far as the technique of composition is concerned, both books have certain contributions to make. Hobson calls the simultaneous improvisation of several instruments jazz counterpoint. However, he has insight into the deceptive character of this counterpoint: jazz knows genuine polyphony as little as it knows genuine melodic freedom and genuine polyrhythm. The so-called counterpoints merely circumscribe the basic harmony: "But many of the appalled have probably not understood that the basic harmonic progression, as it always is in jazz, is known to all the group improvisers. On this basis, each invents a melody guided by his own feeling and the sound of his fellows" (Hobson, p. 59). Sargeant draws the full implication of this discussion of the contrapuntal nature of jazz improvisation: "Jazz . . . is not essentially a contrapuntal type of music—not, at least, in the sense that that term applies to European music. The blues, and subsequent jazz, employed the conventional four-voiced polyphonic structure of European music only sporadically. This Negroid idiom involved a sustained melody moving over a throbbing rhythmic background. Melodic basses and sustained inner voices were not an essential part of blues, or of jazz, structure" (Sargeant, p. 196 f.).

He is no less critical of the so-called harmonic innovations. He knows that jazz harmony is borrowed from the European, particularly from the harmony of the impressionists. It is necessary to note here that American folk music, particularly the so-called hillbilly and cowboy songs of the whites, has crystallized certain harmonic formulas similar to those of the impressionists. They are characterized by the actual rejection of any har-

monic "progression" according to the steps of the key, and rather glide from dominant to dominant—a sort of folklorist *faux bourdon* effect. This is called "barber shop harmony" (See Sargeant, p. 168ff). It would be important for any theory of jazz to analyze the origin and significance of this harmony. It may be characterized by a general "lack of resistance," and has the tendency to let itself glide without positing definite harmonic relationships. In the barber shop chords the general submissiveness of jazz permeates its harmony as well.

Sargeant takes particular note of the melodic structure of jazz and its system of coordinates. He constructs a scale with blue notes at two points, neutral third and neutral seventh, respectively, with the possibility of alternating the big third with the small third and the big seventh with the small seventh (Cf. Sargeant, p. 134). This scale defines the norm of the dirty tones as opposed to the norm of occidental music. And it is in this scale that Sargeant sees the main Negro heritage of jazz. Of course, it applies more to jazz treatment than to the tunes subject to this treatment, the indifference and meanness of which are unequivocally stated by Sargeant.

As far as the *form* of jazz in its more specific sense is concerned, both authors concede the variation character of jazz. The variation form of jazz, however, leads nowhere to intrinsic motifical work, but to mere paraphrasing of the harmonic-melodic skeleton: "There has been almost no extended thematic writing, or contrapuntal writing, for jazz bands" (Hobson, p. 70). Sargeant speaks about a very simple type of variation form; ". . . considered as we consider 'musical form' in Western music, jazz has a rather elementary structure. The hot ensemble simply presents a theme, which may be improvised or taken from some popular melody, and proceeds to make a series of rhythmic and melodic variations on it. The harmonic structure of the theme is not altered in the variations. The formula is that usually expressed in theory books as A-A'-A''' etc.; in other words the simple theme-and-variation type of structure" (Sargeant, p. 211 f). It is obvious that such a mechanical attitude toward form from the very beginning contradicts the idea of improvisatory freedom. This should suffice to exclude any romanticization of jazz. Oddly enough, however, the most essential element of jazz form appears to have escaped the attention of both authors—namely, that its conventional form-attitude tends to suspend consciousness of form (in this respect again a parody of impressionism), tends, as it were, to spatialize music.

Jazz is governed by simultaneity. That is to say, the temporal sequence of events is not involved in the sense of the musical phenomena. In principle all the details of jazz are interchangeable in time and Sargeant observes quite rightly that any jazz piece could end at any given moment. This technique, hailed above all else as being rhythmical, is in reality neutral in regard to musical time. That is probably why virtuosi jazz musicians, such as Ellington and Basie, as far as possible avoid caesuras which might hint at any temporal articulation of form. In jazz one substitutes the immobility of an ever-identical movement for time.

Hobson defines jazz itself as "a more or less vocalized, personal instrumental expression whose melodic and harmonic, as well as percussive, elements move in stress-and-accent syncopation in subtle momentums which are the products of an instinct for suspended rhythm" (Hobson, p. 72). One cannot say that this definition leads very far. Certain hints as to the

origins of the word jazz are more fruitful. Probably it stems from the French still spoken in New Orleans and is derived from *jaser*, meaning to chat, babble. This would suggest the relation to the "melody of speech" as well as to the contingencies of everyday life. Or it can be related to an old term familiar in American minstrel shows, *jasbo*, "meaning antics guaranteed to bring applause" (Hobson, p. 94). This etymology calls to mind the element of trickery in jazz and the commercial interest present in its very origin. At any rate, in the beginning the word had a sexual meaning and appears to have come into common use among anti-jazz competitors who promoted it as an abusive term for the new fad in New Orleans. As early as 1914, however, the word functioned as an advertising slogan. "In 1914, when the jazz bands had their first, faddish success, the word jazz was immediately taken over for its novelty value by dance musicians whose playing had little or no relation to the natural music" (Hobson, p. 75).

Some light is thrown upon the earliest pre-history of jazz in Sargeant's chapter, "The Evolution of Jazz Rhythm in Popular Music." His examples date back as far as 1834. At that time there were popular ditties such as "Turkey in the Straw" and "Old Zip Coon" in characteristic cakewalk rhythm, which contain in a rudimentary form the jazz idea of the pseudo-bar (Two-fourths becoming $3/16$ plus $3/16$ plus $2/16$). The relation of jazz to military band music is mentioned only occasionally. During the first World War numerous American military bands which went to France had their jazz ensembles with them (Sargeant, p. 105). Sargeant recalls the role of the saxophone in the military band and the use of military marches as two-steps. "Military marches often did duty as two-steps during the later decades of the nineteenth century" (Sargeant, p. 195).

For the inevitable concept of *swing*, Hobson cites the following definition: "a band swings when its collective improvisation is rhythmically integrated" (Hobson, p. 16). This definition is problematic in every respect, because of the over-emphasis laid upon the improvisatory elements as well as upon the simultaneity of different improvisations. Later Hobson conceives of swing as a counter-tendency against commercialization, more or less in the same sense in which the small highly syncopated ensembles withdrew themselves from the broad stream of musical mass consumption. But even this does not suffice as a definition, because, as events have shown, the commodity character of popular music at once gets a hold on the specialized artcraft for which swing stands. "The word 'swing' has become completely ambiguous. In some quarters 'swing' even seems to be regarded as if it were some sort of standardized commodity, such as the new-model Buicks, which could be judged from any given sample" (Hobson, p. 84). Finally, Hobson appears to incline toward the opinion that swing must be regarded as a mixture of jazz tricks and current hit music. "The 'swing' fad, which still continues as this is written, has largely been built on the commercially salable mixture of a certain amount of jazz playing and a great many of those compromise, popular melody-and-jazz orchestrations referred to in the chapter on commercial and concert jazz" (Hobson, p. 152).

Sargeant's results fundamentally agree with those of Hobson: swing is a counter-movement against the standardization of jazz, which quickly falls victim itself to this standardization. "The swing fad has, of course, been a reaction against the studied product of the large ensembles, and toward the primitive art of Negroid improvisation. Like most fads it too has

become sophisticated and conventionalized. As this book goes to press the term 'swing' is being universally applied to a ubiquitous variety of noise in which real improvisation has about as much place as it has in a logarithmic table" (Sargeant, p. 201).

There remains only the question of whether standardization is actually an injustice done to swing, or whether the supposed counter-movement against standardization itself inherently implies standardization. Sargeant's analysis of the patterns of improvisation heightens such a suspicion.

The counter-concept of swing, *sweet*, is not much more lucid. Sargeant summarizes as follows: "Small differences aside, then, we have distinguished for our present purposes two general types of jazz both of which represent types of performance rather than types of composition. They are 'hot' jazz and 'sweet' or sophisticated jazz. The former is more purely Negroid, more purely improvisatory, and comparatively independent of composed 'tunes.' The latter is the dance and amusement music of the American people as a whole. The tunes on which it is based issue from Tin Pan Alley, the centre of the popular song-publishing industry. These tunes are, some of them, purely Anglo-Celtic or Central European in character, some of them pseudo-Negroid" (Sargeant, p. 235 f). If this is correct, there ranges under the category of sweet the great mass of entertainment music that uses jazz elements but does not indulge in more complicated rhythmical formulas or appeal to expert listeners. Apparently the historical tendency is toward this type in spite of the manipulated swing fad. The once aggressive has become harmless. "Sweet' commercial jazz today is different in many respects from the ragtime of 1910. It is orchestral where ragtime was jerky and boisterous. Its melodies are vocal, based on tunes that are originally created as songs. Its composers and, what is more important, its arrangers, are likely to be eclectic in their choice of musical material. Its harmonic and orchestral effects are often borrowed from the romantic and impressionistic composers of Europe. Its general character is more romantic and sentimental, less primitive, than that of ragtime" (Sargeant, p. 117). It must be noted that sophisticated here means not rhythmically refined, but, rather, "polished" and "civilized" and therefore even more primitive, in its more strict technical sense.

The connection between jazz and the eccentric clown is conspicuously neglected, although discussions about tap dancing lead to the very threshold of this relationship. Yet there is no lack of material, particularly from the earlier period of jazz: "Within a few months after the Dixieland arrived in New York, the word jazz merely meant any rackets, acrobatic dance music" (Hobson, p. 76). A patriarch of jazz, Ted Lewis, is described as an eccentric. "Lewis at his best was a sort of loony apotheosis of the ragtime spirit, strutting, twirling a baton, offering burlesque histrionics with a dancer's sense of pace and posture" (Hobson, p. 81). What is actually of the utmost interest is that Hobson associates the element of the eccentric with that of the castrated. He quotes a passage from Virgil Thompson, who describes Armstrong, the eccentric trumpet player par excellence, as a master of musical art comparable only "... to the great castrati of the eighteenth century" (Hobson, p. 121). A description of the band of Mike Riley identifies eccentricities as acts of mutilation committed against the instruments: "The band squirted water and tore clothes, and Riley offered perhaps the greatest of trombone comedy acts, an insane rendition of Dinah during

which he repeatedly dismembered the horn and reassembled it erratically until the tubing hung down like brass furnishings in a junk shop, with a vaguely harmonic honk still sounding from one or more of the loose ends" (Hobson, p. 161). Against the background of such acts the theory of the "jazz subject" developed by the reviewer might appear less lofty.

If the eccentric features of jazz are somewhat neglected, the representative of the eccentric in the technique of composition—the *syncope* in its relation to the basic rhythm—is focussed the more sharply. Hobson takes only the first step in the direction of a theory of syncope. "For those who like psychoanalytic suggestions, it might be said that the ragtime public enjoyed being moved out of the rut of the established beat" (Hobson, p. 26). For it is decisive against this supposition that the established beat is re-established constantly and even that it remains effective during the syncopation as the inherent measure of the latter. Hobson feels a legitimate suspicion against this measure, which, however, he attributes somewhat maliciously to the "modernists" instead of making it his own case: "The ultra-modernists in composition go so far as to pronounce taboo upon rhythm, and even omit the perpendicular lines on their bars of written music, so that the risk of a monotonous pulsation is done away with" (Hobson, p. 107 f). Here the insight into the merely pseudo-modern character of jazz, its false freedom, the uniformity of its supposedly multifold rhythm lie at hand.

Sargeant's analyses lead more profoundly to a theory of syncope. To be sure, the two basic types he enumerates, namely simple syncopation and the formation of pseudo-bars, are not ultimately distinct from each other, because, according to Sargeant's own explanation, even the simplest syncopation contains within itself elementary pseudo-bars. However, his interpretation of the syncope as a mere substitution of the down beat, is all the more important. It localizes the fictitious character of jazz in the very center of the technical procedure. "A syncopation often gives the impression of anticipating a normal beat, as the ear tends to expect a normal one, and accepts the appearance of the abnormal one as its hurried or advanced representative" (Sargeant, p. 38). The syncopation is a living "as if." The substitution theory gives significance to Sargeant's interpretation of the "umpateedle" rhythm (Sargeant, p. 54). The punctuation reinforces the effect of the down beat and thus indirectly the effect of the syncope contrasting the groundbeat. The law of syncopation, as formulated by Sargeant, actually conceives of the syncope as a function of the strength of the very groundbeat with which it does *not* coincide. The power of the break is, as it were, drawn from the power of the convention itself. "A syncopation, or syncopative accent, is striking in direct proportion to the weakness of the metric beat on which it enters. Hence the effect, through 'umpateedle,' has been intensified" (Sargeant, p. 55).

Further, it is a new discovery that the relation between groundbeat and syncope has to be understood as involving an historical process. The groundbeats have defended themselves against the submissive scorn of the syncope as well as they could. But the driving force of the malicious trick proved to be stronger: "Even in the rags of the early nineteen hundreds a certain reluctance to override these beats with syncopation and polyrhythmic cycles persisted. The prim, four-square structure of the old reels and horn-

pipes, put up a valiant defense against the new influence. But the development of polyrhythmic freedom was not to be denied indefinitely, even though the Anglo-Celtic tradition and the structural peculiarities of the European notational system were pitted against it. By the turn of the century the besieged strong beats began to yield here and there" (Sargeant, p. 108).

Sargeant's final theory of the syncope largely coincides with that of the reviewer. "The interruption of rhythmic regularity produces a feeling of unrest. The listener's rhythmic faculties are thrown off balance, and he gropes instinctively for a re-orientation. His groping is attended by a certain sense of stimulation or excitement. A resumption of regularity is greeted with a feeling of relief" (Sargeant, p. 203). He aptly describes the syncope as "rhythmic discord longing for its solution." The ritual of revelation by which the "jazz subject" becomes aware of its identity with the social power of the groundbeat to which it believed itself opposed, is thus identified by Sargeant: "The listener is thrown for the moment on unmapped and confusing ground. The basic rhythm ceases to offer its familiar thumping landmarks. The solo dangles dizzily without support, and then, just as the listener has about abandoned hope of re-orienting himself, the fundamental rhythm resumes its orderly sway, and a feeling of relief ensues" (Sargeant, p. 205).

At this point Sargeant becomes aware of the illusory character of the whole process: "In this process the fundamental rhythm is not really destroyed. The perceptive listener holds in his mind a continuation of its regular pulse even though the orchestra has stopped marking it. And when the orchestra resumes its rhythmic function, it continues the series of mentally sustained pulses, its entrance coinciding precisely with one of them. The situation during the silent pulses is one that challenges the listener to hold his bearings. If he has any sort of rhythmic sense he will not be content to lose himself. If he does not feel the challenge, or is perfectly content to lose himself, then he is one of those who will never understand the appeal of jazz" (Sargeant, p. 206; cf. Hobson, p. 49). To comprehend this appeal of jazz means only to be ready to find the gesture of freedom while actually there is no freedom. The achievement of the expert listener is limited to his not being confused by any subjective temptation while obeying the rhythmical law.

Sargeant correctly compares the kind of integration achieved by jazz with the happy ending of the moving picture. Whereas everyone knows the ideological role of the ending of a film, Sargeant for the first time brings the same phenomenon to the fore in the field of musical mass communication. Jazz is "a 'get together' art for 'regular fellows.' In fact it emphasizes their very 'regularity' by submerging individual consciousness in a sort of mass self-hypnotism. . . . In the social dimension of jazz, the individual will submit, and men become not only equal but virtually indistinguishable" (Sargeant, p. 217). This is an astonishing statement from a musician who does not intend to raise any sociological questions. The link between the societal and the aesthetic process, however, is the technique of mechanical reproduction. Jazz and the radio match each other as if they were patterned in the same mold. One might almost say that jazz is the sort of music which in its life performance already appears as if it were trans-

mitted by radio. Sargeant grasps even this relation: "already the flexible idiom of jazz has found a strong foothold in the technologically changed situation" (Sargeant, p. 222).

T. W. ADORNO (New York),
with the assistance of EUNICE COOPER.

Abbott, Wilbur Cortez, ed., *Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell.* Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass. 1937, 1939. Vol. I: 1599-1649. (759 pp.; \$5.00) Vol. II: 1649-1653 (806 pp.; \$5.00)

Petegorsky, David W., *Left-Wing Democracy in the English Civil War.* A Study of the Social Philosophy of Gerrard Winstanley. Victor Gollancz. London 1940. (254 pp.; 7s. 6d.)

Professor Abbott's edition of *Cromwell's Writings and Speeches* gives us far more than the title indicates. It is, in fact, a comprehensive biography of Cromwell and his times, interspersed with Cromwell's utterances, verbal or written. The task which Professor Abbott has performed is stupendous. The quality of the edition is outstanding and its value for the final elucidation of this period, so decisive for European and American history, can hardly be overrated. The first volume covers the years 1599 to 1649, that is, Cromwell's early life and the civil war until the king's death. The important sections of this volume are primarily those dealing with Cromwell's early parliamentary activities. Professor Abbott's interpretation and the documents which he reproduces make it clear that Cromwell's chief concerns during that period were religious problems. I also consider of high value the chapters dealing with Cromwell's activities as Lieutenant General.

The second volume, comprising the years from 1649 to 1653, reaches from the beginning of the Commonwealth to the dissolution of Parliament. This volume also contains an excellent index to the first two volumes, indispensable in a book of this kind. The wealth of information contained in volume two is so overwhelming that, in a short review like this, it is impossible to select any problem for discussion. The very detailed analysis of the military campaigns is perhaps not so important as the documentation of Cromwell's emergence as a dictator. In order fully to evaluate the relation between democracy and the dictatorship, we shall have to wait for the remaining two volumes. That connection is of paramount importance not only for the study of the puritan revolution but for that of the French revolution and even of National Socialism.

Professor Abbott's historiography keeps well within the great tradition of Gardiner and Firth. The method has definite advantages in that it allows us to learn the political, religious, and military movements. Yet it has its drawbacks in that it neglects to put the religious and political struggles in the framework of the great social movements which tore English society asunder during the civil war. We would be able fully to understand the significance of the profound political transformation during that period only if we possessed an economic history of the civil war of the same precision and wealth of information as that contained in the writings of Gardiner, Firth and Abbott. Some preparatory work has been done by the two German socialists, Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky. Their work, however, though very stimulating, does in no way fulfill the condition of an economic history.

Professor R. H. Tawney has promised us in the not too distant future an economic history of the puritan revolution.

Mr. Petegorsky's book is an important contribution to a very much neglected aspect of the puritan revolution, the digger-movement and its leader Gerrard Winstanley. The author, a Canadian who now teaches at Antioch College, has written this book as a Ph.D. thesis at the University of London and under the supervision of Harold Laski. The influence of Laski and of R. H. Tawney is clearly discernible in the fact that the political theories are throughout interpreted in terms of the class antagonisms of English society. The book is well written and very well documented. The author profoundly disagrees with the only existing analysis of Winstanley's thought, Lewis H. Berens' book, *The Digger Movement* (London 1906). He distinguishes five stages in the development of Winstanley's political and social theory: a mystical period (Summer 1648), the theological tracts of 1648, the transition to secular revolutionary thought (1649), the tracts written during the digger experiment, and finally the Law of Freedom in which an elaborate plan of English society based on common ownership is drawn up. The author thus definitely asserts a break within Winstanley's thought, a development away from mystical and religious thought to a purely secular theory, although the latter is clothed in a deistic philosophy. Winstanley aims at securing individual freedom through social equality, that is, through common ownership of the land. The author admits, a little reluctantly, a reversal of Winstanley's revolutionary position in the fifth stage, during which he developed his utopia. Whereas, previously, Winstanley had appealed to the poorest and most exploited classes in society for revolutionary uprising and for the destruction of the traditional forms of society, in his Law of Freedom his trust in the people seems to be badly shaken. It is replaced by an appeal to Cromwell to carry out the changes which Winstanley advocated. Winstanley's proposals show, indeed, a considerable insight into the class-structure of 17th century England, an insight which no English writer of that period, with the exception of Hobbes and Harrington, possessed. Both Levellers and Diggers gave to the common people a vision of a better world. However, their influence had no long duration. English society was certainly not ripe for such revolutionary transition. In consequence, the role of these rational movements was soon taken over by irrational, chiliastic outbursts, like the Fifth Monarchy Men.

In his conclusions, the author follows the development of socialist thought from Abbe Meslier to Babeuf. This short survey indicates the value of this book which is thus a challenging and even daring interpretation of the English civil war. The rich documentation from the British Museum, the MacAlpin and the Seligman collections makes the analysis extremely convincing. Happily enough, Professor George Sabine of Cornell will shortly publish a collection of Winstanley's political tracts so that one will be easily able to verify or to reject Mr. Petegorsky's interpretation.

FRANZ L. NEUMANN (New York).

Cole, Charles W., *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism*. 2 vol. Columbia University Press. New York 1939. (XII, 532, 675 pp.; \$10.00)

Of French economic history in the seventeenth century we already possess the thorough presentations of Boissonnade, Levasseur, Sée, and others, while

the general problem of Mercantilism has been extremely well handled by Heckscher. In spite of this, the author of the two volumes under review has been able to bring rich material and new viewpoints to light. Particularly the colonial problem (as we would call it today) and industrial policy are here for the first time treated in their most minute detail. As regards labor policy, the author correctly stresses the mixture of economic and ecclesiastic motives for the formation of the "hopitaux generaux," although it would perhaps have lain within the framework of the task he set himself to investigate more thoroughly the question of how far these "hopitaux generaux" contributed or aimed to contribute to the introduction of new labor processes. The widening of the gulf between workers and those who owned the means of production is correctly expounded as one of the consequences of Colbert's economic policies. It is regrettable that Cole has not given the same extensive treatment to Colbert's financial policies, about which he states in the first volume (p. 301) that of all Colbert's policies they were of foremost interest to Louis XIV. Such a treatment would of course have had to include the conflict which has been well known ever since Richelieu wrote his political testament,—that between the crown, the financiers, and the noblesse de robe, and would certainly have enriched with new problems and perhaps also with new answers the author's judgment of Colbert's mercantilism which is somewhat colorless when compared to the minuteness of detail in the work proper.

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER (New York).

Brogan, D. W., *France. The Development of Modern France. 1870-1933.* Harpers. New York 1940. (744 pp.; \$5.00)

The predominant place which political history occupied in the 19th century it lost in the 20th;—economic, social and cultural history crept in and the history of political institutions and constitutional history absorbed most of the material usually put forward in political history proper. The results of this division of labor, while inevitable, were not always satisfactory.

Deslandres' recent work on French constitutional history, for example, is an inexhaustible mine of material, but falls short of providing a satisfactory description of dominant political forces and their modes of action. Where the professionals had to direct their attention into special fields, belles lettres and lawyers replaced them, sometimes not without considerable success, as in the case of Bainville, Benda and Zevaes, but without being able, however, to treat the subject with the completeness and thoroughness it merits.

Brogan too writes political history proper. His book is written for a wider public and has no scientific apparatus of annotations, yet it treats the history of modern France both brilliantly and exhaustively, and there is no statement in the book which does not indicate wide knowledge as well as deep insight into the problems of this period.

He has drawn heavily on the peculiar mixture always present in the structure of the French mind, a mixture of a deeply satiated love of western culture and an incessant scepticism of contemporary institutions. From this his description derives its peculiar charm and pervasive wit. Who, for instance, would not admire his two word description of the impact the Panama affair had on the French peasant's mind: "never confess."

Never have the French developments of the last decades been narrated with such a minimum of partisanship, nor have events and personalities ever been presented with such photographic fidelity.

If criticism of such a chef-d'œuvre is at all called for it would have to question the adequacy of the photographic method itself. The book is a splendid sequence of narratives, rather than an analysis which would enable us to pick from the multiplicity of factors apparent in recent French history the dominating ones.

The survival of old-fashioned merchant capitalism, which distinguishes France so sharply from its Eastern neighbor, seems to be significant as a more general explanation of the French political scene with its well institutionalized graft, at least up to the first world war. Yet even for this period, a closer analysis of the problems facing French agriculture and of the cleavages between different categories of landowners would have been instructive. What we specially miss is an explanation of how and to what extent this merchant and finance capitalism put its imprint on a largely agricultural society—after having once disposed of the dangers inherent in the Paris Commune. The history of *causes célèbres* gives some working samples and some glimpses into, but no analysis of this process. And when our author truly describes the divergent position taken by Jaurès and Guesde in the Dreyfus affair, he omits to ask himself to what extent Guesde's scale of evaluating historical events had peculiar merits for a historical analysis. He rather takes the dramatic highlights, in which French political history is so rich, as a compass, and if he does not always follow traditional interpretations, he at least accepts the place and the weight usually ascribed to such events.

Large scale industrial capitalism made rapid advances, perhaps somewhat more rapid than the author was willing to admit, in the postwar years, and consequently the left wing political victories became much more difficult to reconcile with the economic power structure. Transfer of the ashes of republican heroes to the Pantheon wouldn't effect a reconciliation any more—even if they were the ashes of Jean Jaurès. It is doubtful whether even people better versed in financial matters than Herriot—our author follows in his evaluation the path of the perhaps not altogether unbiased judgment of the Governor of the Banque de France in 1924—could reconcile the glowing disparities of the progressive politics and conservative economics of the French system.

During the last period, the thirties, these contradictions lay quite in the open and are symbolized in the struggle around the Banque de France.

The photographic method of historical writing focusses its attention on the description of momentaneous situations dealing with the actions of social groups when and insofar as they come into the limelight of history. Brilliant and illuminating as the description appears in Brogan's case, it stimulates our desire still more to get down to a closer analysis of the main social forces, their attitudes and role, which would allow us to explain with a reasonable degree of accuracy the inner history of the French tragedy.

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER (New York).

Schumpeter, Josef A., *Business Cycles*. A theoretical, historical and statistical analysis of the capitalist process. 2 vol. McGraw-Hill Book Company. New York 1939. (1050 pp.; \$10.00)

Schumpeter's new book is an inexhaustible source of information on the economic facts and theories relevant to business cycles, and as such it is a meritorious work, certainly above the average. He is no newcomer to the

realm of theory; his present work must therefore be judged in the light of his previous theoretical studies.

Schumpeter is an adherent of the subjective theory of value, even though his first book, "The Nature and Content of Economic Theories" (1908), did not show in detail how a science of economics would be built on subjective valuations. Psychic data are intensive magnitudes and hardly appropriate to serve as primary cells of an exact scientific structure, and Schumpeter in that earliest work emphatically refused to explain economics through an analysis of the psyche and the motives of economic activity (p. 77). He preferred to build an "exact discipline of human economy" (*ibid.* p. 117), a mathematical-functional theory, on the basis of objectively existing market phenomena, the objective relations of exchange. He sought to formulate "pure" economics "in a way similar to that in which mechanics describes motions" (*ibid.* p. 128), and to show that "it is possible to conceive it exactly and indisputably and that scientific correctness in the physicist's sense is not unattainable in our domain too" (*ibid.* p. 131).

This exact basis of exchange relations could, according to him, be expressed in a "girdle of equations" (*ibid.* p. 132) that would describe the problem of equilibrium at the center of statics (*ibid.* p. 118). Schumpeter realized that "statics" was nothing but a theoretical fiction. The reality was to be treated in the next book, "The Theory of Economic Evolution" (1912, second edition 1926). The book, however, turned out to be but a temporary and preliminary sketch, the elaboration of which has come only with the present book. Here Schumpeter has moved still further from the Austrian School, and especially from the conception that the consumer—man and his needs—is the initial factor in the study of economic phenomena and that the direction of the productive process and its changes are nothing but a reaction to the changes in the demand. "Railroads have not emerged because any consumers took the initiative in displaying an effective demand for their service in preference to the services of mail coaches. Nor did the consumers display any such initiative,—wish to have electric lamps or rayon stockings, or to travel by motor car or airplane, or to listen to radios or to chew gum. There is obviously no lack of realism in the proposition that the great majority of changes in commodities consumed has been forced by producers on consumers who, more often than not, have resisted the change and have had to be educated up by elaborate psychotechnics of advertising." (*Business Cycles*, p. 73.)

If this is true, however, the whole subjective theory of value is done away with. For the value of the productive factors is not and cannot be deduced from the value of the final product given as the degree of satisfaction of the demand. The relation between the final product and the productive factor is reversed and the basis of the prevalent doctrine is thus abandoned. Since Schumpeter does not present a new theory of economic phenomena, what he offers here is not a general theory attempting a causal explanation, but at best a partial theory of a special domain. All it aims to be is a positivistic description of the phenomena, in an "exact" mathematical disguise, nothing but a protocol statement: "it is thus and so."

But the book just published is remarkable for still another reason. The Schumpeter of 1908 planned to construct an "exact" mathematico-functional theory of exchange relations and he owes his renown as a theoretician to precisely that intention; the Schumpeter of 1912 did not apply this principle

to dynamics, but broke with his previous method. He did not succeed in passing from statics to dynamics while maintaining his "exact" conception of exchange relations. The strict method of statics proved inapplicable to dynamic problems. For that reason Schumpeter took refuge, in his second work, in the method which he had previously deprecated as "motivative" and "psychological." The promises of the first book were not fulfilled. The dynamic forces were not conceived "exactly," in terms of exchange relations or "a girdle of equations," but were deduced from the capitalist's psyche, from his constant urge for innovations: his "joy of forms," his "daring because of his very difficulties," his "will to victory" in the "financial boxing match," in brief, from "economic activity considered as a sport." (*Theory of Economic Evolution*, p. 138 et seq.) Thus, Schumpeter's scientific fame as an exponent of "exact" economic science was founded not on the accomplishments of his second book, but on the unfulfilled promises of his first.

The Schumpeter of 1939 revolutionizes his methodological foundations for the third time: the motive force of all economic changes is no longer to be found in exact exchange relations nor in the capitalist's heroic personality, but in his banal, prosaic quest for profits, already stressed so much by Ricardo and later by Marx: the only thing that counts is the magnitude of profit and its changes. The capitalist no longer functions as the original dynamic force which spontaneously works changes. His activity is itself merely a result and he himself a mere stopping point in the automatic workings of the entire mechanism, aiming to restore a vanished rentability. Methodologically it is interesting that through this inner tendency toward accumulation, and excluding all external influence, Schumpeter tries to explain both the expansion and the depression that follows. He rejects the opinion that the impulse towards the change and expansion of the economic mechanism, originally conceived as static, comes from the consumer and the change in his needs.

The author has many intelligent things to say here (pp. 76-77) about differences between saving, not spending, accumulation, investment, and real investment; his exposition is often more correct and clearer than, for example, similar passages in J. M. Keynes. He attempts a conceptual analysis of dynamic reality, choosing the methodological procedure, customary since J. S. Mill, which begins with a stationary, constantly reproduced system excluding all external disturbing influences. Then, the path to reality is sought by successive approximations. Schumpeter is interested above all in the real source of the dynamic changes, the "prime mover in the process of internal economic change" (p. 72). The stationary system is so defined that there are no savings in it, and therefore no loans either; the rate of interest is thus equal to zero; lastly, there are no profits. Into this stationary phase the factor of savings is first introduced and the factor of accumulation, then inventions; the influence of each of these elements on the course of the process of reproduction is then examined.

As his first approximation, Schumpeter thus takes for his point of departure "a society, stationary in every respect except in that it displays a positive rate of saving." The productive functions follow the same course year after year; there are no external disturbances. The only form of investment opportunity that exists is that of loans to enterprises. Thus, credit exists only in the form of credit for productive ends. The only source of this credit and of the monetary capital offered for it is real savings. The

creation of credit is thus excluded. It is true that credit expansion through the creation of credit is one of the chief sources of enterprising activity and therewith of the secondary wave of industrial and speculative activities, but Schumpeter is here endeavoring to reveal only the primary sources of cyclical motions, and the creation of credit must remain excluded. Within this pattern the means of payment is real gold passing from hand to hand in each transaction (p. 79). A state of competitive equilibrium exists at the beginning and Schumpeter's schematic model is intended exclusively, *ceteris paribus*, to show the effects of the factor of saving and of investment, and in particular to clarify the question whether savings as such can cause depression.

It is true that an influx of new savings offered to the enterprises would result in a constant expansion of the industrial apparatus through the constant addition of new plants or new machines. But as long as these machines and plants would be of the same type as the ones previously used, under the assumption of an unvarying technical and organizational set-up, this growth in the industrial apparatus would be accomplished in a relative equilibrium. True, this equilibrium would constantly be disturbed by the influx of new capital savings. But granted a given rate of savings the economic mechanism would continuously "adapt" itself to this rate, i.e. would continuously absorb the disturbances. As a result of the savings, the rate of interest would necessarily drop, and therefore new investment opportunities would arise, opportunities which had not existed at the previous, higher rate of interest. On the other hand, the enlarged productive apparatus would "certainly" find new buyers of merchandise,—because every saving, just as it creates its own investment opportunities, also creates its own demand for the additional products manufactured in the new plants.

The proof of this wonderful harmonic development, however, is the author's bare assertion of it. The matter treated is eminently quantitative: the additional workers receive additional wages and additional purchasing power, and the new plants produce an added mass of commodities for the market. The problem consists in finding out whether the additional mass of values and the additional purchasing power can coincide. Here is a brilliant occasion for showing in an "exact" mathematical manner, by means of a "girdle of equations," how such an equilibrium could arise from the disequilibrium admitted by Schumpeter, how the consumer's social purchasing power each time just suffices to dispose of the increased mass of products thrown on the market by the producers. Instead of a proof, however, Schumpeter is content with a mere statement that the system has "adapted" itself to the new savings rate; but he says nothing about how this "adaptation" takes place, simply assuring us, "the new producers' commodities are sure to find their buyers" (p. 79).

With a method such as this all the problems in the world could be solved on paper. Schumpeter has arrived at the old harmonistic theory of Investments and "Débouchés" of Ricardo and J. B. Say without supporting it by any new argument or weakening the 150 year old critique of it.

So far, we have not taken into account the internal contradictions of Schumpeter's construction. It starts with the equilibrium and assumes an increase of production in a society which otherwise is "in every respect stationary"; in particular it presupposes "that production functions are invariant," that is, that the technical-organizational basis remains unchanged,

or, in other words, that "the same types of plants and machinery" are used as before (p. 79).

It is evident that these presuppositions are contradictory. We begin with a state of equilibrium in a stationary society wherein all the means of production and all the workers are occupied. If we assume an invariant technical-organizational basis, the additional plants and machines can be put into motion only by an additional number of workers. But in Schumpeter's stationary model the population, too, is stationary, for he counts the "variations in population among external factors" (p. 74), which are excluded from his stationary model (p. 79). Clearly no increase of production is possible in this model at all. In the second place Schumpeter assumes that in passing from the stationary phase to that involving increased production, the producers of consumers' goods suffer no losses. Every producer therefore will at all times be ready to absorb additional capital for an increase of production: "this process can go on indefinitely" (p. 80), so long as the rate of interest has not fallen to zero. This is again an unproved assertion, which is clearly false because every rearrangement of the stationary economy in the direction of increasing production necessarily restricts the production of consumers' goods and therefore also causes losses to the owners of the enterprises concerned.

But Schumpeter holds that even in the latter case no disturbance would ensue and the prices of consumers' goods would not fall. Accepting the famous Tugan-Baranovski merry-go-round which forty years ago was demonstrated as theoretically untenable, he believes that the equilibrium would be reestablished because the increased production of production goods would take the place of the restricted production of consumers' goods. "The demand from the increased incomes in the machine industries steps into the place of the demand discontinued by savers," he says (p. 82). Thus, when there is a displacement of the demand for consumers' goods, the total amount of consumption does not have to fall. And even if one is willing to grant—for the sake of the argument—that the asserted displacements actually take place, one finds that Schumpeter has not attempted to investigate the quantitative problem of the demand for substitutes and of the time factor, and that he has not tried to show that the missing consumption of one consumer group can be replaced in the same unit of time by the new demand of another group; also that the new demand, originating in the machine industry, is quantitatively equal to the previous demand in the consumers' goods industry. Yet, it is known (only, Schumpeter does not take this into account) that machine industry occupies considerably fewer workers (the total amount of investments being the same) and therefore also creates less demand for consumers' goods than does the consumers' goods industry.

Since the savings process is not a single act, but continuous, the need for rearranging industry and increasing the production of means of production would not be a single act—this according to Schumpeter's own presuppositions—but would provoke a wave of successive rearrangements; in short, it would constitute a permanent disturbance.

Schumpeter solves all these theoretical difficulties with a word, "adaptation." He never describes the process of adaptation. The desired result of it—the equilibrium—is introduced as a *deus ex machina*. If this "adaptation" takes place, the system functions "satisfactorily," and we are in "equilibrium."

The latter concept plays a fatal role in the whole exposition. At first, equilibrium is a sort of system of reference which enables us to measure how far removed the real system, afflicted with chronic disequilibrium, is from an ideal point of reference (p. 69). Schumpeter, however, does not stick to this ideal "theoretical norm," but assumes a really existing tendency toward equilibrium (p. 70), to which he ascribes great diagnostic significance, though the equilibrium itself is never reached: "the system approaches a state which would—if reached—fulfill equilibrium conditions" (p. 71). The mode of argumentation runs somewhat as follows: if we had to deal not with our reality, but with an imaginary world, then the conditions of equilibrium would easily be achieved! Schumpeter carries this unrealistic conception so far that he speaks of the constantly growing significance of the concept of equilibrium for economic theory! Here, too, Schumpeter is a victim of self-delusion. For more than 150 years—from the physiocrats, Smith and Ricardo, to Walras, Marshall and Pareto—the concept of equilibrium lay at the basis of all economic theories. The result was that everyone spoke of the failure of economic theory, because it progressively lost all relation to reality and was no longer able to explain it. This sad state finally brought about a reaction; a theoretical opposition against the concept of equilibrium recently arose, an opposition which regarded the concept not only as superfluous but even as harmful and responsible for the retarded development of economic theory as such. Schumpeter has not considered this development in economic theory but continues to represent old, untenable views.

We do not want, however, to dwell any further on these important, though merely preliminary arguments. We shall now examine his main theory: the concept of business cycles. In contrast to the previously considered model of a stationary economy, this theory treats the problem of change as such: "How the economic system generates evolution." Here, too,—for the sake of argument—the author starts from a stationary economy without savings and profits in order to determine how "evolution" arises in such a model. We have seen above how he methodologically isolated the factor of savings and accumulation and tried to demonstrate that the influence of this factor alone would result in an "increase," but an increase which would not disturb the equilibrium. This time he wants to isolate another factor (though both are in reality connected and mutually influence one another), which is responsible for all the disturbances of the equilibrium and is at their root. This factor is "Innovation," by which Schumpeter means not only technological improvements, but all other organizational improvements (new methods in the production of the same goods, the introduction of new articles, the discovery of new markets or new sources of raw materials) (p. 84). "Innovation" is always merely the economic reaction of the system to a specific situation of the economy—non-profitability—and for that reason is, according to Schumpeter, the internal factor in the economic history of capitalist society (p. 86). To him production is nothing but a combination of various production factors. He builds his theory on the following assertion: "the physical marginal productivity of every factor must (in the absence of innovation) monotonically decrease." The monetary expression of this situation, if the prices of the production factors are constant, is increasing cost as compared to decreasing returns (p. 88), as a result of which the profitability of the enterprises falls or, in limit cases, vanishes entirely. Thus, falling profitability, which characterizes the depression, is discussed without the help of external

influences, it is true, but in a naturalistic-technical manner. In this central point of his theory—falling profitability—Schumpeter gives no proof, but dismisses the problem in the few words just quoted. At this point the innovation sets in. It is the capitalist's reaction to vanishing profitability. Its task is to restore profitability by a reorganization of productive factors. The innovation interrupts the falling curve of returns, replacing it by another which begins on a higher level, only to fall again later. Wherever the cost of a commodity or a particular productive factor has decreased, we have a sign that the innovation has taken place. But, Schumpeter assures us, the costs will never fall constantly; there is no law of falling costs,—such a law is but an optical illusion (p. 91). In reality costs fall only at intervals. For once the innovation has been introduced generally, it ceases to be an innovation (p. 89); its efficacy is exhausted, and cost begins to rise again. ("Law of Increasing Cost.") Thereby non-profitability breaks through anew (p. 90).

Thus Schumpeter believes he has arrived at one cause to explain, if not the periodicity, at least the process of alternating phases of prosperity and depression (p. 193), which he later differentiates into the four well known phases of the cycle. He directs his criticism particularly against the so-called "self-generating theories," according to which depression arises out of prosperity and prosperity out of depression. He denounces this theory as a theoretically inadmissible *perpetuum mobile* (p. 139). (This has been done before him, Cf. Grossman, *Das Akkumulationsgesetz*, p. 229). This endogene cyclical process develops only in the industrial sphere. As regards the Stock Exchange, the starting point of the depression, the falling of stock and bond prices is exogenous, provoked by the impulsion coming from the industrial sphere (p. 152).

Schumpeter seems convinced of the great originality of his innovation theory. The expert, however, will see at once that Schumpeter remembers on this point—and despite all other differences—more of Mill's and Marx's explanations of the cycle than he would care to admit, that capitalist production operates not for use, but for profit. When profitability disappears, the capitalist mechanism of production, and capitalist accumulation, come to a standstill and can be revived only by a rearrangement of technical and organizational bases. The theory is not made any more original when the name of "innovations" is assigned to what Mill and Marx called "counter-tendencies."¹ Nor is the theory made more original by projecting the innovations, which in Mill and Marx are objective reactions of the economic mechanism to a specific situation, into the realm of personality and by presenting them and glorifying them as the special merit of the capitalist, as his creative function. While Marx, on the basis of the law of value, deduces the periodic drop in profitability from the social process of accumulation, that is, from the increasing organic composition of capital, Schumpeter takes refuge in an untenable naturalistic-technical explanation, whose model he has found in the obsolete Ricardian doctrine of the decreasing yield of the soil and which he has merely transposed from agriculture to industry.

Schumpeter's theory of the falling profit is an *ad hoc* theory, unintegrated into any larger doctrine. Moreover this theory cannot be theoretically

¹Cf. the exposition of the "counter-tendencies" in Mill and Marx in my book "*Das Akkumulationsgesetz*." Leipzig 1929. pp. 112-117 and 287-530.

grounded on Schumpeter's own premises. It is therefore unnecessary to dwell on Schumpeter's effort to illustrate the theory by statistical and historical data.

In recent years, just as 120 years ago, the center of the discussions has not been the problem of the business cycle. Ricardo and, later, John Stuart Mill and Simonde de Sismondi disputed not only about the causes and the inevitability of depressions, but about a wider question, that of the economic structure changing in the course of its contradictory development, that is, they discussed the tendencies in the evolution of capitalist economy. The question that interested them was thus whether this economic system is durable or whether it approaches its end as a result of its inner structural changes. This decisive problem, which has become even more important after the great depression of 1929, is not discussed by the author; not even the question of increasing "structural" unemployment which may become the tragic fate of the existing economic order. On the contrary, Schumpeter tries to avoid a direct answer to such questions, in order to deal with them by the détour of his peculiar definition of "evolution." Economic "evolution" is conceived in "a quite narrow and particular sense, abstracting from all the concrete content of evolution" (*The Nature and Content*, *ibid.* p. 95). If this definition were to hold, of course there could be no definite direction of evolution in the sense indicated above. What would remain would be the abstract empty idea of a "something" moving without any direction, and "evolution" would here be identical with "change."

Nor does the new book go beyond that result. It is hence to be expected that Schumpeter would slur over such an important problem as that of over-accumulated capital which cannot be profitably invested, a problem particularly pressing in the U. S. A. The fact that many billions of dollars remain idle for many years in the banks of the U. S. A. would not result from the objective situation of American capitalism, from a definite change in structure during a late phase of development, or from a saturation of the economy with capital for which no new and sufficiently profitable investments are at hand. Schumpeter hardly examines this problem—according to him, this is no problem at all. Instead, he describes how the bad government policies of the New Deal victimized the capitalists, declaring that the Roosevelt government has shaken the confidence of the capitalists as a result of its gigantic spending policy, its oppressive taxation and, above all, its open threats against the industrial middle class (pp. 1044-1049), thus contributing to the paralysis of all creative enterprises without putting anything in their place. Here, instead of analyzing the objective structure of American capitalism, Schumpeter offers us accusations against the government. He does not make the simple reflection that similar phenomena of over-accumulation could also be observed in Europe (England, France, Switzerland, etc.) where the relations between government and industry were very different from those in the U. S. A.

This central problem, which the author does not see, disappears in a mass of secondary details; he always deals with particular equilibria, for example, those between a producer and a buyer in an otherwise competitive society; the "cases" are split into "subcases," and each case must be treated separately, until the author finally gets lost in purely private considerations of the profitability of particular firms. For instance, when he takes up a bilateral monopoly he inquires under what conditions a monopolistic workers' union can obtain a maximum of wages and he believes he has proved that "perfect

equilibrium may . . . be compatible with the existence of unemployed resources" (p. 59).

It is evident that the concept of equilibrium is being abused here. A "perfect equilibrium" involving unused production factors is an obvious contradiction, not to mention the significant omissions of the author, his failure to deal with the general equilibrium of the entire system, or even with a particular equilibrium of a particular market or industry branch, but only with the maximal profitability of two concerns!

Schumpeter's predilection for casuistry is demonstrated, for instance, in the treatment of the problem of monopolies. Capitalist reality reveals a general trend toward the concentration of enterprises and the formation of a few large monopolies dominating entire branches of industry. Thus the question spontaneously arises, how a society would function in which such monopolistic tendencies triumphed in all industrial branches so as to form a "universal monopoly." This problem has a great theoretical significance. But Schumpeter has his sympathies and antipathies: he does not like the New Deal, nor anything that means planning and organized economy. For that reason he dismisses this real and important problem with the bare assertion that such a universal monopoly "would be inactive" (p. 57). He prefers to illustrate capitalist monopoly by the example of Nansen and Johansen who, during their polar expedition, were left with only one remaining sled and could not agree about the direction of their voyage, but finally had to reach a compromise (p. 62).

We have seen that Schumpeter fights the theory of the shrinking of capital investment opportunities and sees the cause of the evil in the disastrous government policy. It is true that he is not certain whether capital investment would flourish again if after the 1940 elections men more friendly to business were to assume power; and he says: "The practical implications of our diagnosis do not differ much from those of the theory of vanishing investment opportunity in its usual acceptance" (p. 1050). A similar lack of logic is revealed in Schumpeter's criticism of the government's currency and credit policies, in particular of its "spending" program. According to him, these policies have not achieved their desired effect, they had nothing to do with restoring prosperity in the years 1935 to 1937, because this prosperity took place independently of government measures (p. 1031). But a few pages later we read, to our surprise, that "even government spending as a permanent policy could be rationally defended on our diagnosis" (p. 1050).

If it is true that science consists in subsuming the complex mass of phenomena under general laws which express the true nature of things, then Schumpeter has not made use of a real theoretical idea. In spite of his great erudition and many stimulating details he loses himself in a bewilderment of detail.

HENRYK GROSSMAN (New York).

Grabowsky, Adolf, *Der Sozialimperialismus als letzte Etappe des Imperialismus*. Forschungen zur Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft. Heft 1. Weltpolitisches Archiv. Basel 1939. (X and 126 pp.)

Hobson, J. A., *Imperialism*. Third edition. George Allen & Unwin. London 1938. (XXX and 386 pp.; 8s. 6d.)

Loveday, A. a.o., *The World Economic Future*. Sir Halley Steward Lectures 1938. George Allen & Unwin. London 1938. (134 pp.; 4s. 6d.)

Staley, Eugene, *World Economy in Transition*. Council on Foreign Relations. New York 1939. (XI and 341 pp.; \$3.00)

Salter, Sir Arthur, *Security, Can We Retrieve It?* Reynal & Hitchcock. New York 1939. (XVI and 391 pp.; \$3.50)

Knight, A. W., *What's Wrong With the Economic System?* Longmans, Green & Co. New York and London 1939. (X and 179 pp.; \$2.40, 8s. 6d.)

Ginzberg, Eli, *The Illusion of Economic Stability*. Harper & Brothers. New York 1939. (XI and 275 pp.; \$3.00)

The subject matter of the books reviewed here is the political and economic insecurity that is challenging both the established social structure and individual liberty. The authors agree on one point: that general insecurity is the manifest characteristic of society and economic life today, making this a period of transition. In their search for the roots and the outcome of this transitional period, the writers disagree as to how transition will take place: one group expects all from a necessary evolution, the other sets its hope on planned action.

The books of *Grabowsky* and *Hobson*, which belong to the first group, search more for an interpretation than for a way out of the present social entanglement. Both authors consider the present crisis a stadium of modern imperialism. *Grabowsky* differentiates three phases of imperialistic evolution: feudalistic, commercial and "social" imperialism. After the World War of 1914-18, imperialism entered its last phase which has been characterized by a maximum rationalizing of "living spaces." The process of rationalization expresses itself in planned economy and in the control of the productive forces through "total mobilization." The "social imperialism" (we regret that *Grabowsky* does not offer any definition of this term) is rooted in the specific social conditions of the post war era which have produced the fear that there remains no way out of the permanent business depression. Stricken with this fear, nations have handed all power over to the government, and the government, stricken with the same fear, has overstrained its power. The government's misuse of the productive forces by way of total mobilization will lead to the government's breakdown. What will follow the collapse of the totalitarian state is unpredictable. Socialism is not necessarily the heir to the totalitarian regime,—it would be such only if the fundament of imperialism were exclusively an economic one; in reality imperialism involves an "etatistic" and a "rationalistic" component too. Socialism, therefore, appears only as one of several possible outcomes of totalitarianism. Unfortunately, the empiric data by which *Grabowsky* attempts to prove his theorems lack sufficient theoretical foundation to be convincing.

One of *Grabowsky's* theses is that in recent years new and specific social tasks have devolved upon imperialism. We find a similar idea in the latest edition of *Hobson's* pioneering book on the subject. He, too, sees a new component to have arisen in the evolution of imperialism, the diversion of the domestic struggle for a democratic economy into the channel of a struggle

for foreign markets; but, differently from Grabowsky, he thinks it simply an added element that has not changed the fundamental character of imperialism during the last decades. Hence he believes himself justified in issuing this new edition of his book, first published in 1905, with only a few additions in principle. He also asserts that while the economic factor is not the only factor in imperialism, yet, in his opinion, it sufficiently explains the present imperialist conflicts. The preference given to English exports in the markets of the British empire and the presence of political control over former German colonies have evoked German and Italian aggression, while Japan's fight for political control over China is nothing but a consequence of Japan's expansive capitalism. Whereas the struggle had to be fought out in the West, Japan in the East can choose either to compromise or to compete with the old imperialist powers.

Whatever differences in detail exist between Hobson and Grabowsky, both have attempted to give a uniform and all-embracing explanation of the current social situation. By contrast, the *contributors to the Halley Steward lectures* and *Staley and Salter* lack any common or universal point of view in approaching sociological problems and are more concerned with solving the political and economic insecurity of the present day than with unearthing its roots. Five well-known statesmen and economists contributed to the Halley Steward lectures on "The World Economic Future," A. Loveday, director of the Economic Intelligence Service at the League of Nations, S. de Madariaga, former Spanish delegate to the League of Nations, Professor Condliffe of the University of London and Professors Heckscher and Ohlin of the University of Stockholm. According to their common conviction, the economic future will be determined by tendencies already in effect or becoming apparent. Heckscher points out that since the end of the 19th century the technical progress of production has led to increasing commercialization, manifesting itself on the one hand in a decrease of the rural population and of the number of industrial workers, and on the other in an increase in the number of commercial and technical employees. The decline of the general population coincident with the aforesaid development, and increasing incomes, have, in Loveday's opinion, caused a shift from the production of non-durable goods to that of durable ones. Due to this fact the whole economic structure has grown more susceptible to recurring crisis: the consequent periodic unemployment and social insecurity have induced governments to avoid dangerous eventualities by steady interventions into the private economy. Professor Ohlin thinks such control of the economic life is not perilous under all circumstances, provided the centralization of the economy remains flexible to a certain degree, in that the productive mechanism, instead of being surrendered to political red tape, remains under the rule of private initiative. Since these problems are common to countries all over the world, international cooperation appears inevitable. As to who will organize or lead it, nobody can say today; Professor Condliffe ventures the guess that it will not be Britain nor any other of the European powers, all of which are plagued with decreasing populations and stagnant productions, but the United States with its youthful population, its superior natural resources and higher degree of specialization. One premise of this kind of international collaboration, says Madariaga, would be to relinquish all dogmatism—liberalism, communism, fascism, religious and international tendencies—and to formulate a spiritual attitude embracing all the doctrines men-

tioned (except the communistic) and thus subduing them. With the exception of Madariaga, the authors have kept clear of theoretical constructions and generalizations.

Staley's book too, rich in observations and knowledge, sees the world economy at present as one ruled by the conflict between the expansive tendency of technology, favorable to human welfare, and the restrictive tendency of politics that hampers welfare. Technology has opened to the world new possibilities for the rapid change of goods and for the employment of men and science; nationalistic politics, minded as it has been to customs barriers, and to imperialistic domination, has prevented the full use of these possibilities and has subjugated technology to a war-economy destructive of all aims at higher standards of living. Nevertheless, the nationalistic countries have pointed the method in which technology has to be exploited—for whatever purpose—and this is planning. There appears to be only one way to cure the world economy that has been shaken by the conflict between technology and politics, and that is to replace the present system of world economy by another which would be dedicated to raising the standard of living. In order to achieve this goal all countries interwoven in the world economy would have to strive toward political understanding and toward a planful solution of their economic problems. An entire set of preliminary achievements would be necessary: a system of collective security that would bring about the peaceful frame for economic collaboration; a super-governmental authority, taking in the non-totalitarian as well as the totalitarian systems, that would plan the exchange of goods and capital; a planned currency policy that would aim at softening the business cycles; a commercial policy that would seek a better distribution of raw materials and would develop countries with minor industrializations; and a capital policy that would place investments in countries needing advancement. The United States would have to play an important role in preparing peaceful cooperation between the countries. *Staley* has based his diagnosis, as well as his program, on the abundant material collected by the League of Nation's services and has also taken account of the possible resistances against these plans. Still, a good deal of the utopian remains in his thought, stemming from the too immediate application of his abstract antithesis to very complicated sociological structures.

Salter has devoted a voluminous book to the idea of collective security as a condition for international economic relations. His thoughts, too, are conditioned by the atmosphere of Geneva: the League's failure in the past, of course, does not set aside the truth of his conceptions. In the future only mutual understanding among peaceloving nations will secure peace, whether the form will be an international union or not. This will be even more the case after a war between "democracies" and "dictatorships," which *Salter*, writing in the spring of 1939, considered imminent. A war of this kind would bring a solution only if the "democracies" would offer a program to remedy the needs of the dictatorships. *Salter* draws a blue print of the coming peace: no "war guilt-clause" should stand in the way of a really democratic basis for international relations. The recognition of Germany's "sphere of influence" in Central Europe and her access to internationally controlled colonies would remove her economic difficulties.

In approaching the economic troubles of our day, *A. W. Knight* has employed a method very different from that of the above reviewed books. While the others tried to penetrate the whole network of world economic and

political entanglements, he gets down to the fundamentals of the economic system. He sees its main flaw in the lack of an equilibrium between saving and investment, a view for which he is indebted to Keynes. This equilibrium is deeply anchored in the nature of our individualistic and uncontrolled economic system and may lead to ever sharper depressions involving dangerous consequences for political democracy. There seems to be only one remedy as far as the author is concerned: the democratic communities have to plan their economy. There should be a "planning commission" to control the stream of investments and incomes in such a way that a disequilibrium between saving and investment should never again arise. This commission should be a democratic institution installed not by a political but by a spiritual evolution, which implies voluntary renunciation of profit as the motive of the economic mechanism and its replacement by the ideal of "the maximum amount of material well-being." Knight's book is not merely a program for a planned economy, nor is it merely a pure theoretical investigation into the causes of economic disequilibrium; both aspects are treated in a way that combines the strictest method of theoretical analysis with statistical concreteness, thus furnishing the reader with a sort of "blue print" for an American planned economy.

It is one of Mr. Knight's merits to have shown that planned economy is not conceivable as long as the profit motive guides the productive forces. The other authors may have understood this tacitly; Mr. Knight expressly points out that this motive is the very condition limiting the possibilities of a practical realization of planned economy. And if any doubt should remain as to the truth of this theoretical conception, *Ginzberg* produces the historical proof that stability remains an illusion under present economic and social conditions. His evidence is the experience of American business within the last forty years. The American public from the end of the 19th century up to the New Deal was imbued with the illusion that its economic life had stability. This illusion did not arise by chance, nor did it always exercise such force as it did during the "New Era" of the twenties: it was born, matured and died like an organic being. *Ginzberg* has written the biography of this being in brilliant language. Tracing its roots in the economy and depicting its effect on it, he has rendered a work on American economic history. The outlines are these: the relatively quiet and steady expansion of American business from the depression that came toward the end of the last century until the outbreak of the World War produced an atmosphere of optimism which steadily gave nourishment to faith in the stability of economic foundations. The short crisis of 1920-21, instead of serving as a warning, was, mainly due to its brevity, considered a confirmation of this faith. An obviously weak spot in these stable foundations, unemployment, offered a welcome opportunity for progressive entrepreneurs to secure employment in the face of cyclical and seasonal fluctuations. During the prosperity of the twenties the illusion grew into a popular dogma and became the guiding star of governmental policy. Three sign-posts of prosperity lent a veil of reality to the illusion: wage rates were at a high level, prices failed to fluctuate, and the rate of profit remained almost unchanged, while the size of production expanded, income of labor grew and profits mounted. The rising purchasing power of the masses resulting from the concurrence of high wages and stable prices seemed to offer a sufficient reason and guarantee that the "New Era" would endure. Even the depression of 1929 to 1932 could not at the beginning destroy the

illusion which made for the high wage policy and the hesitancy to liquidate on the part of the entrepreneurs, most of whom hoped for an early return of prosperity. The longer the depression lasted the weaker grew the faith in economic stability, and it staged no full comeback in the upswing of 1932-37. Nevertheless, a good deal of this faith in the stabilizing effect of high wages and stable prices is still alive in the "New Deal" conception, but deficit financing has in practice taken over the function of stimulating and maintaining a high level of business activity. Ginzberg thinks the illusion has in effect died and is going to be replaced by a new ideology which will subjugate the economy to military aims. The illusion of economic stability has not only vanished historically, but has to disappear because of its theoretical untenability. Stability, in the sense of full and efficient use of human and material productive factors, is an impossible goal as long as it contradicts technical progress and the psychology accompanying it and makes it difficult for the banking system to control the credit policy. As long as these three factors and the mechanism of prices defy any rigid control the economic instability might be modified, but it will never be eliminated.

JOSEF SOUDEK (New York).

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